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ABSTRACT 
 
INFORMATIONAL UNIQUENESS, CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND 
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 
 
Yuen Kit Chau 
Brian Bushee 
Luzi Hail 
 
This dissertation examines how the lack of comparable public peers (“informational 
uniqueness”) is related to a firm’s disclosure policy and information environment. Having 
less information spillover from other public firms may present an information deficiency 
if it is not compensated by other components of the information environment. Using 
textual similarity in business description among firms to measure the extent of peer 
presence, I find that informational uniqueness is associated with a higher propensity by 
firms to provide ongoing bundled guidance. This is consistent with firms attempting to 
mitigate the information deficiency through strengthening their tacit commitment to 
continued disclosure by providing more information regularly on predictable schedules. 
Overall, I find a strong negative relationship between informational uniqueness and the 
quality of corporate information environment only among firms without regular bundled 
guidance. My results suggest that, while informational uniqueness can generate 
significant information deficiency, firms with strong tacit commitment to ongoing 
disclosure are largely able to compensate for the lack of information spillover from peers.  
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On the flip side, firms surrounded by many peers may be subject to the influence of peer 
dynamics on their disclosure behavior. While the presence of comparable public peers 
likely expands investors’ information endowment on the base firm through information 
spillover on related exposures, discretionary disclosures by peer firms may also signal 
information arrival. This can raise investors’ inferred probability that non-disclosure is 
due to strategic information withholding rather than the absence of new information. In 
relation to this, I show that the bid-ask spread of the base firm slightly increases when its 
closest peer initiates discretionary disclosures, but subsequently decreases upon 
disclosure by the base firm. In addition, I find that the number of comparable public peers 
is strongly positively associated with the frequency of discretionary disclosure. Overall, 
these results suggest that the presence of peer dynamics can induce firms with more peers 
to provide discretionary disclosures more frequently.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Informational Uniqueness, Corporate Disclosure, and 
Information Environment 
 
1. Introduction 
Information spillover from other publicly listed firms sharing similar business 
exposures is potentially an important component of a firm’s information environment. 
Prior research has documented the existence of within-industry information transfers 
from earnings announcements (e.g. Foster 1981) and management forecasts (e.g. 
Baginski 1987), as well as the widespread use of comparable company analysis by 
practitioners (e.g. Demirakos, et. al. 2004). However, the availability of comparable peers 
in the public universe can vary greatly by firm. Certain firms have few or no close public 
peers, resulting in the absence of one potentially important information channel for 
investors. Unless other information sources, such as firm-initiated disclosures, can 
compensate for this missing channel, these “informationally unique” firms will suffer the 
costs of an opaque information environment, e.g., wider spreads (Glosten and Milgrom 
1985), etc. In addition, informational uniqueness may also be related to “opportunistic” 
concerns due to investors having less knowledge on the information arrival process and 
less external information channels for cross-checking. These raise the question of 
whether and how firms’ disclosure choices respond to “informational uniqueness” and to 
what extent firms can mitigate this potential information deficiency.  
Due to the lack of information spillover from other public firms, investors may have 
lower prior precision on “informationally unique” firms in the absence of any firm-
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initiated disclosures. In addition, with investors having less knowledge over whether and 
when managers are endowed with new information as well as less peer information for 
benchmarking and verification purposes, unique firms potentially have more 
opportunities to withhold or manipulate information. While investors can generally learn 
about the probability of information arrival from other peer firms, investors of 
informationally unique firms may have difficulties assessing when managers receive no 
new information and thus the absence of disclosure can be interpreted more negatively 
(e.g. Jung and Kwon 1988). Opacity and the potential for “opportunism” combined can 
present an exacerbated information asymmetry problem for informationally unique firms. 
If these firms do not try to compensate for the lack of peer information, outsiders would 
have higher prior uncertainty on their values, potentially leading to higher spreads and 
discounts on value (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom 1985).  
Consistent with prior literature that disclosure commitment can help alleviate the 
discount (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia 1991), I expect that informational uniqueness 
should be associated with higher incentives by firms to strengthen their commitment to 
disclosure by adopting a more transparent disclosure policy. However, how managers can 
credibly commit themselves to continued disclosure remains to be explored. In particular, 
disclosure may be viewed as more discretionary and opportunistic in nature for 
informationally unique firms on which investors have little knowledge over when 
managers receive new information. Without any signals of ongoing disclosure 
commitment, investors cannot tell if these firms will continue to disclose when new 
information is received. Thus establishing an ex-ante tacit commitment to provide 
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ongoing disclosure may be an effective way for informationally unique firms to mitigate 
the deficiency in their information environment.  
In the paper, I hypothesize that bundling additional disclosures with earnings 
announcements may serve as a tacit commitment device that helps to strengthen a 
manager’s tacit commitment to ongoing disclosure. In particular, providing additional 
forward-looking information during earnings announcements may also help preempt the 
information that investors would otherwise learn from peer firms during the subsequent 
quarter. For example, bundling guidance with earnings announcements may help build up 
investors’ expectations that guidance will be provided regularly during subsequent 
earnings announcements. While firms may stop their unbundled guidance “quietly” 
without investors immediately noticing, the cessation of bundled guidance can be 
immediately revealed to investors due to its predictable schedule. Thus I expect that 
informational uniqueness is associated with a higher propensity by firms to provide 
additional information during their earnings announcements as a tacit commitment device 
to signal their ongoing releases.  
To capture “informational uniqueness” in the paper, I attempt to measure the extent of 
the availability of comparable public peers in the market. My primary measure uses 
textual analysis and compares firm similarities by computing cosine similarity scores of 
business descriptions in 10-K filings across all U.S. public firms using a vector space 
model. Informational uniqueness is then represented by the logarithm of the inverse of 
the number of peer firms identified through textual analysis. The measure is validated by 
showing that, as predicted, unique firms receive less information transfer during the 
earnings announcements of their closest peer firm and attract less analyst coverage (Litov 
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et al. 2012). For robustness checks, I compute an alternative measure using similarities in 
business segment weights based on industry classification. The results using both 
measures are largely consistent in various tests, with the primary textual measure 
providing more statistical power in almost all cases.  
In the first part of my analyses, I explore how a firm’s disclosure policy is related to 
its “informational uniqueness” property. I begin by examining how informational 
uniqueness is associated with market reactions to earnings announcements. I find strong 
evidence that firms with higher degree of informational uniqueness generally have higher 
abnormal return volatility and trading volume during earnings announcements, consistent 
with news in earnings announcements by informationally unique firms being less 
preempted by information spillover from peers as well as generally deemed credible. This 
suggests that “opportunism” does not seem to be a huge concern for the earnings 
announcements of unique firms on average. It also highlights the potentially more 
important role of firm-initiated disclosures during earnings announcements in 
constituting the information environment for firms with high degree of informational 
uniqueness. 
Next, I examine whether informationally unique firms are more likely to regularly 
provide additional disclosures during their earnings announcements in mitigating their 
information deficiency. As predicted, I find that informational uniqueness is associated 
with increased propensity by firms to adopt a regular bundled guidance policy both 
across the sample of all public firms and within the group of guiding firms, controlling 
for other aspects of the information environment. Conditional on guidance issuance, I 
find that informational uniqueness is positively associated with having guidance of longer 
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horizon and greater specificity. I also find that informationally unique firms appear to be 
more likely to substitute the use of unbundled guidance with bundled guidance. Overall, 
my results are consistent with firms on average attempting to mitigate their deficiency 
from informational uniqueness through bundling additional information releases with 
earnings announcements in strengthening their tacit commitment to a more transparent 
disclosure policy.  
In the second part of the analyses, I evaluate how disclosure choices interact with 
“informational uniqueness” in shaping a firm’s overall information environment. The 
extent to which firm-initiated disclosures can mitigate the deficiency in their information 
environment from the lack of public peers may depend on whether information spillover 
from peers is mostly a subset of the information from firm-initiated disclosures and 
whether these disclosures are generally deemed credible. In the analyses, I use the bid-
ask spread and Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (2002) to proxy for the quality of the 
overall information environment and examine how they relate to the interactions between 
informational uniqueness and disclosure policy.  
My results find that informationally unique firms receive incremental benefits from 
providing ongoing additional disclosures during earnings announcements relative to other 
firms. While bundled guidance is positively associated with the quality of a firm’s overall 
information environment, the relationship is not necessarily true for unbundled guidance. 
These corroborate with my earlier findings that informationally unique firms are more 
likely to regularly provide additional disclosures during their earnings announcements in 
mitigating their information deficiency. In further subsampling analyses, I document a 
significant negative relationship between informational uniqueness and the quality of the 
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overall information environment among firms without regular bundled guidance. 
However, I do not find a significant negative relationship among firms with a regular 
bundled guidance policy. These results suggest that, while “informational uniqueness” is 
a highly economically significant factor in constituting a firm’s information environment, 
firms that demonstrate strong tacit commitment to disclosure are largely able to mitigate 
this deficiency in their information environment. 
My study contributes to the literature by conceptualizing the idea of “informational 
uniqueness” from an informational prospective at the firm level to represent the extent of 
information spillover from other public firms. It introduces empirical measures to capture 
this concept and shows that the availability of peer information is an economically 
important component that constitutes a firm’s information environment, in addition to the 
three main forces (voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure and information 
intermediaries) discussed in Beyer et al. (2010). The study also specifically considers the 
interactions between “informational uniqueness” and corporate disclosure choice in 
shaping the corporate information environment.  
My study also explores how the informational deficiency from lacking public peers 
are being addressed by firms and investigates if regularly providing additional 
information during earnings announcements may serve as an effective tacit commitment 
to ongoing disclosures. I show that informationally unique firms indeed receive 
incremental benefits from providing ongoing additional information during earnings 
announcements in the form of bundled guidance. Firms with higher degree of 
informational uniqueness also appear to have a higher propensity to provide ongoing 
bundled guidance on average. Overall, my results suggest that firms that demonstrate 
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strong tacit commitment to ongoing disclosure appear to largely be able to mitigate the 
problems arising from informational uniqueness.  
In addition, the study contributes to the empirical disclosure literature by advancing 
the idea that bundling additional information releases with earnings announcements may 
help establish a stronger tacit commitment to disclosure, especially in the context of 
informationally unique firms. Using management guidance as an example of such 
additional disclosure, I show that bundled guidance is associated with an overall 
improvement in corporate information environment. However, this association does not 
seem to hold for unbundled guidance. Such benefit in signaling its ongoing releases may 
be one reason that bundled guidance has evolved to be the most prevalent type of 
guidance over time (Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the 
concept of “informational uniqueness” and relates it to existing literature. Section 3 
develops my hypotheses. Section 4 describes my variables measurement and empirical 
specifications. Section 5 presents my results. Section 6 concludes.   
2.  Concept of Informational Uniqueness 
In this study, “informational uniqueness” 1  is used to describe the extent of the 
availability of information spillover from other public firms, with more unique firms 
receiving less information spillover. Investors may obtain information on the underlying 
firm from other public firms with similar business exposures through a variety of 
channels, such as mandatory filings, voluntary disclosure, analyst coverage, or even 
                                                          
1
 In the paper, I use the terms “informational uniqueness” and “uniqueness” interchangeably to refer to the 
lack of information spillover from other public firms. It presents difficulties for outsiders to identify 
comparable public peers with similar business exposures for a firm. 
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private information acquisition impounded into security prices, etc. An extensive prior 
literature has documented the presence of within-industry information transfers from 
earnings announcements (e.g. Foster 1981) and management forecasts (e.g. Baginski 
1987). In addition, the use of comparable company analysis is also prevalent by 
practitioners such as sell-side analysts (e.g., Demirakos, et al. 2004).  
Information from other public firms is thus potentially an important component of a 
firm’s information environment 2 . In Beyer et al. (2010), the results from the 
decomposition of quarterly return variance seem to suggest that over 70% of the variance 
is unexplained by firm-initiated disclosures and analyst reports. It remains unclear how 
much of this large unexplained variance is attributable to noise in returns or other sources 
of information, e.g. information spillover from peers, etc. To help shed light on this issue, 
this paper examines the cross-sectional variations in the extent of information spillover 
among firms and seeks to understand its implications on corporate disclosure policy and 
information environment. 
In the study, I define “uniqueness” strictly from an informational perspective at the 
firm-level. Unique firms thus specifically refer to those firms that have little information 
spillover from other public firms. In other words, unique firms can be characterized as 
those that have no or few comparable peers sharing similar business exposures available 
in the set of public firms. As firms become increasingly dissimilar in terms of business 
exposure, there is likely decreasing signal and increasing noise to use the information of 
one firm to infer on the other firms. It is also important to note that information spillover 
                                                          
2
 In a related literature, Badertscher, et al. (2013) suggests that public firm presence generates positive 
externalities by reducing industry uncertainty and facilitates more efficient private firm investments. It 
provides some other evidence on the important role that information spillover can potentially play.   
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mainly involves peer firms that are public. Close peers that are private are unlikely 
adding much to the information environment of other firms.  
The term “uniqueness” is also often used in various business contexts as a desirable 
characteristic, such as in marketing and corporate strategy
3
. Uniqueness, however, may 
also bring informational problems. One such problem is identified by Litov et al. (2012) 
showing that uniqueness in corporate strategy choice discourages analyst coverage, 
possibly due to higher cost in information gathering and analysis. Litov et al. (2012) 
further proposes the term “uniqueness paradox” to describe the tradeoff between value 
creation and information problem (in discouraging analyst coverage) manager faces in 
selecting corporate strategy. However, it did not consider the role of corporate disclosure 
in potentially mitigating the information problem.  
While the conceptual notion of “uniqueness” from existing studies in other fields 
mostly relates to “uniqueness” from a competition perspective at the product level, my 
study focuses exclusively on the informational aspects of “uniqueness” at the firm level. 
There are likely two sources of “informational uniqueness”: (1) a firm is “unique” 
because it has no competitors conducting similar businesses; (2) a firm is “unique” only 
from an informational perspective because all other firms engaging in similar businesses 
are either private or part of a large conglomerate.   
The first source of “uniqueness” is defined with respect to all other firms. This may 
manifest in a variety of business dimensions, such as unique products/services, unique 
                                                          
3
 For example, uniqueness is often espoused as a desirable product characteristic in marketing, e.g. the 
concept of unique selling proposition at the product level. There is also some evidence in finance that 
having unique products are positively associated with stock market valuations (Hoberg and Philips 2014). 
From the management literature (e.g. Barney 1986), uniqueness in strategy choice at the firm-level is also 
regarded as an important path for value creation. In most of these notions, uniqueness is viewed positively 
from a competition perspective, mainly focusing on the product level. 
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operating models, unique business or corporate strategy, exclusive relationships with 
suppliers and customers. On one hand, uniqueness can be attributable to the presence of 
sustained competitive advantage so that no other firms can replicate easily, e.g. due to 
access to proprietary technology or scarce resources. On the other hand, some firms may 
become unique because they are engaging in a business that no other firms want to be in.  
The second source of “uniqueness” only concerns comparable peers from the 
universe of public firms as investors usually cannot obtain much information from peers 
that are private. Thus, “informational uniqueness” can be simply due to all other firms 
engaging in similar businesses being either private or part of a large conglomerate
4
. Even 
though the businesses of these “informationally unique” firms may have close 
competitors in the private space or from giant conglomerates, it is difficult for outsiders 
to learn much about their businesses using information from other public firms.  
While it is difficult to clearly distinguish between these two sources due to the 
absence of detailed information on private firms, some initial evidence suggests that most 
“informationally unique” firms are unique only with respect to public firms from an 
informational perspective, but not with respect to all firms. Manually reading through the 
competition section of 10-K filings from a few dozen samples of “informationally 
unique” firms, I find that almost every firm mentions the presence of competitors from 
either private companies or giant conglomerates. In addition, according to the data from 
Statistics of U.S. Businesses, every U.S. public firm has some private peers within the 
                                                          
4
 For example, Groupon was “informationally unique” as a firm as its peer firm LivingSocial was private 
and other competitors were either small local private companies or embedded in the businesses of giant 
public companies such as Google and Amazon. As another example, Acme United, a leading supplier of 
cutting, measuring and first aid products, was “informationally unique” because its major competitor for 
each product market were either private, foreign or part of a giant conglomerate such as Johnson & Johnson.  
Some other examples of “informationally unique” firms around year 2012 are listed in Appendix C.  
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same primary industry based on its 6-digit NAICS classification even though it may be 
the only firm that is public among firms in the same primary NAICS code.  
3. Hypotheses Development 
 Regardless of the sources of uniqueness, unique firms may face certain informational 
challenges. One potential challenge is opacity. Due to the lack of information spillover 
from other public peers, investors may have less information endowment from external 
sources on unique firms. For a firm with many close public peers, outsiders can 
potentially continuously glean some information on the firm from the disclosures or even 
private information impounded into stock prices from its public peers. In addition, 
investors will likely find it difficult to identify peer groups for unique firms for valuation 
and benchmarking exercises. Furthermore, uniqueness may increase the cost of 
information production by information intermediaries such as sell-side analysts and 
thereby discouraging analyst coverage (Litov et al. 2012).   
Another potential challenge for uniqueness is the concern for “opportunism”. As 
firm-initiated disclosure is likely the predominant information source to investors for 
unique firms, unique firms can be considered as a “monopoly” provider of information on 
their own businesses. Disclosures by unique firms are likely less immediately verifiable 
using peer information relative to firms with abundant information spillover from peers
5
. 
The abundance of peer disclosures may provide some constraints on opportunistic 
behaviors as drastic unexplained differences can often cause suspicions by investors. In 
addition, investors of unique firms likely possess little knowledge over whether and when 
                                                          
5
 For example, in the case of forward-looking information disclosures, investors of unique firms may only 
be able to verify the information when audited earnings reports are released or cash flows are realized in 
the future.  
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managers are endowed with new information, potentially giving managers more rooms to 
strategically time their disclosures or even temporarily withhold certain new information. 
Furthermore, managers of unique firms may receive more benefits from information 
manipulation if investors put a larger relative weight on firm-initiated disclosures in 
updating their beliefs when other information sources are not readily available.  
Despite these potential informational challenges, mandatory disclosure requirements 
(e.g. audited financial reports), associated litigation risks, and market forces can place 
some constraints on opportunistic behaviors by unique firms. While uniqueness may 
provide enhanced capability for firms to withhold or manipulate information 
opportunistically, it is unclear if most unique firms choose to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors given various disciplinary forces. In addition, firm-initiated disclosures and 
other sources of information may be a “superset” of information spillover from peer 
firms. Thus the relationship between uniqueness and the quality of overall information 
environment is likely dependent on how firms respond to uniqueness in their disclosures 
to compensate for the lack of information spillover from peers and to what extent 
information spillover is a “subset” of information from firm-initiated disclosures.  
3.1. Informational Uniqueness and Market Responses 
With fewer comparable public peers available, “informationally unique” firms likely 
receive less pre-announcement information flows due to the lack of information transfers 
from other public firms. The information contained in the disclosure announcements of 
more unique firms is thus less likely to be pre-empted by other sources of information. 
With less information spillover from peers, the earnings announcements by more unique 
firms should provide more surprises to investors. This should trigger more pronounced 
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market reactions in the market if information contained in earnings announcements are 
generally deemed credible for unique firms. 
Due to potentially higher prior uncertainty on firm value, investors of unique firms 
may put a heavier weight on firm-initiated disclosures in updating their beliefs on firm 
value. This has a direct effect in increasing investors’ reaction to announcement news for 
more unique firms
6
. On the other hand, concerns for “opportunism” may reduce the 
credibility of disclosures and therefore their market reactions, especially for the 
discretionary disclosure of informationally unique firms on which investors have little 
knowledge on the information endowment of managers and limited access to external 
information channels for verification.   
As the accounting system provides relatively consistent and verifiable performance 
measures across firms due to external auditing, financial information during earnings 
announcements can potentially serve as an important information source for investors of 
unique firms due to possibly fewer concerns for rampant manipulation relative to non-
financial information contained in other occasions of discretionary disclosure. Thus I 
expect that market reactions during earnings announcements should be stronger for more 
unique firms, similar to prior findings in Eberhart (2001) that the number of firms in an 
industry is related to lower stock return volatility around earnings announcements. This 
leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Informational uniqueness is associated with more pronounced market reactions 
during earnings announcements. 
                                                          
6
 However, an indirect effect of a heavier weight on disclosure is an increased benefit from information 
manipulation. According to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), the direct effect should dominate the indirect 
effect and thus higher prior uncertainty should be associated with more pronounced market responses. 
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3.2. Informational Uniqueness and Disclosure Policy 
Opacity from the lack of peer information spillover and the concern for 
“opportunism” can present an exacerbated information problem for unique firms, 
especially if unique firms of worse type can easily mimic unique firms of better type. If 
firms do not try to compensate for the lack of peer information and signal their values, 
outsiders would have lower information precision on firm value or may infer a worse 
type, potentially leading to higher spreads and value discounts (e.g. Akerlof 1970, 
Glosten and Milgrom 1985, Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Lambert et al. 2012). While 
investors can generally learn about the probability of information arrival from other peer 
firms, investors of informationally unique firms may have difficulties assessing when 
managers receive no new information and thus the absence of disclosure can be 
interpreted more negatively (e.g. Dye 1985, Jung and Kwon 1988). In addition, 
difficulties in hedging positions for unique firms may discourage trading by certain types 
of investors (e.g. long/short equity hedge funds) and further reduce its liquidity.  
Consistent with prior literature that disclosure commitment can help alleviate the 
discount (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, Baiman and Verrecchia 1996, Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000), I expect that unique firms should generally have higher incentives to 
mitigate the information deficiency through strengthening their commitment to 
continuous disclosure. If informationally unique firms can demonstrate a strong 
commitment to ongoing disclosure, the absence of disclosure at any given time is then 
more likely to be interpreted as receiving no new signals instead of possessing adverse 
information. On the flip side, firms with many close public peers can potentially free-ride 
on information spillover and thus have reduced incentives to implement potentially costly 
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commitment mechanisms to disclose continuously. Heinle and Verrecchia (2015) also 
generate similar theoretical predictions that firms with higher prior uncertainty on cash 
flows and lower cash flow correlation with peers are more likely to commit to disclose. 
Thus establishing an ex-ante tacit commitment to provide ongoing disclosure can 
possibly be an effective way for unique firms to mitigate their information deficiency. 
However, how managers can credibly commit themselves to continued disclosure 
remains to be explored. In particular, disclosure may be viewed as more discretionary and 
opportunistic in nature for informationally unique firms on which investors have little 
knowledge on when managers receive new information. Without any signals of ongoing 
disclosure commitment, investors cannot tell if these firms will continue to disclose when 
new information is received. To mitigate the deficiency in their information environment, 
informationally unique firms may need to credibly signal their commitment to provide 
ongoing disclosures through an auxiliary commitment device.  
I hypothesize that bundling additional disclosures with earnings announcements may 
serve the role of this auxiliary commitment device by helping to strengthen a manager’s 
tacit commitment to ongoing disclosure. For example, bundling guidance with earnings 
announcements may help to build up an expectation among investors that guidance will 
be issued regularly during subsequent quarterly earnings announcements no matter 
whether the signal is good or bad
7
. This is supported by prior research showing that 
                                                          
7
 Having a track record of guidance during prior earnings announcements likely suggest that managers 
usually possess enough information to provide guidance by the time of the earnings announcements, 
following the assumption that firm’s possession of information is history dependent (Einhorn and Ziv 
2008). Stopping bundled guidance is likely interpreted more negatively and deemed more costly relative to 
stopping unbundled guidance.  
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bundled guidance is highly sticky over time (e.g. Billings, et al. 2015)
8
. In addition, 
guidance cessation can be immediately revealed to investors when guidance is bundled 
with earnings announcements
9
. On the other hand, information releases outside a 
predictable window, e.g. unbundled guidance, can be viewed as more discretionary and 
opportunistic in nature (with regards to both the disclosure decision and the timing of 
disclosure) upon managers receiving a signal, the existence of which investors may not 
even be aware of for informationally unique firms. In the case of unbundled guidance, 
unless firms voluntarily announce the cessation of guidance, it is difficult for investors to 
tell whether and when exactly firms “quietly” stop providing unbundled guidance. 
Providing additional disclosures during earnings announcements (e.g. having a 
regular bundled guidance policy) is thus tantamount to an increase in tacit commitment to 
continued disclosure, which may help reduce outsiders’ assessed variance on firm value. 
In addition, providing additional forward-looking information during earnings 
announcements may also help to preempt the information that investors would otherwise 
learn from peer firms during the subsequent quarter. However, these informational 
benefits likely do not come without any costs. As conference calls held concurrent with 
earnings announcement have become increasingly common in recent years (e.g. 
Matsumoto and Roelofsen 2011), these additional information provided during earnings 
announcements may invite more scrutiny during conference calls. In the case of bundled 
                                                          
8
 In Billing, et al. (2015), they find that firms which bundled their guidance with earnings announcements 
in the prior quarter and in the same quarter of the previous year provide bundled guidance in the current 
quarter 87.2% of the time in their sample.  
9
 Chen et al. (2011) finds that the three-day return window around guidance stoppage announcements is 
negative, suggesting that there is immediate cost associated with guidance cessation if investors can 
identify them. The cost of discontinuing bundled guidance can help to make the tacit commitment more 
credible.  
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guidance, managers may also lose the flexibility to wait for more certain signals before 
issuing their guidance in the future and risk damaging their reputation by providing 
inaccurate or imprecise guidance (e.g. Lee, et al. 2012).   
  Facing the deficiency in their information environments, unique firms should have 
more incentives to bear the costs and strengthen their tacit commitment to a more 
transparent disclosure policy by bundling additional disclosures with earnings 
announcements. This leads to second hypotheses below:  
H2: Informational uniqueness is associated with a higher propensity by firms to 
strengthen their tacit commitment to continued disclosure by providing additional 
disclosures during earnings announcements.  
3.3. Informational Uniqueness and Overall Information Environment 
The relationship between informational uniqueness and the overall information 
environment is likely linked to how significant the information deficiency is from the 
lack of information spillover from peers and how firms respond to this deficiency through 
their disclosure policy based on their cost-benefit tradeoff. In particular, it may depend on 
how much investors can learn from public peer firms is a “subset” of the information 
from firm-initiated disclosures or other information sources. If information spillover from 
peers is indeed an important component that constitutes a firm’s information 
environment, I expect that uniqueness should be associated with a weaker overall 
information environment when the other components of the information environment 
(e.g. firm-initiated disclosures) cannot compensate for the loss of information spillover 
from peers. In particular, informational uniqueness may generate significant 
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informational barriers to investors for firms that have not demonstrated a strong tacit 
commitment to ongoing disclosure. This leads to my third hypothesis:  
H3: Informational uniqueness is associated with a weaker overall information 
environment among firms without strong tacit commitment to continued disclosure.  
As investors likely have little knowledge over whether and when managers are 
endowed with new information for informationally unique firms, having a regular 
disclosure policy that provides additional information during earnings announcements 
can help strengthen the ex-ante tacit commitment to ongoing disclosure for these firms 
and preempt the need for information transfer from peers. For informationally unique 
firms, unbundled disclosure may not be as effective as bundled disclosure in signaling a 
tacit commitment to ongoing disclosure since it can be viewed as more discretionary and 
opportunistic in nature. From our prior literature, higher ex-ante commitment to 
disclosure is shown to be positively associated with lower discount or cost of capital (e.g. 
Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, Hail 2011). Thus, I expect that bundled guidance should 
provide incremental benefits on the corporate information environment for more unique 
firms in addressing their information deficiency. These notions lead to my fourth 
hypothesis: 
H4: Strengthening tacit commitment to continued disclosure provides incremental 
benefits to the corporate information environment of informationally unique firms by 
mitigating their information deficiency. 
To what extent strengthening a firm’s tacit commitment to providing ongoing 
additional disclosures may help to mitigate the information deficiency due to uniqueness 
is ultimately an empirical question. For firms with high level of tacit commitment to 
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disclosure, it is possible that information spillover from peers is just a “subset” of the 
other sources of the information, such as firm-initiated disclosures. Thus, “informational 
uniqueness” may not be necessarily associated with a weaker overall information 
environment when other components of the information environment are sufficiently 
strong and fully compensate for the information deficiency. In the case of guidance, prior 
literature provides some weak evidence that the presence of management guidance helps 
preempt information transfer from earnings announcements of firms in the same industry 
(Pownall and Waymire 1989). However, whether firms adopting a regular bundled 
disclosure policy can completely eliminate the information deficiency from uniqueness 
remains to be empirically tested. If information spillover from peers is largely subsumed 
by information from bundled disclosure, I would expect that informational uniqueness is 
not significantly associated with a weaker overall informational environment among 
firms with strong tacit commitment to continued disclosure. 
4.  Variable Measurement and Empirical Specifications 
4.1. Measuring Informational Uniqueness 
4.1.1 Measure Based on Business Segment Data 
To measure “informational uniqueness” at the firm-level, I start off with using the 
business segment data
10
. Based on business segment information, this measure is 
intended to capture whether there are other public firms that operate in similar business 
segments as the underlying firm. It assumes that business exposures are similar within 
                                                          
10
 In my measure, I compare the business segment distribution of each firm to all other public firms using 
COMPUSTAT segment data and attempt to measure the extent of the presence of comparable peers. Litov 
et al. (2012) also uses similar business segment data source to compute their measure of corporate strategy 
uniqueness by computing uniqueness as deviation in business segment weights from the centroid firm in 
the industry based on primary industry classification.  
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each business segment as defined by 6-digit NAICS codes. Thus, a single-segment firm is 
highly unique if it is the only publicly listed single-segment firm in its industry with no 
other multi-segment firms having a high segment weighting on that particular industry. 
Similarly, a multi-segment firm is unique if there are no or few other public firms having 
similar business segment weight distribution. Operationally, the measure is implemented 
by computing similarity scores across all public firms using a vector space model where 
each business segment is regarded as a dimension in the model
11
. The natural logarithm 
of the inverse of the number of peer firms with high similarity score above a defined 
threshold is used to represent “informational uniqueness”. In the paper, this measure 
(segunique) is mostly used as a secondary measure for robustness checks.  
4.1.2 Measure Based on Textual Business Description 
Instead of assuming homogeneity within 6-digit NAICS industry classification across 
firms, I attempt to expand the scope of information set in comparing similarities across 
firms by utilizing the textual business description section in mandatory 10-K filings. This 
measure assumes truthful disclosure in the business description section of 10-K filings as 
governed by regulation S-K. Compared to the measure based on business segment data, it 
has the advantage of being able to distinguish among firms within an industry 
classification using a richer information set based on textual information. Operationally, 
this textual measure uses the terms in company business description (instead of business 
segment) as the dimensions in the vector space model to compute cosine similarity scores 
                                                          
11
 The vector space model here represents each firm as a vector in an n-dimensional Euclidean space, where 
n is the number of unique 6-digit NAICS business segment and the value of each vector element is the 
proportion of sales contribution by each segment of the firm. The similarity of any two firms can be viewed 
as the angle between the two vectors representing the two firms, with a smaller angle representing more 
similar firms. More details on measure construction are included in Appendix B. 
21 
 
across all public firms
12
. The natural logarithm of the inverse of the number of peer firms 
identified through having high similarity scores is used as my primary measure 
(txtunique) to represent “informational uniqueness”13. I also define an indicator variable 
(txtunique indicator) to represent the top 25% unique firms, i.e. firms that have similarity 
score with their closest peer in the bottom quartile.  
4.1.3 Measure Validation 
4.1.3.1 Internal Consistency 
While using business segment and textual business description to measure similarities 
across firms may both suffer from certain measurement errors, measures of uniqueness 
computed using the two methods should show significant positive correlation. As 
predicted, correlation analysis confirms that the uniqueness measures calculated using 
both methodology have a statistically significant positive correlation coefficient of 0.29.  
4.1.3.2 Information Transfer 
The extent of the information transfer during earnings announcements is likely related 
to how similar the firms are to one another. Thus, I expect that more unique firms should 
have less information transfer from the earnings releases of their closest peer. As 
                                                          
12
 The vector space model here represents the 10-K business description of each firm as a vector in an n-
dimensional Euclidean space, where n is the number of unique phrases in the textual business description 
and the value of each vector element is represented by the commonly used tf-idf (term frequency-inverse 
document frequency) weighting scheme in the information retrieval literature (e.g. Salton and Buckley 
1988). Using tf-idf scheme weighs down the effects of too frequently occurring terms and weighs up the 
effects of less frequently occurring terms. The similarity of any two firms can be viewed as the angle 
between the two vectors representing the two firms, with a smaller angle representing more similar firms. 
Similar textual analysis methodology using a vector space model is also used in Brown and Tucker (2010) 
to compare within-firm MD&A modifications and Hoberg and Philip (2015) to reclassify industries based 
on product similarities. Further details and differences are discussed in Appendix B. The performance of 
my textual method in identifying peer firms is further tested in Chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
13
 The similarity threshold is arbitrarily chosen to define 25% firms as having no peers in each year to aid 
interpretation. The results are robust to using other similarity thresholds around the chosen cutoff, as 
varying the similarity threshold mostly just changes the scale of the measure.  
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expected, I show that unique firms identified using textual analysis receive significantly 
less information transfer from the earnings announcements of their closest peer firm in 
Panel A of Table 2.   
4.1.3.3 Analyst Coverage 
Litov et al. (2012) shows that “corporate strategy uniqueness”, defined using a firm’s 
choice of business segment, is associated with lower analyst coverage. Similar to 
corporate strategy uniqueness in Litov et al. (2012), I expect that my measure of 
“informational uniqueness” should also be significantly negatively related to analyst 
coverage. Consistent with this conjecture, I show that my uniqueness measures are indeed 
significantly negatively associated with analyst coverage in Panel B of Table 2.   
4.2 Sample Selection 
In my full sample, I include all U.S. public firms from 1996 to 2013 where major 
financial reporting items, stock returns, business segment and valid textual business 
description data are available from CRSP, COMPUSTAT and SEC Edgar filings. The 
earliest year goes back to 1996 when electronic Edgar data started to become available. 
The sample used in most test specifications that require management guidance data, 
however, only dates back to 2003 when more consistent IBES guidance data started to 
become available. I exclude firms in the regulated industries such as utilities and banking 
as there are often different disclosure requirements for these firms. After imposing further 
data requirements on major control variables, the post-2002 sample used in most 
specifications comprises of 29,839 observations. 
4.3 Research Design 
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In this study, the identification of the relationship among uniqueness, disclosure and 
information environment mainly relies on the cross-sectional variations across firms. 
Informational uniqueness is an inherent and relatively sticky firm-level property in 
relationship to all other firms. It depends not only on the decision of the firm itself but 
also on other firms. As a firm’s entry into its major businesses is likely determined long 
before the firm becomes public, such business decisions are likely a first-order 
consideration for most firms before they start considering disclosure policy and 
information environment. Thus, there should be little concern over reverse causality bias 
in this setting. As shown in my data, “informational uniqueness” is quite stable over time 
and the autocorrelation in the textual uniqueness measure is close to 0.75. 
Major identification threats include measurement errors with respect to the 
uniqueness measures and correlated omitted variable bias. To mitigate concerns for 
measurement errors, I use both uniqueness measures constructed using textual business 
description and business segment data in my tests for robustness checks. I also include 
various controls for firm characteristics, such as analyst coverage, institutional 
ownership, firm size, stock returns, stock beta, market-to-book ratio, stock return 
volatility, years of listing, profitability, leverage, etc., to mitigate concerns for correlated 
omitted variables. In additional analyses, I use the proportion of private peers as an 
instrument variable to informational uniqueness to capture the more exogenous sources 
of variation and include more control variables for robustness checks.  
4.3.1 Market Responses during Earnings Announcements 
To examine how market reactions during annual earnings announcements are related 
to informational uniqueness, I regress measures of market responses on measures of 
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uniqueness, measures of guidance policy (e.g. frequency of bundled guidance, frequency 
of unbundled guidance, frequency of earnings preannouncements), and various controls 
on other firm characteristics. I consider two dimensions of market responses: abnormal 
return volatility and abnormal trading volume. Measures of abnormal volatility and 
trading volume during annual earnings announcements are calculated relative to non-
event windows following Landsman et al. (2012). The sample includes observations after 
2002 due to requirement on IBES guidance data. To be consistent with H1, the sign for 
the coefficient on uniqueness should be positive in (1). 
Market Responses=α+β1Uniqueness+β2 Guidance β3 Controls+β4 Year FE+ε --- (1) 
4.3.2 Tacit Commitment to Disclosure  
As a typical example of additional disclosures provided by firms during earnings 
announcements, the presence of a regular bundled guidance policy is used to represent 
the strengthening of a firm’s tacit commitment to ongoing disclosure in testing H2.  Prior 
literature suggests that management guidance contributes significantly to the information 
reflected in stock prices (e.g. Ball and Shivakumar 2008) and may help reduce 
information asymmetry (e.g. Coller and Yohn 1997). Other prior empirical studies also 
suggest that firms generally have an incentive to mitigate the deficiency in their 
information environment through voluntary disclosures in the form of management 
guidance (e.g. Gong et al. 2013, Balakrishnan et al. 2014). Thus establishing an ongoing 
bundled guidance policy to investors can be regarded as an important form of 
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strengthening a firm’s tacit commitment to continued disclosure through building a 
reputation for being “forthcoming” as opposed to being “strategic”14.   
To examine how a firm’s guidance policy varies with informational uniqueness, I 
regress the guidance policy of firms on measures of uniqueness and other controls for 
firm characteristics. To represent tacit commitment to a more transparent disclosure 
policy, I use the annual frequency of bundled guidance or an indicator for regular 
bundled guiders (with three or more bundled guidance annually)
15
. I also examine 
guidance properties such as horizon and specificity as part of the tacit commitment. 
These dimensions of guidance tend to be relatively stable and investors can easily form 
an expectation about its ongoing releases. I measure guidance horizon and guidance 
specificity by taking the annual averages of the forecast horizons of EPS guidance and 
the number of forecasted items per guidance respectively. The sample is post-2002 due to 
requirement on IBES guidance data
15
. 
To be consistent with H2, I expect that unique firms are more likely to provide 
bundled guidance and guidance of longer horizon and specificity. Thus, the sign for the 
coefficient on uniqueness should be positive in (2) when frequency of bundled guidance, 
indicator for regular bundled guiders, guidance horizon and guidance specificity are used 
as dependent variables. I also expect that the coefficient on uniqueness in (2) should be 
more positive for high-growth firms that care about their valuation levels in capital 
                                                          
14
 Terminology follows Beyer and Dye (2012) in which “forthcoming” managers disclose all forecasts they 
receive while “strategic” managers disclose forecasts they receive only when it is in their self-interest to do 
so. 
15
 Guidance is categorized as bundled if it is issued in less than two days after earnings announcements. As 
Chuk et. al (2013) point out that a previously commonly used guidance database CIG was not able to 
identify all guidance, I further restrict my sample observations to those that are covered by analysts as 
defined by IBES to minimize errors in incorrectly identifying guiding firms as non-guiding firms. 
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markets as low-growth firms may receive fewer benefits from more precisely revealing 
their type.   
Disclosure Policy=α+β1Uniqueness+β2Controls+β3Year FE +ε --- (2) 
4.3.3 Overall Information Environment 
To investigate how informational uniqueness and disclosure policy interact in 
constituting the overall information environment, I regress proxies for the quality of the 
overall information environment on measures of uniqueness, disclosure policy, the 
interaction terms between uniqueness and disclosure policy, as well as other controls for 
firm characteristics. I use both the ratio of bid-ask spread over price and Amihud’s 
measure of illiquidity (2002) to represent the quality of the overall information 
environment. To represent disclosure policy, I use the frequency of bundled guidance and 
unbundled guidance or an indicator variable for regular bundled guiders. To be consistent 
with H3, the coefficient on uniqueness should be positive. To be consistent with H4, the 
coefficient on the indicator for regular bundled guider or frequency of bundled guidance 
as well as the coefficients on the interaction terms between uniqueness and the indicator 
for regular bundled guider or frequency of bundled guidance should also be negative 
when either bid-ask spread or illiquidity is used as the dependent variable in (3).  
Information Environment=α+β1Uniqueness+β2Disclosure+β3Uniqueness*Disclosure 
+β4Controls+β5Year FE +ε --- (3) 
In further tests, I use subsampling analyses by the presence of regular bundled 
guidance and re-run (3) without the interaction terms to examine whether under certain 
conditions the adverse effects of uniqueness on a firm’s overall information environment 
can be completely eliminated. Jointly estimating the model using both subsamples and 
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testing for the difference in coefficients is equivalent to examining (3) but fully 
interacting all independent variables with the presence of regular bundled guidance. To 
facilitate interpretation, I use the indicator variable to represent the top quartile firms in 
terms of uniqueness in the test. To be consistent with H3 and H4, the coefficient on 
uniqueness indicator should be significantly positive in a subsample of firms without 
regular bundled guidance but insignificant in a subsample of firms with regular bundled 
guidance. 
5. Results 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides the basic summary statistics for the main variables in the paper in 
Panel A. For variables related to guidance, the sample starts from 2003. The table shows 
that roughly 43% of firms in the sample provide regular bundled guidance after imposing 
data requirements on controls. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics broken down 
into whether the firm is regarded as the top quartile unique firms or not. It shows that 
unique firms have a worse overall information environment on average, measured by the 
bid-ask spread and Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (2002). In addition, unique firms tend 
to have less analyst coverage and institutional ownership. To be conservative, I control 
for both analyst coverage and institutional ownership in all my tests to focus on the direct 
effect from the lack of information spillover. The table also shows that unique firms tend 
to be smaller, less levered and have slightly lower beta and higher market-to-book ratio. 
These variables are all included as controls in subsequent tests. Panel C provides the 
pairwise correlation among some of the main variables in the tests. All the signs of 
correlation are consistent with my hypotheses in univariate setting.   
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5.2 Market Reactions during Earnings Announcements 
Table 3 displays the results on the relationship between informational uniqueness and 
market reactions during annual earnings announcements of firms. I find that 
informational uniqueness is highly positively associated with abnormal return volatility 
and abnormal trading volume during annual earnings announcements. Controlling for 
guidance behaviors and other firm characteristics, abnormal return volatility changes 
from 0.50
16
 for firms in the lowest quartile of uniqueness to 0.9416 for firms in the highest 
quartile of uniqueness. Similarly, abnormal trading volume changes from 0.3416 for firms 
in the lowest quartile of uniqueness to 0.5416 for firms in the highest quartile of 
uniqueness. These highly economically significant results are consistent with investors 
having lower prior precision on unique firms and therefore more surprises during 
earnings announcements due to the lack of information spillover from peer firms. My 
results strongly support H1 and confirm prior similar finding by Eberhart (2001). The 
larger magnitude of market reactions for unique firms also suggests that the earnings of 
unique firms are generally deemed credible by investors
17
. Thus, “opportunism” does not 
seem to be a huge concern for the earnings announcements of unique firms
18
.  
5.3 Disclosure Policy 
                                                          
16
 The numbers are calculated using the sample median for other firm characteristics.  
17
 In untabulated tests, I find that the same results hold for quarterly earnings announcements. In addition, I 
find that the earnings response coefficients using analyst consensus as expectation also increase with 
uniqueness on average. 
18
 As financial information needs to be subsequently verified by external auditors, opportunism is likely not 
a big concern for information contained in financial reporting. It is not clear if opportunism is not a concern 
for other types of more qualitative discretionary disclosures of unique firms. In untabulated test, I do not 
find a more pronounced market reaction for unique firms for other types of more qualitative discretionary 
disclosures (Cooper et al. 2015) that are subsequently filed through 8-Ks. This may either suggest that the 
content for these disclosures are equally surprising for both unique and non-unique firms or that the 
investors may find these types of disclosures less credible for unique firms. 
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In Table 4, I examine how the disclosure policy of firms varies with uniqueness. In 
Panel A, I focus on the decision to provide additional disclosure during earnings 
announcements as tacit commitment to disclosure. I find that informational uniqueness is 
significantly positively associated with a firm’s propensity to provide bundled guidance. 
Controlling for other firm characteristics, the propensity to provide regular bundled 
guidance changes from 37%
16
 for firms in the lowest quartile of uniqueness to 50%
16
 for 
firms in the highest quartile of uniqueness. This is consistent with firms generally 
attempting to mitigate the information deficiency from lacking information spillovers 
through regular bundled guidance
19
. In columns (3) and (4), I find that the positive 
association between uniqueness and bundled guidance are driven mostly by firms with 
high growth potential
20
. This is consistent with high-growth firms having more capital 
market incentives to address the information problem by credibly communicating their 
values to avoid pooling with firms of worse types.  
In Panel B of Table 4, I examine the relationship between uniqueness and properties 
of guidance among guiding firms. Conditional on firms providing management guidance, 
the results show that uniqueness is positively associated with the frequency of bundled 
guidance, but negatively associated with the frequency of unbundled guidance. This is 
consistent with unique firms being more likely to substitute unbundled guidance with 
bundled guidance to strengthen their tacit commitment to continued guidance, as 
investors likely have more uncertainty over the information endowment of the managers 
                                                          
19
 My results in the paper are robust to alternative specifications such as using Poisson regression for 
frequency variables and using probit model for indicator variables in the dependent variables.  
20
 In further cross-sectional tests, I find that the results are also stronger in subsamples of firms that are 
more profitable, have higher analyst coverage/institutional ownership, and have multiple business segments. 
Statistical significance of the results is present within nearly all subsamples except for the subsample of 
neglected firms (defined by no analyst coverage). 
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of unique firms and unbundled guidance can be regarded as more discretionary and 
opportunistic in nature. In columns (3) and (4), I further find that uniqueness is positively 
associated with guidance of longer horizon and higher specificity. Overall, my results are 
consistent with firms attempting to mitigate the information deficiency by strengthening 
their tacit commitment to continued disclosure through providing additional disclosure 
such as guidance during earnings announcements, providing strong support for H2
21
.  
5.4 Overall Information Environment 
In Table 5, I assess how informational uniqueness interacts with disclosure policy in 
constituting the overall information environment. The results from Table 4 suggest that 
different firms may have different incentives and cost-benefit tradeoffs in addressing the 
informational deficiency from uniqueness. Heterogeneity in disclosure choices provides 
the cross-sectional variations to isolate the direct influence of informational uniqueness 
on the information environment. In Panel A, I show that my measure of informational 
uniqueness is indeed significantly negatively associated with the quality of the overall 
information environment, providing strong support to H3. With the inclusion of controls 
for the presence of other informational channels such as guidance policy, analyst 
coverage, institutional ownership and other firm characteristics, the bid-ask spread 
changes from 0.69%
16
 for firms in the lowest quartile of uniqueness to 0.92%
16
 for firms 
in the highest quartile of uniqueness while the Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (2002) 
                                                          
21
 In addition, Ball et al. (2012) proposes the confirmation hypothesis that audited financial reporting and 
voluntary disclosure of managerial private information are complement in communications with investors 
due to enhanced credibility from ex-post verifiability. Consistent with the confirmation hypothesis, I find 
that more unique firms also seem to provide reported earnings of high quality on average, measured by 
accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002). This also helps to refute an alternative explanation that more 
unique firms provide more bundled guidance because guidance is generally easier to beat through 
opportunistic manipulation.   
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changes from 1.53
16
 for firms in the lowest quartile of uniqueness to 3.65
16
 for firms in 
the highest quartile of uniqueness (see Figure 1A and 1B). 
The results in columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 Panel A also confirm that bundled 
guidance, which resembles a stronger tacit commitment to disclosure, is positively 
associated with the quality of the overall information environment
22
. However, the results 
suggest that unbundled guidance can be negatively associated with the quality of the 
overall information environment. This might be because unbundled guidance is more 
discretionary in nature and may often be triggered by some adverse exogenous events 
(e.g. Rogers, et al. 2009). These results corroborate with earlier findings in Table 4 and 
help explain why unique firms are more likely to bundle additional disclosure with 
earnings announcements as tacit commitment mechanism instead of other types of more 
discretionary disclosure mechanisms, e.g. unbundled guidance, to address their 
information deficiency. 
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 Panel A, I examine whether strengthening a firm’s 
tacit commitment to disclosure provides incremental benefits in mitigating the deficiency 
associated with informational uniqueness by including an interaction term between 
uniqueness and the presence of regular bundled guidance. Controlling for bundled 
guidance and other firm characteristics, I find that the interaction term is significantly 
negatively associated with the quality of the overall information environment. This 
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 In addition, I find that informationally unique firms incur statistically negative returns upon the cessation 
of bundled guidance, suggesting that it is costly to breach the tacit commitment. In untabulated test, I find 
that the cumulative returns around the three-day window of earnings announcements during which firms 
stop providing bundled guidance to be significantly negative for informationally unique firms, amounting 
to about -2% on average. Such incremental costs may also help to strengthen their tacit commitment to 
continued disclosure through bundling guidance with earnings announcements. 
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supports H4, suggesting that unique firms receive incremental benefits from stronger tacit 
commitment to ongoing disclosure with respect to their information environment. 
Coefficients on the interaction terms in columns (2) and (4) have almost the same 
magnitude as the coefficients on informational uniqueness, providing preliminary 
evidence that firms with a regular bundled guidance policy may be able to largely 
eliminate the information deficiency resulting from uniqueness. 
To provide further evidence on whether firms with stronger tacit commitment to 
ongoing disclosure can largely eliminate the information deficiency from the lack of 
information spillover from peers, I use subsampling analyses by splitting the sample into 
firms with regular bundled guidance and those without regular bundled guidance in Panel 
B of Table 5. I find that informational uniqueness is negatively associated with the 
quality of the overall information environment only among firms without bundled 
guidance in columns (1) and (3). However, informational uniqueness does not show a 
significant negative association with the quality of the overall information environment 
among firms with regular bundled guidance in columns (2) and (4). Figure 1B and 1D 
provide some additional graphical illustrations on these relationships as well as their 
economic magnitude across uniqueness of different quartiles. Overall, my results are 
consistent with both H3 and H4 and suggest that firms with strong tacit commitment to 
ongoing disclosure through regular bundled guidance policy can largely overcome the 
information problem from lacking information spillover from peers.  
5.5 Additional Analyses 
5.5.1 Alternative Measures of Informational Uniqueness 
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In Table 6, I rerun the main test specification in the paper using various alternative 
measures of informational uniqueness, including an industry-level and industry-adjusted 
measure based on textual data, an alternative measure based on business segment data as 
well as an instrument variable constructed using the proportion of private peers within the 
industry a firm operates.  
In Panel A, I further split my textual uniqueness measure into an industry-level 
component and industry-adjusted component based on Fama-French 48 industry 
classification for my main tests. Both the industry-level and industry-adjusted uniqueness 
measures show consistent signs, and are significant in all specifications. However, the 
industry-level uniqueness measure is much more significant in most specifications
23
.  
In Panel B, I implement my main tests using an alternative measure of uniqueness 
based on business segment data. The results indicate that my uniqueness measures using 
both textual and business segment data produce consistent and significant signs in the 
main tests, with the primary measure being much more significant in all specifications. 
This is consistent with findings in earlier measure validation tests and suggests that the 
alterative measure is likely coarser than the textual measure in capturing informational 
uniqueness. 
In Panel C, I further use the proportion of private firms in the firm’s primary NAICS 
6-digit industry (excluding the underlying firm in calculation) as an instrument variable 
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 In theory, if there is a perfect industry classification scheme that is fine enough so that all firms within an 
industry can be regarded as homogeneous, all variations in uniqueness should be at the industry level. 
While I expect that a significant source of variation in uniqueness is at the industry level, I have also 
included industry fixed effects using Fama-French 48 industry classification to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the industry level for robustness checks in untabulated tests. The statistical significance of 
uniqueness variables generally drops in all specifications with the inclusion of industry fixed effect but 
uniqueness still shows up statistically significant. 
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for informational uniqueness for my main tests. Conditional on the underlying firm being 
pubic, higher proportion of private firms in the firm’s industry likely correspond to less 
information spillover from other public firms
24
. The findings using the instrumental 
variable approach is also consistent with my prior findings.  
5.5.2 Controlling for Competition Perspective 
In Table 7, I attempt to further distinguish between the information perspective and 
the competition perspective on uniqueness through using additional data covering both 
public and private firms. In Panel A, I include an additional control for the natural 
logarithm of total number of U.S. public and private firms in the firm’s primary NAICS 
6-digit collected from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses. In Panel B, I include an additional 
control for the industry concentration ratio (Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the 50 
largest companies) of each NAICS 6-digit industry from US 2007 Economic Census 
calculated using data from all US firms within the manufacturing sector, similar to Ali et 
al. (2009). Under both panels, I find that my results continue to hold after putting in the 
extra controls for competition. 
5.5.3 Additional Controls 
In Table 8, I include additional control variables in my main tests for robustness 
checks, such as an indicator for loss firms, asset turnover, litigation risks proxied by high-
risk industry dummies (Francis et al. 1994), proprietary costs proxied by the frequency of 
words on protected sources of competitive advantage in 10-Ks (e.g. patents, licenses, 
copyrights), industry concentration proxied by Herfindahl index, business complexity 
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 The instrument satisfies the relevance condition as evidenced by the high F-statistic of 74.58 in the first-
stage Wald test. It also likely satisfies the exclusion restriction as the proportion of private peers in an 
industry is mostly beyond the control and influence of the underlying firm. 
35 
 
proxied by the number of business segments and the number of geographical segments, 
accounting comparability (Franco et al. 2011), etc. While data requirements on additional 
controls further shrink the samples, the results are not significantly changed with the 
addition of these extra controls
25
.  
5.5.4 Time-Series Variation – Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
While I expect that variations across informational uniqueness are mostly cross-
sectional, I also attempt to examine some residual time-series variations as an alternative 
research design by identifying a sample of firms experiencing a seemingly exogenous 
decrease in their information uniqueness due to comparable private peers completing 
their initial public offerings. While this may mitigate concerns for correlated omitted 
variable that is stable through time, such time-series variations may not provide a 
powerful setting to test the relationship. In addition to being limited to a tiny sample of 
44 firms, adding a new peer from IPO may not provide a significant decrease in 
information uniqueness. It may also not represent a very “clean” event as there may be 
some other confounding effect from peer IPOs, e.g. increased competition.  
Panel A of Table 9 shows the first difference in earnings announcement volatility, 
regular bundled guidance policy, spread and illiquidity for the subsample of 44 firms that 
experience a decrease in information uniqueness after the IPOs of their close peers. Panel 
B of Table 10 shows the difference-in-difference of the variables for the 44 “treated” 
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 In untabulated tests, I have included more additional specific controls for each specification, including 
prior probability of beating guidance, proportion of guiding firms within the industry, frequency of capital 
raising activities, research and development expenses (Brown and Kimbrough 2011), return synchronicity 
(Morck et al. 2000), return skewness (as an additional variable for predicting litigation risk in Kim and 
Skinner 2012), etc. Similar results are obtained. I have also used a firm-quarter specification and followed 
the same specification as Table 3 of Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013 and added my measures of 
informational uniqueness to the specification. My results on the propensity to issue bundled guidance 
continue to hold in the firm-quarter specification.  
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firms matched with 44 size-matched “control” firms that exhibit similar prior uniqueness, 
analyst coverage and profitability. Samples only include at most 3 years before and after 
the event depending on data availability. The signs for the coefficients are consistent with 
my other prior tables but only the changes in spread and illiquidity in columns (3) and (4) 
are statistically significant in this time-series setting, possibly due to the lack of power in 
such a tiny sample. The results also indicate that there is not much change in guidance 
policy after the event, consistent with the sticky nature of regular bundled guidance.   
6. Conclusion 
In the paper, I conceptualize the idea of “informational uniqueness” as the lack of 
information spillovers from comparable public peers and examine its relationship with 
corporate disclosure and information environment. To capture uniqueness, I construct 
two measures using business segment data and textual business description to represent 
the availability of comparable public peers by computing similarity scores across firms in 
a vector space model.  
The lack of information spillover from peers and concerns for potential 
“opportunism” can present an exacerbated information problem for unique firms. 
Consistent with firms having an incentive to mitigate such an information deficiency, I 
find that informational uniqueness is associated with a higher propensity by firms to 
provide additional disclosures during earnings announcements to strengthen its tacit 
commitment to ongoing disclosure.  
Overall, I find a significant negative association between uniqueness and the quality 
of the overall information environment among firms without regular bundled guidance, 
but not among firms with regular bundled guidance. My results suggest that, while 
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“informational uniqueness” is a highly economically significant factor in constituting a 
firm’s information environment, firms with strong tacit commitment to disclosure are 
able to largely compensate for the lack of information spillover from peers.   
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Appendix A: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition 
 
Measures of Informational Uniqueness  
segunique Natural logarithm of the inverse of the number of comparable 
public peers using business segment information 
txtunique Natural logarithm of the inverse of the number of comparable 
public peers using textual  business description in 10-K filings 
txtunique indicator Indicator for firms in the top quartile of “informational 
uniqueness” using textual business description 
 
Dependent Variables 
abnormal volume Abnormal trading volume during annual earnings 
announcements [-1 day, +1 day] relative to non-announcement 
periods [-60 days, -10 days] & [+10 days, +60 days] following 
Landsman, et. al. [2012] 
abnormal volatility Abnormal return volatility during annual earnings 
announcements [-1 day, +1 day] relative to non-announcement 
periods [-60 days, -10 days] & [+10 days, +60 days] following 
Landsman, et. al. [2012] 
regular bundled 
guider 
Indicator for regular bundled guidance issuer with three or more 
bundled guidance in a fiscal year 
frequency- bundled  Frequency of bundled guidance in a fiscal year 
frequency- unbundled  Frequency of unbundled guidance in a fiscal year 
guidance specificity Average number of forecasted items per annual guidance in a 
year 
guidance horizon Average EPS forecast horizon per guidance in a year 
spread Average bid-ask spread over price in a fiscal year 
illiquid Amihud’s illiquidity measure (2002) 
 
Standard Firm Controls 
mb ratio Market-to-book ratio 
stock return Cumulative stock returns over the fiscal year 
stock volatility Standard deviation of monthly returns over the fiscal year 
% inst ownership % institutional ownership 
stock beta Stock beta 
roa ratio Income before extraordinary items / total assets at the beginning 
of the year 
firm size Natural logarithm of total assets 
years of listing Number of years since initial public offering 
coverage Natural logarithm of (number of analysts + 1) 
leverage Total debt / total equity 
 
Other Variables 
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frequency- preann. Frequency of preannouncement of earnings in a fiscal year 
industry-level 
uniqueness 
Industry average uniqueness (txtunique) at Fama-French 48 
industry level 
industry-adj. 
uniqueness 
Deviation from average uniqueness (txtunique) at Fama-French 
48 industry level 
totindpeersize Natural logarithm of the total number of U.S. public & private 
firms in the firm’s primary NAICS industry 
US Census herfindahl Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the 50 largest companies in 
each manufacturing NAICS 6-digit industry classification from 
the US 2007 Economic Census data 
loss firms Indicator for loss firms (roa< 0) 
asset turnover Revenue / total assset 
FPS litigation 
industries 
Indicator for industries with high litigation risks (Francis et al. 
1994) 
word counts about 
protected advantage 
Counts of words in 10-K to describe protected sources of 
competitive advantage, e.g. patents, licenses, copyrights 
industry concentration Industry herfindahl index calculated using public firms 
# industry segments Number of business segments 
# geo. segments Number of geographical segments 
accounting 
comparability 
Accounting comparability measure (Franco et al. 2011) 
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Appendix B: Measuring Informational Uniqueness 
1. Alternative Measure Based on Business Segment Data 
To measure “informational uniqueness” in the universe of publicly listed firms based on 
similarities in business exposures, one feasible source of data is using the business 
segment disclosure data by firms under the assumption that business exposures are 
similar within each business segment as defined by 6-digit NAICS codes.  
This measure is constructed using similar Compustat Industrial and Segments data as 
used in Litov et al. (2012) but differs in the following sense. Litov et al. (2012) is more 
concerned about corporate strategy uniqueness and computes uniqueness as deviation in 
business segment weights from the centroid firm in the industry based on primary 
industry classification. If the centroid firm is a multi-segment firm, then all single-
segment firms will be regarded as more unique in their corporate strategy. For my 
measure of uniqueness, I compare firms against all other public firms instead of against 
the centroid firm in their primary industry classification. If there are more than 2 single-
segment firms having the same business segment, these firms will have a similarity score 
of 1, which is regarded as highly non-unique. Thus, this measure assumes that 
firms/segments within a 6-digit NAICS code are homogeneous and makes no distinction 
across these firms/segments in any other dimensions, such as business strategy, products 
and services, geographical exposure, etc.  
Operationally it is implemented by computing cosine similarity scores across all publicly 
listed firms on an annual basis using a vector space model, which represents each firm as 
a vector in an n-dimensional Euclidean space, where n is the number of unique 6-digit 
NAICS business segment and the value of each vector element is the proportion of sales 
contribution by each segment of the firm. Cosine similarity scores are calculated using 
the following formula: 
 
Suppose in a simplified world with only 3 industries X, Y and Z, company A has 100% 
revenue from industry X. Company B has 80% revenue from industry X and 20% 
revenue from industry Y while company C has 10 % revenue from industry X, 20% 
revenue from industry Y and 70% from industry Z.  The vector space model thus contains 
3 dimensions: X, Y, Z.   
Applying the formula, the cosine similarity score between A and B is calculated by 
0.8/[1*sqrt(0.8
2
+0.2
2
)], which is 0.97. The cosine similarity score between B and C is 
calculated by (0.8*0.1+0.2*0.2+0) /[sqrt(0.8
2
+0.2
2
)*sqrt(0.1
2
+0.2
2
+0.7
2
)], which is 0.12. 
While this simple scenario has only 3 dimensions in the vector space model, there can be 
as many as 1,200 dimensions in the vector space model when 6-digit NAICS industry 
codes are used to represent the dimensions in the vector space.  
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Uniqueness based on business segment information can then be represented in a variety 
of methods. In Table 2 Panel B and Table 7, my business segment based measure of 
“informational uniqueness” (segunique) is represented by the logarithm of the inverse of 
the number of close peers above certain similarity score threshold. In counting the 
number of close peers for a given firm using business segment information, a similarity 
score of 0.867, equivalent to cos 30
o
, is chosen as the similarity score threshold. While 
the threshold is arbitrarily chosen, robustness checks are done using a variety of 
thresholds and the results are largely similar. 
2. Primary Measure Based on Textual Business Description 
Similar to the measure based on business segment information, my measure based on 
textual business description replaces business segment weights by the relative term 
frequency in the business description section of 10-K filings in the vector space model on 
an annual basis. Thus, a firm-year level of uniqueness measure can also be constructed. 
For this primary measure, I only include the first 2,000 words in the business description 
for textual analysis for more apples-to-apples comparison as firms tend to put the most 
essential parts of business description upfront but may often diverge in content on the 
latter part of the business description. For example, some firms may present much more 
lengthy details on a variety of items such as regulatory environment, management team 
profiles, etc., in the latter part of the business description section.   
Instead of considering all words as being equally important as in Hoberg and Philip 
(2015), I apply the commonly used tf-idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency) 
weighting factor, which weighs down the effects of too frequently occurring terms and 
weighs up the effects of less frequently occurring terms, where terms are defined by 
word/phrases in my vector space model
26
. This is because most common terms are 
unlikely providing much useful information in differentiating among firms.  
Mathematically, each business description in the corpus 𝑑𝑖 is represented by a vector in 
the word space considering the distinctive power of each word (idf), where 𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗 represents 
the term frequency of word 𝑗 for firm 𝑖, 𝑖𝑑𝑓𝑗 represents the inverse document frequency 
of word 𝑗 and 𝑀 is the number of unique words in the entire corpus. 
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 One major difference is that I use all pre-processed meaningful words/phrases within the first 2,000 
words of business description and Hoberg and Philip (2015) considers the binary occurrence of nouns and 
pronouns in the whole section of business description as it attempts to focus more on capturing product 
similarity. Similar to Hoberg and Philip (2015) using a 25% threshold (excluding 75% most common nouns 
and proper nouns) in calculating product similarities among firms, I also use a stopword threshold of 25% 
(excluding the 75% most common terms) but exclude extremely rare words/phrases that only occur once 
across all business descriptions annually in calculating the similarity score in my main measure. As tf-idf 
weighting scheme is being used, my measure is not sensitive to the choice of stopword threshold. Brown 
and Tucker (2010) also use the tf-idf weight scheme in comparing within-firm MD&A changes. Table 5 in 
Hoberg and Philip (2015) performs some benchmarking tests on various parameters. It shows that tf-idf 
weighting scheme using all words works better than tf-idf weighting scheme using only nouns and proper 
nouns in all cases as well as stopword threshold of 25% using only nouns and proper nouns in most cases. 
The results of the paper are robust to different combinations of parameters in stopword thresholds and the 
number of words retained from business description section.  
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𝑑𝑖 = {𝑡𝑓𝑖1 ∗ 𝑖𝑑𝑓1, … ,  𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑑𝑓𝑗 ,  𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑀 ∗ 𝑖𝑑𝑓𝑀} 
Uniqueness based on business description can then be similarly represented by a number 
of ways. My primary measure of informational uniqueness (txtunique) is represented by 
the logarithm of the inverse of the number of close peers above certain similarity score 
threshold. In each year, I define firms in the bottom 25% in similarity score with their 
closest peer as unique firms (txtunique indicator). In other words, these unique firms 
have no peers above a certain similarity threshold. In calculating the size of the peer 
group for txtunique, I use the same similarity threshold to count the number of close peers 
for a given firm. While the threshold is arbitrarily chosen based on defining 25% firms as 
having no close peers in each year, robustness checks are done using a variety of 
thresholds and the results are largely similar. In addition, although not tabulated in the 
paper, I also use some other representations to capture the concept of uniqueness, such as 
the negative of the cosine similarity with the closest peer (txtmaxcosine), the negative of 
the average cosine similarity with the top 4 closest peers (txttop4cosine), etc.  
Various measures of uniqueness computed using either the negative of the cosine 
similarity with the closest peer, the negative of the average cosine similarity of the top 4 
closest peers or the logarithm of the inverse of the number of close peers above certain 
similarity thresholds are highly correlated with one another. For example, the cosine 
similarity score with the closest peer (txtmaxcosine) has a correlation coefficient of 0.91 
with the average cosine similarity score of the top 4 closest peers (txttop4cosine). The 
negative of the average cosine similarity score with the top 4 closest peers (txttop4cosine) 
has a correlation coefficient of 0.80 with the logarithm of the inverse of the number of 
close peers above certain similarity score threshold (txtunique).  For the ease of 
presentation, I mainly use txtunique as my primary measure of uniqueness in my 
analyses.  
Instead of assuming that all operations within a 6-digit NAICS business segment are 
homogeneous, this measure attempts to expand the scope of information set in 
considering the similarities across firms by utilizing the textual business description 
information in 10-K filings. It adds additional information in calculating the uniqueness 
measure compared to business segment data and has the advantage of being able to 
distinguish among firms within an industry segment classification. As business 
description section is part of mandatory disclosure governed by regulation S-K and 
contains mostly factual information, it is unlikely that certain firms would strategically 
choose words that are common or uncommon to describe their businesses, causing 
systematic biases in the measure
27
.  
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 There is fairly detailed framework under regulation S-K on the content of business description in the 10-
K filings, with over 3,800 words of extensive guidance, e.g. on products and services, raw materials, 
seasonality, intangibles, working capital, customers, order backlogs, competition, research and 
development, regulation, number of employees, etc. However, it is possible that textual analysis based on 
business description section may suffer from noise in measurement due to differential writing styles by 
different firms. 
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However, my informational uniqueness measure using 10-K business description has the 
limitation that it captures informational uniqueness with respect to all U.S. public firms 
that file 10-Ks only. Some identified unique firms under my measure may not be really 
“informational unique” from a global perspective if these firms have close comparable 
public peers from foreign countries
28
.  This may suggest that my measure may have 
larger measurement errors for firms with large foreign market presence. In untabulated 
tests, I split my sample of firms based on the proportion of foreign pre-tax income and 
find that the results are robust in both subsamples but stronger in the subsample of firms 
with domestic focus. This is consistent with the nature of the limitation of my measure 
described above.   
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 For example, Autodesk appears to be “informationally unique” from my measure, but its close 
competitor Dassault Systemes is a French company which does not file 10-Ks and therefore is excluded 
from my universe of public firms for comparison. In most case (except for some multinational companies), 
this may not be a huge concern as foreign firms mostly focus on local foreign markets and thus their 
markets are potentially different from the U.S. public firms in my sample. 
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Appendix C: Examples of Informationally Unique Firms 
Acme United 
- A leading worldwide supplier of innovative cutting, measuring and first aid products to the 
school, home, office, hardware, sporting goods and industrial markets 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “The Company competes with many companies in each market and geographic area. 
The Company believes that the principal points of competition in these markets are 
product innovation, quality, price, merchandising, design and engineering capabilities, 
product development, timeliness and completeness of delivery, conformity to 
customer specifications and post-sale support.”  
o “The major competitor in the cutting category is Fiskars Corporation. The major 
competitor in the measuring category is Maped. The major competitor in the safety 
category is Johnson and Johnson.” 
Brinks 
- Premium provider of secure logistics and security solutions 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “Brinks competes with large multinational, regional and smaller companies 
throughout the world.  Our largest multinational competitors are G4S plc (U.K.); 
Loomis AB (Sweden); Prosegur, Compania de Seguridad, S.A. (Spain); and Garda 
World Security Corporation (Canada).” 
- Analyst (Macquarie Initiating Report 2015)  
o Less of a “transportation” or “security” company than it is a proxy for cash as a 
method of payment 
o 40% EPS exposure to Venezuela 
o Controls the largest share (about 20%) of global cash and valuables transportation 
market 
o Use Commercial and Professional Services (e.g. Casella Waste Systems, Xerium 
Technologies, Performant Financial Corp, Cenveo, Heritage-Crystal Clean, Energy 
Recovery) as comps 
CECO Environmental 
- A leading global industrial technology company focused on providing innovative solutions 
for the environmental, energy, and fluid handling/filtration industries 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “We believe that there are no singly dominant companies in the product recovery, air 
pollution control, fluid handling and filtration product and service industries. These 
markets are fragmented with numerous small and regional participants.” 
- Analyst (Cowen Initiating Report 2012) 
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o “Although there is stiff competition in each specific segment and product, no other 
public company offers the full breadth of CECE products and services. Companies 
were selected for our comparable valuation analysis because they either have some 
overlap, compete in closely related markets, or serve the same customer set with 
complementary products.” 
Dun & Bradstreet 
- The world's leading source of commercial information and insight on businesses  
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “We are subject to highly competitive conditions in all aspects of our business. 
However, we believe no competitor offers our complete line of solutions or can 
match our global data and analytic capabilities including proprietary capabilities 
quality resulting from our DUNSRight Quality Process.” 
- Analyst (Piper Jaffray Initiating Report 2010) 
o “D&B’s database lies at the core of all its product offerings and serves as a 
significant competitive barrier to entry. Underscoring its database is the DUNSRight 
process, which quality controls all inputs and outputs and which the company views 
as a major source of its competitive advantage. “ 
o Use information services companies as peer group 
Groupon  
- A global leader in local commerce, making it easy for people around the world to search and 
discover great businesses and merchandise 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “Since our inception, a substantial number of competing group buying sites have 
emerged around the world attempting to replicate our business model, from very 
small startups to some of the largest companies in the world.” 
- Analyst (UBS Initiating Report 2012) 
o Competition in Daily Deals comes from Amazon Local, LivingSocial, Google Offers, 
and a host of smaller companies / Competition in Goods comes from Amazon, eBay, 
Overstock.com, woot!, etc. 
o “Groupon’s 1P business is tilted toward inventory disposal on a large scale. We 
believe Overtstock.com to be a fair comparable for this segment.” / “As for 3P, it is 
more difficult to find a true comparable given the business tilts more toward lead 
generation (versus third-party fulfillment or marketplace for goods models).” 
Hershey 
- Largest producer of quality chocolate in North America/ global leader in chocolate and sugar 
confectionery 
- 10-K Competition Section 
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o “We sell our brands in highly competitive markets with many other multinational, 
national, regional and local firms. Some of our competitors are much larger firms that 
have greater resources and more substantial international operations. “ 
- Analyst (Jefferies Initiating Report 2011) 
o Use large-cap U.S. packaged food as peers, such as General Mills, McCormick, 
Kellogg, etc. 
Liquidity Services 
- Leading online auction marketplaces for surplus and salvage assets 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “We currently compete with other e-commerce providers; auction websites; 
government agencies that have created websites to sell surplus and salvage assets; 
and traditional liquidators and fixed-site auctioneers.” 
- Analyst (William Blair Initiating Report 2007) 
o “LSI is a distinctive business model that combines facets of other publicly traded 
companies. “ 
o “The basic procurement and sales model is like a distributor, but with a unique source 
of goods from the reverse supply chain, and a sales model that is different in two 
ways—it is an auction model and it is online-only. LSI is an auctioneer, but without 
the capital and buyer-acquisition constraints of bricks and mortar. Like e-tailers, it 
uses the Internet to inexpensively reach a huge number of buyers, yet its buying base 
is commercial rather than consumers.” 
o List related categories as comparable companies in online e-tailers (e.g. Amazon), 
online infrastructure (e.g. Digital River), Auction Companies (e.g. eBay), traditional 
distributors (e.g. CDW) 
Peerless Systems 
- Licenses imaging and networking technologies and components to the digital document 
markets (became private in 2015) 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “The market for outsourced imaging systems for digital document products is highly 
competitive and characterized by continuous pressure to enhance performance, add 
functionality, reduce costs and accelerate the release of new products.  We compete 
on the basis of the set of core technologies we sublicense from third parties, 
technology expertise, product functionality and price.  Our technology primarily 
competes with solutions developed internally by OEMs.” 
Pool Corp 
- Largest wholesale distributor of swimming pool and related backyard products 
- 10-K Competition Section 
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o “We are the largest wholesale distributor of swimming pool and related backyard 
products and the only truly national wholesale distributor focused on the swimming 
pool industry in the United States. We face intense competition from many regional 
and local distributors in our markets…We also face competition, both directly and 
indirectly, from mass-market retailers and large pool supply retailers…” 
- Analyst (JPMorgan Initiating Report 2005) 
o “Only pure play in attractive pool distribution market” 
o Use high-quality, niche distribution companies with solid secular growth business 
models as peers 
OpenTable 
- Provide solutions that form an online network connecting reservation-taking restaurants and 
people who dine  
- 10-K Competition Section 
o The traditional competitor for our restaurant software and hardware solutions is the 
pen-and-paper reservation book. We also compete with reservation management 
software companies, point of sale providers and waitlist management system 
providers. 
o Our primary competitor for diners making reservations is the phone. 
- Analyst (JPMorgan Initiating Report 2012) 
o “A leading online restaurant reservations site in North America” 
o “Faces significant competition from Livebookings in Germany, and Livebookings 
launche Freebookings in the US in 4Q11” 
o Use online bookings/reservations companies such as Priceline and local online 
players such as Angie’s List and Yelp as peer group 
Snap-On 
- A leading global innovator, manufacturer and marketer of tools, equipment, diagnostics, 
repair information and systems solutions for professional users performing critical tasks 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o Snap-on competes on the basis of its product quality and performance, product line 
breadth and depth, service, brand awareness and imagery, technological innovation 
and availability of financing (through SOC or its international finance subsidiaries). 
While Snap-on does not believe that any single company competes with it across all 
of its product lines and distribution channels, various companies compete in one or 
more product categories and/or distribution channels. 
- Analyst (Wunderlich Initiating Report 2014) 
o “Snap-on develops innovative products to make work easier for professionals in the 
automotive repair sector and in multiple industrial segments.” 
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o “Snap-on operates an industrial and tools business with high barriers to entry and 
geographic diversification that results in sustainable fundamentals. The valuation for 
the core business should be more in line with a high-quality industrial company.” 
Steinway Musical Instruments 
- Largest domestic manufacturing of musical instruments (became private in late 2013) 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “Steinway & Sons Pianos – The level of competition our pianos face depends on the 
market definition. Steinway & Sons pianos hold a unique position at the top of the 
grand piano market, both in terms of quality and price. While there are many makers 
of pianos, only a few compete directly with our Steinway brand. Other manufacturers 
of primarily higher priced pianos include Bösendorfer and Fazioli. Because Steinway 
pianos are built to last for generations, a relatively large market exists for used 
Steinways. It is difficult to estimate the significance of used piano sales because most 
are conducted in the private aftermarket. However, we believe that used Steinway 
pianos provide the most significant competition in the high end piano market.” 
o “Boston and Essex Pianos – Our mid-priced pianos compete with brands such as 
Bechstein, Schimmel, Kawai, and Yamaha.” 
Tesla 
- First company to commercially produce a federally-compliant electric vehicle 
- 10-K Competition Section 
o “The worldwide automotive market, particularly for alternative fuel vehicles, is 
highly competitive today and we expect it will become even more so in the 
future…Many established and new automobile manufacturers have entered or have 
announced plans to enter the alternative fuel vehicle market.” 
- Analyst (JPM Initiating Report 2012) 
o “We are attracted to Tesla’s highly differentiated business model: the firm uniquely 
owns its distribution and is saddled with none of the pension, OPEB, and other 
legacy costs that frequently burden large entrenched automakers.” 
o “We are attracted to Tesla’s highly differentiated products.” 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics  
Panel A: Overall Descriptive Statistics 
The table below shows the summary descriptive statistics for the main variables in the paper for 
the full sample from 1996 to 2013 after imposing data requirements. Variables on guidance are 
from 2003 onwards after imposing data requirements.  
       
VARIABLES N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
              
txtunique 49,738 -1.295 1.031 -2.079 -1.099 -0.693 
txtunique indicator 49,738 0.246 0.431 0 0 0 
segunique 49,738 -2.973 1.757 -4.500 -2.944 -1.609 
       
abnormal volatility 49,738 0.349 1.572 -0.628 0.407 1.407 
abnormal volume 49,738 0.314 0.756 -0.0940 0.350 0.781 
       
regular bundled 
guider 25,123 0.432 0.496 0 0 1 
frequency- bundled 25,123 1.881 1.864 0 1 4 
frequency- unbundled 25,123 0.682 1.221 0 0 1 
frequency- preann. 25,123 0.223 0.555 0 0 0 
guidance specificity 13,262 1.722 0.899 1 1.481 2 
guidance horizon 9.980 135.7 91.89 64 138.3 189 
       
spread 49,738 1.781 2.464 0.196 0.867 2.403 
illiquid 49,738 2.328 19.67 0.00238 0.0212 0.273 
       
analyst coverage 49,738 1.448 0.951 0.693 1.386 2.197 
inst. ownership 49,738 0.502 0.299 0.239 0.517 0.755 
firm size 49,738 5.889 2.006 4.413 5.775 7.232 
stock return 49,738 17.17 73.76 -24.16 5.628 38.29 
mb ratio 49,738 3.258 4.161 1.226 2.018 3.547 
roa ratio 49,738 0.000127 1.577 -0.0221 0.0332 0.0762 
stock beta 49,738 1.253 0.979 0.593 1.091 1.727 
stock volatility 49,738 0.148 0.0944 0.0841 0.124 0.184 
leverage 49,738 0.885 2.061 0.0142 0.292 0.843 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics by Group 
The table below shows the summary descriptive statistics by groups defined by uniqueness 
indicator (txtunique indicator) for the variables on the overall information environment and basic 
firm characteristics for the full sample from 1996 to 2013 after imposing data requirements. 
         
 
txtunique indicator=0 txtunique indicator=1 
VARIABLES N mean sd p50 N mean sd p50 
                  
spread 37,483 1.654 2.321 0.777 12,255 2.169 2.822 1.185 
illiquid 37,483 1.740 16.28 0.0162 12,255 4.128 27.46 0.0584 
         
analyst coverage 37,483 1.534 0.940 1.609 12,255 1.185 0.939 1.099 
inst ownership 37,483 0.519 0.297 0.538 12,255 0.453 0.301 0.447 
firm size 37,483 6.031 1.984 5.936 12,255 5.456 2.009 5.245 
stock return 37,483 17.45 74.68 5.469 12,255 16.31 70.88 6.117 
mb ratio 37,483 3.322 4.254 2.041 12,255 3.063 3.859 1.948 
roa ratio 37,483 0.00380 1.805 0.0313 12,255 -0.0111 0.344 0.0389 
stock beta 37,483 1.270 0.991 1.103 12,255 1.203 0.939 1.057 
stock volatility 37,483 0.148 0.0945 0.125 12,255 0.148 0.0942 0.123 
leverage 37,483 0.938 2.151 0.303 12,255 0.723 1.747 0.259 
                  
 
Panel C: Correlation Table  
The table below shows the correlation table between uniqueness (txtunique) and market responses 
and major guidance variables. 
 
txtunique 
abnormal 
volatility 
abnormal 
volume 
bundled 
guider 
guidance 
specificity 
guidance 
horizon 
txtunique 1 
     
abnormal volatility 0.0571 1 
    
abnormal volume 0.0550 0.5192 1 
   
bundled guider 0.0182 0.2273 0.1860 1 
  
guidance specificity 0.1201 0.1091 0.1027 0.2531 1 
 
guidance horizon 0.0617 0.0963 0.0654 0.0256 0.2298 1 
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Table 2 Measure Validation  
Panel A: Information Transfer from Closest Peer 
(i) Correlation in Returns with Closest Peer during Peer Earnings Announcements 
The table below examines the correlation in returns between the underlying firm and its closet 
peer identified using textual business description during the peer firm’s earnings announcement. 
car1d2 refers to the underlying firm’s abnormal return during the [-1D, +1D] window around the 
earning announcement of its closest peer while car2 refers to the peer firm’s abnormal return 
during the [-1D, +1D] window around its earnings announcement. 
 (1) (2) 
 txtunique indicator=0 txtunique indicator=1 
Correlation between car2 and car1d2 0.10510 0.04378 
p-value <.0001 0.0001 
# observations 53,099 18,940 
 
 
(ii) Regression of Firm Return on Peer Return during Peer Earnings Announcements 
 
The table below examines how information transfer from the closest peer is related to 
“informational uniqueness” of the underlying firm. Subsample 1 restricts the sample to significant 
information events only (with absolute abnormal returns of closet peer firms over 5% during their 
earnings announcements). Subsample 2 further restricts the sample to closet peer firms whose 
earnings announcements dates are more than 7 days apart from the underlying firm. Firm 
clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Full Sample Subsample 1  Subsample 2  
VARIABLES car1d2 car1d2 car1d2 
        
car2 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.074*** 
 
(15.70) (14.70) (12.54) 
car2 * txtunique indicator -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.045*** 
 
(-5.30) (-5.15) (-4.91) 
txtunique indicator -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(-0.97) (-1.44) (-0.43) 
Observations 67,120 29,416 20,650 
R-squared 0.009 0.014 0.014 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
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Table 2 Measure Validation (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Uniqueness and Analyst Coverage  
The table below examines how analyst coverage varies with measures of “information 
uniqueness” using both textual business description (txtunique and txtunique indicator) and 
business segment data (segunique). The first three columns use the full sample from 1996 to 2013 
while Columns (4) and (5) use the post-2002 sample with guidance data. Firm and year clustered 
t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Analyst 
Coverage 
Analyst 
Coverage 
Analyst 
Coverage 
Analyst 
Coverage 
Analyst 
Coverage 
            
txtunique (-) -0.058***   -0.087*** 
 
 
(-6.85)   (-11.10) 
 txtunique indicator (-) 
 
-0.096***  
 
-0.118*** 
  
(-7.60)  
 
(-9.25) 
segunique (-)   -0.022***   
   (-3.31)   
      
inst ownership 0.962*** 0.960*** 0.968*** 0.770*** 0.774*** 
 
(30.43) (30.08) (30.07) (15.96) (15.62) 
firm size 0.284*** 0.286*** 0.290*** 0.259*** 0.264*** 
 
(33.91) (34.30) (35.05) (21.46) (21.41) 
stock return -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-8.88) (-8.69) (-8.85) (-5.65) (-5.55) 
mb ratio 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 
(11.82) (11.73) (11.86) (18.85) (19.53) 
roa ratio -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** -0.009*** -0.008** 
 
(-2.56) (-2.46) (-2.47) (-2.64) (-2.49) 
years of listing -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 
(-8.99) (-9.16) (-9.82) (-9.66) (-10.60) 
stock beta 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.085*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 
(6.37) (6.40) (6.30) (3.38) (3.46) 
stock volatility 0.647*** 0.656*** 0.640*** 0.584* 0.609** 
 
(3.62) (3.69) (3.66) (1.95) (2.05) 
leverage -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.087*** 
 (-17.21) (-17.28) (-17.28) (-13.81) (-14.15) 
frequency - bundled    0.075*** 0.070*** 
    (9.94) (8.97) 
      
Observations 49,738 49,738 49,738 29,839 29,839 
R-squared 0.599 0.597 0.597 0.622 0.617 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 3 Market Reactions during Earnings Announcements  
Panel A: Uniqueness and Market Reactions 
The table below examines how market reactions in terms of abnormal return volatility and 
abnormal trading volume vary with measures of “information uniqueness” (txtunique and 
txtunique indicator) during annual earnings announcements, controlling for guidance policy as 
well as other standard firm characteristics. Firm and year clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Abnormal 
 Volatility 
Abnormal 
Volatility 
Abnormal 
Volume 
Abnormal  
Volume 
    
 
  
 
txtunique (+) 0.163***  0.075***  
 (11.06)  (13.27)  
txtunique indicator (+)  0.200***  0.090*** 
  (8.09)  (10.09) 
     
frequency - bundled 0.094*** 0.104*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 
 
(10.18) (10.98) (15.16) (15.81) 
frequency - unbundled -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 
 
(-8.60) (-9.21) (-4.40) (-5.04) 
frequency-  preann. -0.053** -0.047** -0.003 -0.000 
 
(-2.47) (-2.20) (-0.46) (-0.03) 
inst ownership 0.571*** 0.583*** 0.253*** 0.258*** 
 
(11.53) (11.76) (11.32) (11.34) 
analyst coverage 0.226*** 0.200*** 0.124*** 0.112*** 
 
(14.38) (12.89) (16.95) (15.07) 
firm size 0.018** 0.013* -0.013** -0.015** 
 
(2.39) (1.69) (-2.05) (-2.37) 
stock return 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(3.68) (3.55) (3.91) (3.82) 
mb ratio -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(-1.34) (-1.22) (-1.39) (-1.33) 
roa ratio 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.62) (0.46) (0.67) (0.56) 
years of listing -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 
(-0.65) (0.66) (-1.48) (0.01) 
stock beta 0.046** 0.047** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 
(2.52) (2.46) (3.81) (3.71) 
stock volatility 0.453** 0.417** 0.322** 0.304** 
 
(2.48) (2.14) (2.27) (2.05) 
leverage -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (-4.10) (-4.17) (-2.86) (-3.16) 
  
 
  
Observations 29,839 29,839 29,839 29,839 
R-squared 0.102 0.095 0.110 0.102 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 4 Corporate Disclosure  
Panel A: Uniqueness and Disclosure Policy – Variation across Full Sample 
The table below examines how the disclosure policy of firms varies in cross-section with 
“information uniqueness” (txtunique). The first two columns utilize the full post-2002 sample for 
firms with analyst coverage with column (1) using the frequency of bundled guidance and column 
(2) using an indicator for regular bundled guiders as dependent variables. The last two columns 
split the sample into high growth firms and low growth firms by the median market-to-book (MB) 
ratio. The difference column shows the chi-square statistics of the difference in coefficients 
between columns (3) and (4).  Firm and year clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Full  
Sample 
Full  
Sample 
High MB 
Sample 
Low MB 
Sample  
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Frequency of 
Bundled 
Guidance 
Regular 
Bundled Guider 
Regular 
Bundled Guider 
Regular 
Bundled Guider 
Diff. 
F-Stat. 
          
txtunique (+) 0.213*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.026*** 15.88 
 
(9.41) (8.35) (8.49) (3.56) *** 
inst ownership 1.654*** 0.393*** 0.350*** 0.409*** 2.36 
 
(10.99) (10.47) (9.49) (9.36)  
analyst 
coverage 0.599*** 0.155*** 0.144*** 0.124*** 1.50 
 
(10.06) (11.24) (9.52) (7.30)  
years of listing -0.001 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 1.41 
 
(-0.54) (-0.47) (-1.84) (-0.38)  
firm size -0.035 -0.010* 0.007 -0.016** 7.86 
 
(-1.42) (-1.65) (1.07) (-2.08) *** 
stock return 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 5.45 
 
(4.89) (4.53) (3.06) (0.45) ** 
roa ratio 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.108*** 28.77 
 
(0.76) (0.84) (1.06) (4.60) *** 
stock beta 0.062** 0.012* 0.006 0.022** 3.57 
 
(2.48) (1.85) (0.84) (2.07) * 
mb ratio -0.003 -0.001 -0.005** 0.105*** 61.31 
 
(-0.36) (-0.40) (-2.48) (5.42) *** 
stock volatility -1.330*** -0.284*** -0.403*** 0.084 20.23 
 
(-3.34) (-2.71) (-3.26) (0.74) *** 
leverage -0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.016*** 26.55 
 
(-0.28) (-0.43) (1.06) (-4.90) *** 
  
    
Observations 25,123 25,123 12,562 12,561  
R-squared 0.228 0.192 0.214 0.181  
Year FE YES YES YES YES  
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Table 4 Corporate Disclosure (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Uniqueness and Disclosure Policy – Variation within Guiding Firms 
The table below examines how the disclosure policy of firms varies with “information 
uniqueness” (txtunique) conditional on providing management guidance in the year. The first two 
columns use the frequency of bundled guidance and unbundled guidance respectively as 
dependent variables and the last two columns use measures of earnings guidance horizon and 
guidance specificity as dependent variables. Firm and year clustered t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Frequency of  
Bundled Guidance 
Frequency of 
Unbundled 
Guidance 
Guidance  
Horizon 
Guidance  
Specificity 
              
txtunique (+) 0.065*** (+/-) -0.081*** (+) 6.657*** (+) 0.144*** 
 
 (3.32)  (-4.06)  (3.61)  (5.74) 
inst ownership  1.173***  0.067  0.298  0.142** 
 
 (8.72)  (0.89)  (0.05)  (2.35) 
analyst 
coverage  0.356***  0.345***  -10.715***  0.100*** 
 
 (7.64)  (8.31)  (-4.24)  (3.82) 
years of listing  0.000  0.006***  -0.112  -0.005*** 
 
 (0.12)  (3.49)  (-0.82)  (-4.53) 
firm size  -0.039  0.074***  10.041***  -0.038*** 
 
 (-1.62)  (3.43)  (6.87)  (-3.57) 
stock return  0.002***  0.001***  -16.660  0.272*** 
 
 (6.81)  (4.17)  (-1.40)  (3.35) 
roa ratio  0.979***  0.279**  0.054**  0.000 
 
 (6.16)  (2.34)  (1.99)  (0.14) 
stock beta  -0.001  -0.021  -13.676***  -0.076*** 
 
 (-0.04)  (-1.36)  (-5.89)  (-2.90) 
mb ratio  0.004  0.006  2.462***  0.009** 
 
 (0.40)  (1.15)  (5.11)  (2.41) 
stock volatility  -1.729***  -0.042  -75.469**  -0.027 
 
 (-3.97)  (-0.12)  (-2.47)  (-0.09) 
leverage  0.006  -0.011  -0.600  -0.004 
 
 (0.39)  (-1.00)  (-0.77)  (-0.73) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Observations  15,124  15,124  9,980  13,262 
R-squared  0.157  0.098  0.076  0.073 
Year FE  YES  YES  YES  YES 
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Table 5 Information Environment 
Pane A: Uniqueness and Information Environment 
The table below examines how the quality of the overall information environment varies with 
“information uniqueness” (txtunique) and guidance choices. The first two columns use the bid-
ask spread (spread) while the latter two columns use Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (illiquid) to 
proxy for an inverse relationship with the quality of the overall information environment. Firm 
and year clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spread Spread Illiquid Illiquid 
          
txtunique (+) 0.086*** 0.126*** 0.718*** 1.061*** 
 
(5.91) (6.25) (3.60) (3.21) 
txtunique* bundled guider(-)  -0.125***  -1.079*** 
  (-5.47)  (-2.99) 
bundled guider (-)  -0.246***  -1.991*** 
  (-4.78)  (-3.04) 
frequency – bundled (-) -0.042*** 
 
-0.308*** 
 
 
(-3.47) 
 
(-2.82) 
 frequency – unbundled (+/-) 0.045*** 
 
0.379** 
 
 
(3.39) 
 
(2.44) 
 analyst coverage -0.196*** -0.192*** -0.435 -0.389 
 
(-6.84) (-6.75) (-1.53) (-1.51) 
inst. ownership -1.216*** -1.247*** -6.058*** -6.283*** 
 
(-7.95) (-7.89) (-3.35) (-3.34) 
firm size -0.187*** -0.181*** -1.044*** -0.997*** 
 
(-8.55) (-8.46) (-3.79) (-3.81) 
stock return -0.000 -0.000 -0.009** -0.009** 
 
(-0.50) (-0.51) (-2.14) (-2.15) 
mb ratio -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.303*** -0.295*** 
 
(-5.81) (-5.74) (-4.17) (-4.21) 
roa ratio -0.012** -0.011** -0.047 -0.045 
 
(-2.03) (-1.98) (-1.14) (-1.10) 
stock beta -0.173*** -0.173*** -1.348*** -1.346*** 
 
(-5.63) (-5.68) (-2.73) (-2.74) 
stock volatility 2.333*** 2.348*** 13.562* 13.666* 
 
(4.22) (4.26) (1.89) (1.91) 
leverage 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.310*** 0.305*** 
 
(5.09) (5.02) (4.27) (4.19) 
     Observations 29,839 29,839 29,839 29,839 
R-squared 0.445 0.445 0.045 0.045 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 5 Information Environment (Cont’d) 
Panel B:  Subsampling on the Presence of Regular Bundled Guidance Policy 
The table below examines how the quality of the overall information environment of 
“informationally unique” firms (txtunique indicator) varies in subsamples of different guidance 
policy.  Columns (1) and (3) examine a subsample of firms without a regular bundled guidance 
policy while columns (2) and (4) examine a subsample of firms with a regular bundled guidance 
policy. The dependent variables are the bid-ask spread (spread) in columns (1) and (2) and 
Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (illiquid) in columns (3) and (4) respectively. The difference 
columns show the chi-square statistics of the difference in coefficients in the prior two columns. 
Firm and year clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Sample w/o 
Regular 
Bundled  
Guidance 
Sample w/ 
Regular 
Bundled  
Guidance  
Sample w/o 
Regular 
Bundled  
Guidance 
Sample w/ 
Regular 
Bundled  
Guidance  
       
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
(1) (2) Diff. 
F-
Stat. 
(3) (4) 
Diff. 
F-Stat. 
Spread Spread Illiquid Illiquid 
            
txtunique indicator (+) 0.210*** 0.009 29.44 2.017*** 0.010 7.08 
 
(5.45) (0.70) *** (2.58) (0.14) *** 
analyst coverage -0.239*** -0.104*** 36.72 -0.538 -0.067** 4.06 
 
(-6.61) (-5.45) *** (-1.41) (-2.58) ** 
inst. ownership -1.234*** -0.559*** 88.83 -6.484*** -0.809*** 28.43 
 
(-7.58) (-7.67) *** (-3.01) (-3.44) *** 
firm size -0.241*** -0.052*** 
208.4
0 -1.409*** -0.081*** 67.78 
 
(-8.07) (-7.68) *** (-3.63) (-2.92) *** 
stock return -0.000 0.001*** 9.79 -0.011* 0.001** 12.34 
 
(-0.87) (4.55) *** (-1.96) (2.36) *** 
mb ratio -0.066*** -0.010*** 
158.7
3 -0.441*** -0.022*** 67.02 
 (-5.80) (-5.01) *** (-3.86) (-3.15) *** 
roa ratio -0.009** -0.398*** 53.00 -0.029 -0.220 1.54 
 (-1.98) (-5.29) *** (-0.87) (-1.48)  
stock beta -0.197*** -0.055*** 72.90 -1.692*** -0.047** 23.36 
 
(-5.57) (-3.41) *** (-2.59) (-2.21) *** 
stock volatility 2.774*** 0.800*** 
158.7
3 18.271** -0.464 9.86 
 
(4.10) (4.01) *** (2.01) (-0.86) *** 
leverage 0.088*** 0.012*** 79.34 0.461*** 0.024** 25.77 
 
(5.54) (3.52) *** (4.54) (1.98) *** 
  
  
 
  
Observations 18,818 11,021  18,818 11,021  
R-squared 0.436 0.370  0.051 0.026  
Year FE YES YES  YES YES  
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Table 6 Alternative Measures of Informational Uniqueness 
Panel A:  Main Tests Using Industry-Level and Industry-Adjusted Uniqueness  
The table below examines the main test specifications from Tables 3 to 5 using abnormal 
volatility during earnings announcements in column (1), the frequency of bundled guidance in 
column (2), the bid-ask spread in column (3) and Amihud’s measure of illiquidity in column (4), 
where uniqueness measure (txtunique) is split into industry-level uniqueness and industry-
adjusted uniqueness based on Fama-French 48 industry classification. Firm and year clustered t-
statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Abnormal 
Volatility 
Frequency of  
Bundled Guidance 
Spread Illiquid 
          
industry-level uniqueness 0.387*** 0.548*** 0.062*** 0.864* 
(+) (9.83) (12.53) (2.71) (1.95) 
industry-adjusted  0.076*** 0.037* 0.076*** 0.491*** 
uniqueness(+) (6.36) (1.79) (4.55) (3.49) 
inst. ownership 0.510*** 1.483*** -1.190*** -0.304** 
 
(10.03) (10.62) (-7.86) (-2.52) 
analyst coverage 0.220*** 0.564*** -0.176*** 0.332** 
 
(14.38) (10.66) (-6.65) (2.29) 
frequency - bundled 0.079*** 
 
-0.039*** -5.911*** 
 
(8.99) 
 
(-3.08) (-3.26) 
frequency - unbundled -0.060*** 
 
0.040*** -0.272 
 
(-6.91) 
 
(3.08) (-1.05) 
firm size 0.039*** 0.019 0.006*** 0.053*** 
 
(5.46) (1.04) (5.47) (2.86) 
stock return 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.209*** -1.215*** 
 
(3.40) (6.09) (-8.31) (-3.84) 
mb ratio -0.001 0.006 -0.000 -0.009** 
 
(-0.43) (1.02) (-0.34) (-2.12) 
roa ratio 0.003 0.003 -0.012** -0.051 
 
(0.67) (0.67) (-2.00) (-1.16) 
years of listing -0.001 -0.003 -0.169*** -1.325*** 
 
(-1.24) (-1.59) (-5.74) (-2.73) 
stock beta 0.033* 0.032 -0.050*** -0.319*** 
 
(1.92) (1.45) (-5.82) (-4.20) 
stock volatility 0.475*** -0.943*** 2.425*** 14.420** 
 
(2.87) (-3.68) (4.43) (2.03) 
leverage -0.023*** -0.007 0.068*** 0.353*** 
 
(-4.24) (-0.47) (5.46) (4.81) 
     Observations 29,839 29,839 29,839 29,839 
R-squared 0.109 0.322 0.448 0.046 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6 Alternative Measures of Informational Uniqueness (Cont’d) 
Panel B:  Main Tests Using Alternative Measure Based on Business Segment Data 
The table below examines the main test specifications from Tables 3 to 5 using abnormal 
volatility during earnings announcements in column (1), the frequency of bundled guidance in 
column (2), bid-ask spread in column (3) and Amihud’s measure of illiquidity in column (4), 
where uniqueness measure (segunique) is constructed based on comparing weightings on 
business segments across firms. Firm and year clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Abnormal 
Volatility 
Frequency of  
Bundled Guidance 
Spread Illiquid 
          
segunique (+) 0.054*** 0.024** 0.020*** 0.159* 
 (6.27) (2.04) (2.70) (1.87) 
inst. ownership 0.553*** 1.633*** -1.196*** -5.867*** 
 
(11.04) (11.88) (-7.81) (-3.34) 
analyst coverage 0.205*** 0.560*** -0.187*** -0.355 
 
(12.76) (9.32) (-6.96) (-1.36) 
frequency - bundled 0.103*** 
 
-0.035*** -0.247** 
 
(10.98) 
 
(-2.78) (-2.47) 
frequency - unbundled -0.062*** 
 
0.039*** 0.322** 
 
(-7.33) 
 
(2.97) (2.25) 
firm size 0.006 -0.026 -0.214*** -1.287*** 
 
(0.76) (-1.21) (-8.33) (-3.76) 
stock return 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.009** 
 
(3.46) (5.27) (-0.42) (-2.14) 
mb ratio -0.002 0.002 -0.049*** -0.317*** 
 
(-0.59) (0.37) (-5.84) (-4.10) 
roa ratio 0.001 0.001 -0.013** -0.057 
 
(0.28) (0.19) (-2.08) (-1.26) 
years of listing 0.000 -0.001 0.006*** 0.057*** 
 
(0.19) (-0.28) (5.71) (2.89) 
stock beta 0.054*** 0.059*** -0.166*** -1.283*** 
 
(2.73) (2.89) (-5.90) (-2.70) 
stock volatility 0.401* -1.097*** 2.402*** 14.190** 
 
(1.91) (-3.98) (4.40) (2.00) 
leverage -0.026*** -0.007 0.066*** 0.342*** 
 
(-4.79) (-0.50) (5.47) (4.72) 
     Observations 29,839 29,839 29,839 29,839 
R-squared 0.095 0.298 0.446 0.046 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 6 Alternative Measures of Informational Uniqueness (Cont’d) 
Panel C:  Main Tests Using IV on Informational Uniqueness 
The table below examines the main test specifications from Tables 3 to 5 using abnormal 
volatility during earnings announcements in column (1), the frequency of bundled guidance in 
column (2), bid-ask spread in column (3) and Amihud’s measure of illiquidity in column (4), 
where uniqueness measure (txtunique_instrument) is the predicted value of informational 
uniqueness from the first-stage regression using the proportion of private firms in the firm’s 
primary NAICS 6-digit industry as instrument variable. Firm and year clustered t-statistics in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Abnormal  
Volatility 
Frequency of   
Bundled Guidance 
Spread Illiquid 
          
txtunique_instrument (+) 0.560*** 0.793*** 0.298*** 3.094*** 
 
(6.56) (5.82) (4.16) (2.82) 
inst. ownership 0.547*** 1.470*** -1.248*** -6.433*** 
 
(9.34) (10.43) (-8.20) (-3.44) 
analyst coverage 0.300*** 0.730*** -0.125*** 0.369 
 
(12.01) (12.47) (-4.03) (1.51) 
frequency - bundled 0.063*** 
 
-0.060*** -0.543*** 
 
(5.55) 
 
(-4.18) (-3.45) 
frequency - unbundled -0.055*** 
 
0.046*** 0.418** 
 
(-5.24) 
 
(3.08) (2.37) 
firm size 0.051*** 0.019 -0.191*** -1.128*** 
 
(5.30) (0.90) (-8.28) (-3.71) 
stock return 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.009** 
 
(3.91) (4.21) (-0.07) (-2.14) 
mb ratio -0.001 0.004 -0.050*** -0.327*** 
 
(-0.19) (0.72) (-6.20) (-4.33) 
roa ratio 0.005* 0.007* -0.010* -0.034 
 
(1.66) (1.79) (-1.73) (-0.81) 
years of listing -0.005*** -0.008*** 0.003*** 0.027 
 
(-4.17) (-3.74) (2.64) (1.64) 
stock beta 0.049*** 0.056** -0.180*** -1.386*** 
 
(3.01) (2.20) (-5.40) (-2.76) 
stock volatility 0.598*** -0.431 2.400*** 14.985** 
 
(4.11) (-1.63) (5.25) (2.02) 
leverage -0.022*** -0.004 0.075*** 0.400*** 
 
(-3.42) (-0.27) (5.14) (4.54) 
     
Observations 26,813 26,813 26,813 26,813 
1
st
 Stage K-P Wald F 
statistic 74.58 74.58 74.58 74.58 
R-squared 0.041 0.213 0.427 0.037 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 7 Controlling for Competition Perspective 
Panel A:  Main Tests Controlling for Total Number of U.S. Public and Private Firms in the 
Industry  
The table below examines the main test specifications from Tables 3 to 5 using abnormal 
volatility during earnings announcements in column (1), the frequency of bundled guidance in 
column (2), the bid-ask spread in column (3) and Amihud’s measure of illiquidity in column (4), 
where the logarithm of the total number of U.S. public and private firms operating in the same 
primary 6-digit NAICS code (totindpeersize) is added alongside my main measure of 
informational uniqueness (txtunique)  as an additional control. Firm and year clustered t-statistics 
in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Abnormal 
Volatility 
Frequency of   
Bundled 
Guidance 
Spread Illiquid 
          
txtunique (+) 0.158*** 0.206*** 0.068*** 0.653*** 
 
(10.21) (8.94) (5.48) (3.33) 
totindpeersize  -0.000 0.019* 0.017** 0.195** 
 
(-0.01) (1.66) (2.51) (2.41) 
inst. ownership 0.584*** 1.595*** -1.232*** -6.273*** 
 
(10.90) (10.18) (-7.82) (-3.31) 
analyst coverage 0.201*** 0.616*** -0.179*** -0.199 
 
(12.45) (12.89) (-6.34) (-0.71) 
frequency - bundled 0.098*** 
 
-0.041*** -0.337*** 
 
(9.47) 
 
(-3.28) (-3.03) 
frequency - unbundled -0.063*** 
 
0.041*** 0.372** 
 
(-6.95) 
 
(3.14) (2.39) 
firm size 0.026*** -0.022 -0.206*** -1.288*** 
 
(3.53) (-1.12) (-8.32) (-3.66) 
stock return 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.009** 
 
(3.50) (4.80) (0.19) (-2.04) 
mb ratio -0.003 0.001 -0.051*** -0.336*** 
 
(-0.76) (0.18) (-6.03) (-4.12) 
roa ratio 0.002 0.002 -0.012** -0.053 
 
(0.52) (0.58) (-2.02) (-1.17) 
years of listing -0.001 -0.001 0.006*** 0.057*** 
 
(-0.81) (-0.41) (5.13) (2.74) 
stock beta 0.049*** 0.059*** -0.178*** -1.371*** 
 
(2.80) (2.68) (-5.51) (-2.66) 
stock volatility 0.333* -0.858*** 2.256*** 13.551* 
 
(1.94) (-3.03) (4.82) (1.82) 
leverage -0.023*** -0.005 0.074*** 0.391*** 
 
(-4.05) (-0.35) (4.91) (4.21) 
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     Observations 26,791 26,791 26,791 26,791 
R-squared 0.101 0.310 0.450 0.047 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 7 Controlling for Competition Perspective (Cont’d) 
Panel B:  Main Tests Controlling for Herfindahl Index Computed from US Census Data 
The table below examines the main test specifications from Tables 3 to 5 using abnormal 
volatility during earnings announcements in column (1), the frequency of bundled guidance in 
column (2), the bid-ask spread in column (3) and Amihud’s measure of illiquidity in column (4), 
where industry concentration ratio represented by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the 50 
largest companies from the US 2007 Economic Census data is added alongside my main measure 
of informational uniqueness (txtunique) as an additional control. The sample is restricted to US 
manufacturing firms only due to data availability on industry concentration ratio. Firm and year 
clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Abnormal 
Volatility 
Frequency of   
Bundled 
Guidance 
Spread Illiquid 
          
txtunique (+) 0.131*** 0.144*** 0.111*** 0.788** 
 
(5.39) (4.72) (4.70) (2.47) 
US Census herfindahl -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
 
(-0.21) (2.91) (-0.83) (0.45) 
inst. ownership 0.549*** 1.338*** -1.386*** -6.324*** 
 
(7.22) (7.93) (-6.77) (-3.30) 
analyst coverage 0.159*** 0.534*** -0.154*** -0.048 
 
(6.08) (10.54) (-4.57) (-0.11) 
frequency - bundled 0.105*** 
 
-0.027* -0.217* 
 
(9.62) 
 
(-1.70) (-1.77) 
frequency - unbundled -0.051*** 
 
0.062*** 0.319** 
 
(-3.59) 
 
(4.68) (2.14) 
firm size 0.021 0.114*** -0.248*** -1.430*** 
 
(1.52) (3.93) (-7.69) (-4.04) 
stock return 0.001** 0.001*** 0.000* -0.005 
 
(2.03) (3.45) (1.89) (-1.41) 
mb ratio -0.004 -0.010 -0.067*** -0.417*** 
 
(-0.55) (-0.99) (-5.94) (-3.50) 
roa ratio 0.626*** 0.339*** -0.239*** -2.096 
 
(7.56) (4.23) (-3.67) (-1.00) 
years of listing -0.001 -0.007*** 0.007*** 0.055** 
 
(-1.03) (-2.80) (4.13) (2.37) 
stock beta 0.069*** 0.035 -0.165*** -0.838** 
 
(2.96) (1.15) (-4.55) (-2.41) 
stock volatility 0.523** -1.053*** 1.694*** 1.574 
 
(2.41) (-3.09) (2.60) (0.27) 
leverage -0.020 -0.000 0.131*** 0.754*** 
 
(-1.51) (-0.01) (4.64) (5.15) 
     Observations 12,176 12,212 12,206 12,182 
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R-squared 0.120 0.382 0.452 0.044 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 8 Additional Controls for Robustness Checks 
Panel A:  Main Tests with Additional Firm Characteristics as Controls 
The table below examines the main test specifications from Tables 3 to 5 using abnormal 
volatility during earnings announcements in column (1), the frequency of bundled guidance in 
column (2), the bid-ask spread in column (3) and Amihud’s measure of illiquidity in column (4), 
where additional controls,  such as indicator for loss firms, asset turnover, FPS (1994) high-
litigation risk industries, counts of words in 10-K filings to describe protected sources of 
competitive advantage (e.g. patents), industry concentration, number of industrial segment, 
number of geographical segments, Franco et. al. (2011) accounting comparability, are included in 
addition to standard firm controls in prior tables. Firm and year clustered t-statistics in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Abnormal 
Volatility 
Frequency of   
Bundled Guidance 
Spread Illiquid 
          
txtunique indicator(+) 0.138*** 0.137** 0.201*** 2.014** 
 (5.80) (2.42) (3.67) (2.24) 
txtunique indicator* 
  
-0.248*** -2.274** 
bundled guider (-) 
  
(-4.06) (-2.38) 
bundled guider (-) 
  
-0.003 0.181 
   
(-0.10) (0.67) 
   
Standard Firm 
Controls INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
 
  
  
Additional Controls     
     
loss firms -0.211*** -0.177** 0.118*** 1.154** 
 (-6.06) (-2.29) (4.24) (2.19) 
asset turnover 0.125*** 0.011 0.107*** 0.697** 
 (6.42) (0.24) (3.23) (2.55) 
FPS litigation 
industries 0.188*** 0.392*** 0.066** 0.618 
 
(4.33) (5.22) (2.26) (1.50) 
word counts about 0.000 -0.002** -0.001** 0.001 
protected advantage (0.10) (-2.34) (-2.34) (0.24) 
Compustat industry  0.398*** 0.127 0.010 -0.174 
concentration (4.93) (0.80) (0.15) (-0.33) 
# industry segments 0.008 0.048* -0.001 0.024 
 
(0.68) (1.92) (-0.13) (0.44) 
# geo. segments 0.024** 0.062*** 0.004 0.187 
 
(2.23) (4.22) (0.71) (0.80) 
accounting 
comparability 0.016 0.098*** -0.108*** -0.649** 
 
(1.43) (3.20) (-2.89) (-2.11) 
     
Observations 13,879 12,212 13,879 13,879 
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R-squared 0.085 0.229 0.447 0.028 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table 9 Time Series Variation   
Panel A: Decreases in Uniqueness due to IPOs of Close Peers 
The table shows the changes in announcement volatility around annual earnings announcement, 
the presence of regular bundled guidance policy, the bid-ask spread and Amihud’s measure of 
illiquidity (illiquid) for a subsample of 44 firms that experience a decrease in information 
uniqueness after the IPOs of their close peers. Postevent is an indicator variable for years 0, 1 and 
2 relative to their peer IPO date. Samples only include at most 3 years before and after the event 
depending on data availability. Sample of columns (2) is post-2002 due to data requirement on 
guidance. Firm and year clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Announcement 
Volatility 
Regular 
Bundled 
Guidance 
Spread Illiquid 
          
postevent(-ve) -0.004 -0.023 -1.407*** -2.186* 
 
(-0.47) (-0.26) (-3.90) (-1.67) 
     
Observations 232 116 233 233 
R-squared 0.206 0.578 0.624 0.294 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Panel B: Difference-in-Difference with Matched Firms as Controls 
The table shows the difference-in-difference in announcement volatility around annual earnings 
announcement, the presence of regular bundled guidance policy, the bid-ask spread and Amihud’s 
measure of illiquidity (illiquid) for a subsample of 44 firms that experience a decrease in 
information uniqueness after the IPOs of their close peers relative to their size-matched firms 
with similar prior uniqueness, analyst coverage and profitability. Postevent is an indicator 
variable for years 0, 1 and 2 relative to their peer IPO date. Treated is an indicator variable for 
firms that experience a decrease in information uniqueness due to peer IPOs. Samples only 
include at most 3 years before and after the event depending on data availability. Sample of 
columns (2) is post-2002 due to data requirement on guidance. Firm and year clustered t-statistics 
in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Announcement 
Volatility 
Regular 
Bundled 
Guidance 
Spread Illiquid 
postevent*treated(-ve) -0.010 -0.030 -0.903** -2.199* 
 
(-0.86) (-0.37) (-2.13) (-1.72) 
postevent 0.008 0.121 -0.034* 0.967 
 
(0.71) (1.15) (0.16) (0.84) 
     
Observations 487 236 488 487 
R-squared 0.305 0.760 0.610 0.401 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
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Figure 1 Uniqueness and Information Environment 
Part A: Bid-Ask Spread 
Figure 1A below shows the plot of bid-ask spread across different quartiles of uniqueness 
(txtunique).  Dotted columns represent the average spread in each quartile of uniqueness without 
controls. Solid columns represent the estimated spread in each quartile of uniqueness in the model 
with standard firm controls assuming other firm characteristics being the same as sample median.   
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Figure 1A. Uniqueness and Spread 
Without Controls With Controls
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Figure 1 Uniqueness and Information Environment (Cont’d) 
Part B: Bid-Ask Spread 
Figure 1B below shows the plot of bid-ask spread across different quartiles of uniqueness 
(txtunique) conditional on the presence of regular bundled guidance or not. Solid columns are 
from samples of firms without regular bundled guidance while dotted columns are from samples 
of firms with regular bundled guidance. Spread in each quartile of uniqueness within each 
subsample is estimated using the model with standard firm controls assuming other firm 
characteristics being the same as sample median.   
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Figure 1B. Uniqueness and Spread Conditional on Guidance 
Non Rugular Bundled Guiders Regular Bundled Guiders
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Figure 1 Uniqueness and Information Environment (Cont’d) 
Part C:  Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (2002) 
Figure 1C below shows the plot of Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (2002) across different 
quartiles of uniqueness (txtunique).  Dotted columns represent the average illiquidity in each 
quartile of uniqueness without controls. Solid columns represent the estimated illiquidity in each 
quartile of uniqueness in the model with standard firm controls assuming other firm 
characteristics being the same as sample median.   
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Figure 1 Uniqueness and Information Environment (Cont’d) 
Part D:  Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (2002) 
Figure 1D below shows the plot of Amihud’s measure of illiquidity (2002) across different 
quartiles of uniqueness (txtunique) conditional on the presence of regular bundled guidance. Solid 
columns are from samples of firms without regular bundled guidance while dotted columns are 
from firms with regular bundled guidance. Illiquidity in each uniqueness quartile within each 
subsample is estimated using the model with standard firm controls assuming other firm 
characteristics being the same as sample median.   
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Figure 1D. Uniqueness and Illiquidity Conditional on Guidance 
Non Rugular Bundled Guiders Regular Bundled Guiders
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CHAPTER 2 
Peer Dynamics and Discretionary Disclosure 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I investigate how multi-firm dynamics influence discretionary 
disclosure behaviors
29
. While the presence of comparable public peers should increase 
investors’ overall information endowment on the underlying firm over their common 
exposures, it also provides investors expanded knowledge about the timing of 
information arrival for managers. Although prior empirical research has demonstrated the 
presence of within-industry information transfers from earnings announcements (e.g. 
Foster 1981) and management forecasts (e.g. Baginski 1987), it is unclear if investors can 
always perfectly understand the implications of peer disclosures on the underlying firm. 
If investors can see through the implications, it is possible that the underlying firm can 
free-ride on the information transfer from peers, therefore negating the need to provide 
additional discretionary disclosures if they are costly. However, if investors are unable to 
determine whether the absence of disclosure is due to the absence of new information or 
strategic information withholding, discretionary disclosures by peer firms may signal the 
possibility of information arrival to the underlying firm, raising investors’ uncertainty and 
assessed likelihood that non-disclosure is due to deliberate information withholding 
rather than the absence of new information. Whether such peer dynamics suppress or 
                                                          
29
 In this paper, I focus on examining ex-post discretionary disclosure behaviors by firms upon signal 
arrival, instead of ex-ante commitment to disclosure.  
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induce more discretionary disclosures remain largely unanswered by prior empirical 
literature.  
Prior theoretical literature on discretionary disclosure using a single-firm setting has 
generally shown that a firm’s propensity to provide discretionary disclosure increases as 
disclosure-related cost decreases (e.g. Verrecchia 1983) or as investors’ assessed 
probability that the firm receives information increases (e.g. Dye 1985, Jung and Kwon 
1988).  The two most closely related papers using a multi-firm setting include Dye and 
Sridhar (1995) and Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012). Dye and Sridhar (1995) 
generally predicts “herding” behavior in discretionary disclosure as long as there is 
positive correlation among firms’ receipt of information. It suggests that a firm’s 
equilibrium disclosure policy depends on whether the information the firm receives is 
“private knowledge” or “industry-wide common knowledge”. Jorgensen and 
Kirschenheiter (2012) consider a sequential discretionary disclosure setting. It predicts a 
higher disclosure threshold by the follower due to information free-riding if the signals 
are positively correlated, and a lower disclosure threshold by the follower due to negative 
information externalities if the signals are negatively correlated. Despite these theoretical 
works, it remains to be empirically tested whether some of these conditions are more 
prevalent for firms in general.   
Within groups of comparable peers, I expect that both the information arrival 
processes and signals should be positively correlated on average as prior empirical 
studies generally find a positive coefficient on within-industry information transfer. 
While positive correlation in information arrival processes generally predicts a lower 
disclosure threshold (Dye and Sridhar 1995), positive correlation in information signals 
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may predict a higher disclosure threshold for the follower due to the possibility of 
information free-riding if disclosure is costly (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2012). 
However, the free-riding argument may not hold if discretionary disclosures after peer 
disclosures are not that costly. If much of the information has already been transferred 
from peers for free-riding to occur, subsequent discretionary disclosures by the 
underlying firm is unlikely to bear significant disclosure cost (e.g., proprietary cost), 
other than small administrative costs in drafting and sending out press releases. In 
addition, free-riding may be less likely to happen in the first place if investors have 
difficulty interpreting the implications of peer disclosures on the underlying firm. 
Due to possibly correlated signal arrival processes among comparable peer firms, 
investors may increase their perceived probability of information arrival for the 
underlying firm whenever any of its close peer firms discloses. This may raise the 
uncertainty among investors as well as their assessed likelihood that the absence of 
disclosure by the underlying firm is due to deliberate information withholding by 
manager for strategic reasons rather than due to the absence of new information, 
consequently lowering the disclosure threshold for the underlying firm (Jung and Kwon 
1988, Dye and Sridhar 1995). In addition, if information transfer is noisy and 
confirmatory discretionary disclosures are not so costly, investors may have a preference 
for firms providing discretionary disclosures to resolve the residual uncertainty or even 
just to confirm prior market expectations in response to peer disclosures. As firms with 
more comparable public peers are more often exposed to such peer dynamics, I expect 
that this can induce a higher frequency of discretionary disclosure for these firms.  
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In the paper, I identify a firm’s closest peer by the firm with the highest textual 
similarity in the business description section of 10-K filings using a vector space model. I 
measure the number of comparable public peers for a firm by the number of public firms 
sharing high textual similarity with the underlying firm. An alternative measure based on 
similarity in business segment distribution is also used as a robustness check. In addition, 
the analysis on the frequency of discretionary disclosure is also conducted at the industry-
level using the number of public firms in each industry to represent the size of peer 
groups based on three widely used industry classification schemes respectively
30
. To 
measure the frequency of discretionary disclosure, I use the annual frequency of 
“voluntary” 8-K filing under Item 2.02, Item 7.01 or Item 8.01, similar to Cooper, et al. 
(2015). Alternatively, I also use a measure that excludes Item 2.02, which consists of 
mostly earnings announcements, to represent the more discretionary disclosures.  
I start my analyses by investigating whether the discretionary disclosures by peers 
may raise the uncertainty among investors over the underlying firm with no 
contemporaneous disclosure. I examine the changes in the daily closing bid-ask spread of 
the underlying firm when its closest peer provides discretionary disclosures on major 
updates of business conditions
31
. Controlling for contemporaneous disclosure by the 
underlying firm, I find that the bid-ask spread increases slightly, by 9 basis points, on 
average across the underlying firm after the discretionary disclosure of its closest peer. 
                                                          
30
 The three industry classification schemes include North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS), Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), and Global Industry Classifications Standard (GICS).  
31
 In my sample, major business updates refer to client announcements, guidance updates, business 
expansions, business reorganizations, product announcements, strategic alliances, conference calls. These 
major business updates likely have some implications about the underlying firm either through their 
common exposures or competitive positions. 
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However, the presence of subsequent discretionary disclosure by the underlying firm 
appears to be able to largely restore the bid-ask spread back to its status before its peer 
discloses. The results suggest that firms may not be able to completely free-ride on the 
discretionary disclosures from peers as investors may find it difficult to perfectly interpret 
the implications of peer discretionary disclosures on the underlying firm without its 
concurrent discretionary disclosure. The results are also consistent with investors 
possibly increasing their assessed likelihood that non-disclosure is due to strategic 
information withholding from an increased perceived probability of information arrival 
from peer disclosure.  
Next, I examine whether the presence of comparable peers induces a higher 
frequency of discretionary disclosure using both industry-level and firm-level analyses. 
In the industry-level analyses, I find that the number of public firms in each industry 
defined using any of the SIC, NAICS and GICS industry classifications is positively 
associated with the average annual frequency of discretionary disclosure per firm in the 
industry. This relationship is present in both cross-sectional and time-series variations.  In 
the firm-level analyses, I also find that the number of comparable public peers identified 
using textual analyses on their 10-K business description is positively associated with the 
annual frequency of discretionary disclosure for each firm. Among the sample of firms 
that provide management guidance, I also find that the number of comparable public 
peers is positively associated with the frequency of unbundled guidance, which resembles 
discretionary disclosure upon information arrival in the context of management guidance. 
These results provide strong evidence consistent with the presence of comparable peers 
inducing a higher frequency of discretionary disclosure.  
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To provide further evidence for such peer dynamics, I examine how the business 
similarity between the underlying firm and its closest peer relates to the timing of 
discretionary disclosures between them. Using the Cox proportional hazard model, I find 
that higher similarity between the underlying firm and its closest peer is associated with a 
higher likelihood of subsequent discretionary disclosure by the other firm when any one 
of the firms in the pair provides discretionary disclosure first. Using OLS regression, I 
also find that the number of days between the closest discretionary disclosures of the 
underlying firm and its closest peer is smaller if the similarity between the underlying 
firm and its closest peer is higher. I repeat the tests for the relationships with the second-, 
third- and fourth-closest peers and find similar results. Thus, when a firm has many close 
public peers, the presence of peer dynamics from its numerous peers likely induces the 
firm to provide discretionary disclosure more frequently.  
My study contributes to the burgeoning empirical literature on multi-firm dynamics 
of discretionary disclosure (e.g., Tse and Tucker 2010, Rogers et al. 2014). While Tse 
and Tucker (2010) find evidence supporting a clustering in the timing of earnings 
warnings within industries, my results suggest that having more comparable public peers 
induces a higher frequency of discretionary disclosure due to the presence of peer 
dynamics. In relation to Rogers et al. (2014), my results may also suggest that having a 
larger industry size can make tacit collusion to withhold industry-wide news more 
difficult. In the paper, I also utilize the details of 8-K filings to construct a more 
comprehensive frequency measure for discretionary disclosure instead of relying on the 
traditional management forecast frequency measure.  
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The study also adds to the information transfer literature that what investors can learn 
from peer discretionary disclosures involve not only the content of news, but also the 
arrival of information arrival for the underlying firm. The slight increase in the bid-ask 
spread for non-disclosure firms in the presence of peer discretionary disclosures also 
suggests that investors may not be able to always perfectly understand the implications of 
peer disclosures on the underlying firm. The results point to the possibility that peer 
disclosures can sometimes introduce additional uncertainty over whether the absence of 
disclosure by the underlying firm is due to strategic information withholding or the 
absence of new information.   
In addition, the results of the study may have implications on the discretionary 
disclosure behaviors with regard to the developmental stage of capital markets. In 
emerging markets with few public firms available in the capital markets, investors may 
have less knowledge on the arrival of information for public firms. Thus in some of the 
small emerging markets, peer dynamics that induce higher frequency of discretionary 
disclosure can be much weaker compared to the larger and more developed markets.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior 
literature and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 describes my variables measurement 
and research design. Section 4 presents my results. Section 5 concludes.   
2.  Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Related Literature 
Prior theoretical literature on discretionary disclosure using a single-firm setting has 
generally shown that a firm’s propensity to provide discretionary disclosure increases as 
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disclosure-related costs decrease (e.g. Verrecchia 1983) and as investors’ perceptions on 
the probability that the firm receives information increase (e.g. Dye 1985, Jung and 
Kwon 1988). The two most closely related theoretical papers using a multi-firm setting 
include Dye and Sridhar (1995) and Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012).
32
 
In Dye and Sridhar (1995), the model assumes that the probability of being informed 
is correlated but the private signals are uncorrelated. Dye and Sridhar (1995) generally 
predicts “herding” behavior in discretionary disclosure as long as there is positive 
correlation among firms’ receipt of information and suggests that a firm’s equilibrium 
disclosure policy depends on whether the information the firm receives is private 
knowledge or industry-wide common knowledge.  
In Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2012), the model assumes that the private signals 
are correlated with an exogenous leader and follower. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 
(2012) predict a higher disclosure threshold by the follower due to information free-
riding if the signals are positively correlated and a lower disclosure threshold by the 
follower due to negative information externality if the signals are negatively correlated. 
While the theoretical models provide some guidance on discretionary behaviors under 
certain assumptions and conditions, it remains to be empirically tested whether some of 
the conditions are more prevalent for firms in general. A key tension is whether firms can 
free-ride on the information transfer from peer disclosures through non-disclosure 
assuming that discretionary disclosures are costly or whether firms are induced to 
                                                          
32
 Another related paper is by Acharya, et al. (2011) which considers the strategic timing of information 
releases in a dynamic disclosure model and predicts clustering of negative announcements. However, the 
paper is more focused on the timing of discretionary disclosure. 
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disclose more frequently as investors infer a higher probability of information arrival 
from peer disclosures.   
In addition to the theory literature on multi-firm dynamics of discretionary disclosure, 
there is also a burgeoning empirical literature on multi-firm phenomenon with respect to 
discretionary disclosure. Brown et al. (2006) provides evidence on the existence of 
herding behavior in capital expenditure forecasts by firms. Tse and Tucker (2010) focus 
on the timing of bad-news discretionary disclosure and finds that firms speed up their 
warnings in response to peer firms’ warnings. They argue that this phenomenon is due to 
managers pooling bad-news disclosure with peers to minimize responsibility for earnings 
shortfalls. Rogers et al. (2014) investigates whether managers can tacitly collude to 
withhold industry-wide bad news and seek to understand what factors makes strategic 
cooperative withholding more likely. It documents some cases of increased intra-industry 
obfuscation of adverse signals in annual 10-K filings.  
Peer dynamics in discretionary disclosure is also related to the literature on within-
industry information transfers from earnings announcements (e.g. Foster 1981, Han and 
Wild 1990, Freeman and Tse 1992) and management forecasts (e.g. Baginski 1987, Han 
et. al. 1989).  While prior empirical literature has generally demonstrated the existence of 
within-industry information transfers, a few papers have pointed out that the information 
transfer may not be perfect. For example, Ramnath (2002) find some evidence consistent 
with investors and analysts not fully incorporating the information from the earnings 
report of the first announcers in the industry in their revised earnings expectations for 
subsequent announcers. On the other hand, Thomas and Zhang (2008) find some 
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evidence consistent with the stock market overestimating the intra-industry implications 
of early announcers’ earnings for late announcers’ earnings.  
While the above papers suggest that investors may have some trouble interpreting the 
information content from the earnings announcements from peer firms within an industry, 
there may be an additional factor for investors to consider when it comes to the 
discretionary disclosures by peer firms, i.e. the probability of information arrival for the 
underlying firm. While earnings announcements often follow a relatively fixed schedule, 
the initiation of discretionary disclosure may often signal information arrival for related 
firms. This may raise the uncertainty among investors regarding whether non-disclosure 
by firms is due to strategic withholding of information or the absence of new information.  
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1. Inferences on Non-Disclosure 
When a firm’s closest peer firm initiates any discretionary disclosure, investors may 
use the content in peer disclosures to infer the implications on the underlying firm. It is 
unclear if investors can perfectly make inferences on the news contained in peer 
disclosures. The news may have a common exposure element as well as a competitive 
element. In the case of earnings announcements, prior literature presents evidence for 
both underreaction (e.g. Ramnath 2002) or overreaction (e.g. Thomas and Zhang 2008) 
by investors on late announcers within an industry in different samples. If investors can 
perfectly interpret the implications on the underlying from peer disclosures, discretionary 
disclosures by peers likely further improves the information environment of the 
underlying firm. 
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On the other hand, if investors cannot perfectly interpret the information contained in 
peer disclosures, they may want the underlying firm to provide updates and clarifications 
on the situation. When their close peers provide discretionary disclosures, investors may 
infer a higher likelihood of information arrival for the underlying firm. If the underlying 
firm does not provide discretionary disclosure around the same time, investors may incur 
higher uncertainty in interpreting “non-disclosure” by the underlying firm and may assign 
an increasing likelihood that non-disclosure is due to strategic information withholding 
rather than due to the absence of new information.  
Thus, there may be an increase in the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders of the underlying firm when the closest peer provide discretionary disclosures 
but the underlying firm does not. The rise in perceived information uncertainty by 
outsiders is likely leading to higher bid-ask spread of the underlying firm (Glosten and 
Milgrom 1985).  For those underlying firms that also provide discretionary disclosures 
contemporaneously or in the near subsequent periods, I expect that the bid-ask spread of 
the underlying firm should likely stay flat or drop back to the initial level after 
disclosures
33
. This notion leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1: The bid-ask spread of the underlying firm with no contemporaneous discretionary 
disclosure increases after its closest peer provides business-related discretionary 
disclosure.   
2.2.2. Frequency of Discretionary Disclosure 
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 Parallel to this prediction, in the case of overreaction in intra-information transfer from earnings 
announcements, Thomas and Zhang (2008) finds that the overestimation is corrected when late announcers 
disclose their earnings. 
83 
 
In addition to possible information transfers from the discretionary disclosure, the 
initiation of discretionary disclosures by peer firms may also signal information arrival, 
which can raise investors’ inferred probability that non-disclosure is due to strategic 
information withholding rather than the absence of new information. While the 
possibility of free-riding on peer discretionary disclosures may reduce discretionary 
disclosures by the underlying firm, the increased perceived probability of information 
arrival may induce more discretionary disclosures by the underlying firm. My second 
hypothesis is concerned with how the extent of the presence of close public peers relates 
to the frequency of discretionary disclosure by firms. 
On one hand, if discretionary disclosure is costly and information transfer from peer 
discretionary disclosures is perfect, the underlying firm may incur positive information 
externality from peer discretionary disclosures (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2012). The 
underlying firm may thus potentially benefit from free-riding on the discretionary 
disclosures of peer firms and save on the disclosure cost. However, the free-riding 
argument may not hold if sequential discretionary disclosure is not that costly. If much of 
the information has been transferred from peers already for free-riding to occur, 
discretionary disclosure by the underlying firm is unlikely containing significant 
disclosure cost (e.g. proprietary cost of disclosure), other than some administrative costs 
in drafting and sending out press releases.  
On the other hand, investors may increase their perceived probability of information 
arrival for the underlying firm whenever a peer firm initiates any discretionary disclosure 
due to possibly correlated signal arrival processes among similar firms. Non-disclosure 
by the underlying firm may be more likely interpreted as due to strategic information 
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withholding instead of the absence of new information. An increased assessed probability 
of information arrival likely lowers the disclosure threshold for the underlying firm (Jung 
and Kwon 1988).  For firms with many comparable public peers, they are more often 
exposed to such group disclosure dynamics whenever some peer firms provide 
discretionary disclosures (Dye and Sridhar 1995).  
Thus, I expect that firms with many comparable public peers should have a higher 
frequency of discretionary disclosure under the influence of peer dynamics. There is 
potential positive feedback effect on discretionary disclosure among the groups of similar 
firms as more peer firms initiate discretionary disclosures and further increase investors’ 
perceived probability of information arrival for the remaining non-disclosure firms in the 
group. In addition, if information transfer is often imperfect and noisy, the possibility of 
negative information externality from information transfer may also induce some firms to 
initiate discretionary disclosures to correct for the imperfect information transfers 
(Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2012). This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: The number of comparable public peers is associated with a higher frequency of 
discretionary disclosure.  
2.2.3. Timing of Discretionary Disclosure 
Naturally, the timing on the incidence of events should be closer among more similar 
firms. The arrival of information should be more correlated among firms that have more 
similar business operations. If a firm’s closest peer is more similar to the underlying firm, 
investors are more likely to increase their assessed probability of information arrival 
when its closest peer initiates any discretionary disclosure. Non-disclosure by the 
underlying firm in the presence of peer disclosures may be viewed negatively due to the 
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possibility of strategic information withholding. Thus the underlying firm is more likely 
to provide discretionary disclosure contemporaneously to avoid the possible adverse 
interpretation of non-disclosure by investors. As an extension to my second hypothesis, I 
expect that the timing between discretionary disclosures between firm pairs that are more 
similar to each other should be on average shorter in duration. In other words, I expect 
that firms generally do not free-ride on peer discretionary disclosures through non-
disclosure themselves as information transfers alone may not be sufficient to fully resolve 
the information uncertainty by investors. Therefore: 
H3: The similarity between a firm and its close peer is associated with closer timing in 
discretionary disclosures between the two firms.  
3.  Variable Measurement and Research Design 
3.1 Measuring Peer Size 
3.1.1 Industry-Level Measure Based on Industry Classification 
I use the number of public firms within each industry based on 3 different widely 
used industry classification schemes as a measure of peer size at the industry-level. The 
finest industry classification scheme I use is North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) at the 6-digit level, with 1,131 industries in total. In addition, I use the 
traditional Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) scheme at its 4-digit level, with a size 
of 441 industries in total.  Lastly, I use the Global Industry Classifications Standard 
(GICS) at its 6-digit level to represent industry boundaries, with a size of 70 industries in 
total
34
.  
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 GICS was jointly developed by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) in 1999 basing its classification on a firm’s principal business activity. Bhojraj et al. (2002) 
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3.1.2 Firm-Level Measure Based on Textual Business Description 
Similar to the textual analysis methodology used in Chapter 1, I compute cosine 
similarity scores on the business description section in 10-Ks across all public firms using 
a vector space model with TF-IDF weighting scheme to compare similarities across 
firms. This measure assumes truthful disclosures by firms in the business description 
sections of 10-Ks, which are governed by regulation S-K. For my primary measure, the 
number of peer firms above a similarity threshold that classifies 25% of the firms as 
having no close comparable peer is used to represent the size of peer groups. I also 
include measures based on different levels of similarity threshold for counting peers as 
robustness checks and the results largely stay the same. More details on measure 
construction are included in Appendix B.  
3.2 Measuring Frequency of Discretionary Disclosure 
The frequency of discretionary disclosure is the key dependent variable of interest in 
the paper. Prior empirical literature has used the frequency of management forecasts as 
one of the common proxies for voluntary disclosure (e.g. Kasznik 1999, Baginski et al. 
2002, Ball et al. 2012, Li and Yang 2015). On the other hand, Rogers and Van Buskirk 
(2013) shows that firms are increasingly bundling their management forecasts with 
earnings announcements over time. Bundled guidance has evolved to be the most 
prevalent type of guidance. My first chapter argues that the practice of bundling guidance 
resembles a tacit ex-ante commitment to disclosure and may not highly discretionary. As 
I focus on understanding the ex-post discretionary disclosure behaviors by firms upon the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
provides more details on GICS and also shows that GICS classifications are better at explaining stock 
return comovements and cross-sectional variations in various accounting ratios.  
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arrival of signals in this paper, I can potentially use the frequency of unbundled guidance 
as a proxy for the frequency of discretionary disclosure in the context of management 
guidance
35
.  
However, management guidance is just one out of many types of discretionary 
disclosure issued by firms. Firms may issue press releases to inform investors upon 
product launches, client announcements, strategic alliances, business reorganization, etc. 
One potential way to measure the frequency of discretionary disclosure more 
comprehensively is by the annual frequency of “voluntary” 8-K filings under “Item 2.02 
Results of Operations and Financial Conditions”, “Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure” 
or “Item 8.01 Other Events”, similar to the 8-K item classification scheme on voluntary 
disclosure by Lerman and Livant (2010) as well as Cooper et al. (2015)
36
. Such 
classification will naturally include both the frequency of bundled and unbundled 
guidance in the measure
37
. However, as Item 2.02 often contains a firm’s earnings 
announcements which are regarded as regular disclosure usually, I also measure the 
frequency of discretionary disclosure using “Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure” or 
“Item 8.01 Other Events” from 8-K filings only, in attempt to better capture disclosures 
that are more discretionary
38
. The results using both measures are largely similar in the 
paper.  
                                                          
35
 I use this measure in column (4) of Table 5 as additional analysis. 
36
 There was a major overhaul over 8-K filings in August 2004 but these three items were largely 
unchanged. However, these three items were numbered differently prior to the overhaul:  “Item 12. Results 
Operations”, “Item 9. Regulation FD Disclosure”, “Item 5. Other Events”.  My results are robust to the 
exclusion of 8-K filings before the overhaul in 2004.   
37
 Bundled guidance is likely contained in “Item 2.02” of 8-K filings while unbundled guidance is likely 
contained in “Item 7.01” of 8-K filings.  
38
 Public companies are required to report material corporate events on a current basis using 8-K forms. 
While much of the 8-K filings are likely linked to mandatory disclosures upon the occurrence of certain 
88 
 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Inferences on Non-Disclosure 
To understand how investors’ inferences on the underlying firm changes when its 
closest peer initiates discretionary disclosure, I examine the changes in the bid-ask spread 
of the underlying firm when its closest peer initiates discretionary disclosure as well as 
when the underlying firm also subsequently provides discretionary disclosure within a 7-
day window after peer disclosure.  
To construct my sample of events, I first include all 8-K filings under Item 2.02, Item 
7.01 and 8.01 by each firm’s closest peer identified through textual analysis on the 10-K 
business description. Then I match all these discretionary 8-K filings with the Capital IQ 
Key Development database using the date of the earliest report in 8-K filings as the event 
date. I only include matched discretionary disclosures related to the following major 
corporate event types for my sample of event: client announcements, product 
announcements, business expansions, business reorganizations, strategic alliances, 
corporate guidance and conference calls. These major corporate events are chosen 
because they are likely to have implications on the underlying firm due to either common 
exposures or competition concerns. Next, I search for the closest discretionary disclosure 
made by the underlying firm for each event, i.e. discretionary disclosure from its closest 
peer, and exclude all events in which the underlying firm provides discretionary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
material corporate events, firms are also required to file an 8-K filing under either “Item 7.01” or “Item 
8.01” for any material discretionary disclosures. For example, if a firm voluntarily releases press releases 
providing updates on management guidance, product launches, new business developments, etc., it also 
tends to file an 8-K filing with the press releases as exhibits to satisfy the disclosure requirements.  Some 
examples of 8-K filings under “Item 7.01” or “Item 8.01” are provided in Appendix C. By including 8-Ks 
containing “Item 7.01” and “Item 8.01” only in counting frequency, this measure will mostly exclude the 
frequency of bundled guidance but include the frequency of unbundled guidance.  
89 
 
disclosures first, i.e. within 7 days before its closest peer discloses. My final sample 
consists of 27,867 peer disclosure events and includes observations of daily bid-ask 
spread for the underlying firm within a [-7 days, +7 days] window around the date of 
each event.  
I measure the bid-ask spread as the difference between daily closing ask price and bid 
price divided by the mid-point of daily closing bid and ask price. I code  event date as an 
indicator for the date of the earliest report of the discretionary disclosure found in the 8-K 
filings by the closest peer, after event as an indicator for dates following the event date 
[+1 day, +7 days] , post event as an indicator for dates on and following the event date [0, 
+7 days]. In addition, I code disclose date as an indicator for the date of the earliest report 
of the discretionary disclosure by the underlying firm within a [0, +7 days] window 
around the event date, after disclosure as an indicator for dates following the disclosure 
date [disclose date+1, +7 days], and post disclosure as an indicator for dates on and 
following the disclosure date [disclose date, +7 days]. 
To examine how the market inferences on the underlying firm changes when its 
closest peer initiates any discretionary disclosure, I regress the daily closing bid-ask 
spread of the underlying firm on the indicators for days on and after peer disclosure (post 
event) and for days on and after corresponding disclosure by the underlying firm (post 
disclosure), with event fixed effect. To be consistent with H1, I expect that the coefficient 
on post event in (1) below should be positive and the coefficient on post disclosure in (1) 
below should be negative, as peer disclosure increases investors’ uncertainty on the 
implications of “non-disclosure” but subsequent disclosure by the underlying firm 
reduces investors’ uncertainty. In another specification, I further break down post event 
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into peer disclosure date (event date) and days after peer disclosure (after event) and 
break down post disclosure into disclosure date by the underlying firm (disclose date) 
and days after disclosure by the underlying firm (after disclosure).   
Bid-Ask Spread = α + β1 Post Event +β2 Post Disclosure + β4 Event F.E. + ε --- (1) 
3.3.2 Frequency of Discretionary Disclosure 
To examine how the frequency of discretionary disclosure is associated with the 
number of comparable public peers, I mainly rely on the cross-sectional variations across 
firms. The number of comparable public peers is likely an inherent and sticky property in 
relation to all other firms in the universe of public firms. It depends not only on the 
actions of the firm itself but also other firms. As firms likely cannot change their number 
of comparable peers easily without substantially change the nature of their businesses, 
there should be little concern over reverse causality bias in such a cross-sectional 
research design. 
Major identification threats include measurement errors with respect to the 
uniqueness measures as well as correlated omitted variable bias. To mitigate concerns for 
measurement errors, I use peer size measured both at the industry-level using 3 different 
traditional industry classification schemes as well as at the firm-level using identified 
comparable peer firms by textual analyses on business description in 10-K filings. I have 
also included various controls for firm characteristics, such as analyst coverage, 
institutional ownership, firm size, stock returns, stock beta, market-to-book ratio, stock 
return volatility, years of listing, profitability, leverage, etc. to mitigate concerns for 
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correlated omitted variables. More control variables are also included in additional 
analyses for robustness checks. 
In the industry-level analysis, I include all U.S. industries with listed public firms 
from 1996 to 2013 using NAICS 6-digit code, SIC 4-digit code and GIC 6-digit code 
respectively.
39
  In firm-level analysis, I include all U.S. public firms from 2002 to 2013 
where financial reporting, returns, guidance, industry classification, and valid textual 
business description data are available from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, IBES, and SEC 
Edgar filings. I exclude firms in regulated industries such as utilities and banking as there 
are often different disclosure requirements for these firms. After imposing further data 
requirement on major control variables, the sample with firm-level data used in most 
specifications comprises of 33,277 observations. 
In my preliminary industry-level analysis, I regress the average frequency of 
discretionary disclosure per firm within an industry on the number of firms within an 
industry, with or without year fixed effects. In my main firm-level analysis, I regress the 
frequency of voluntary 8-K filings on the number of comparable peers identified through 
textual analysis, and other firm-level controls. To be consistent with H2, the sign for the 
coefficients on peer size should be positive in (2) when using either industry-level or 
firm-level peer size measure. I further separate the frequency of discretionary disclosure 
into those with positive news and negative news respectively in my analyses
40
. 
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 As GICS industry classification is unavailable before 1999 from COMPUSTAT, I assume that the 
industry assignment of each firm prior to 1999 is the same as that in 1999 or later when data is available.  
40
 I categorize discretionary disclosure as containing positive news or negative news if abnormal returns are 
above or below 0% within a [-1 day, +1 day] window around its date of first report as identified from the 8-
K filings. Based on traditional discretionary disclosure model in which managers try to maximize the share 
price without considering any litigation costs, “peer dynamics” may manifest slight more in terms of higher 
frequency of discretionary disclosure with negative news if the discretionary threshold is lower in the 
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Conditional on firms providing management guidance, I also run a regression with the 
frequency of unbundled guidance as the dependent variable. Among guiding firms, I 
expect that the number of comparable peers is positively associated with the frequency of 
unbundled guidance, which is likely more discretionary in nature. 
Frequency of Discretionary Disclosure=α+β1Peer Size+β2Controls+β4 Year FE+ε --- (2) 
3.3.3 Timing of Discretionary Disclosure 
A commonly used method in analyzing the timing of incidents is duration analysis. I 
measure the timing of discretionary disclosure as the number of days between the closest 
discretionary disclosure from the peer and the discretionary disclosure from the 
underlying firm. For each discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm, I match it with 
the closest peer’s closest discretionary disclosure in terms of disclosure timing. This 
generates a total 245,202 observations matching discretionary disclosure between the 
underlying firm and its closest peer from 1996 to 2013, conditional on the duration 
between discretionary disclosures of the underlying firm and the closest discretionary 
disclosure of its closet peer below 90 days. As the similarity between the underlying firm 
and its closest peer firm varies in cross-section, H3 predicts that higher similarity 
between the pairs will be associated with shorter duration between their discretionary 
disclosures.   
First, I try to estimate a simple Cox proportional hazard model to conduct the 
duration analysis in Table 6. In this case, the hazard refers to the probability that its 
                                                                                                                                                                             
presence of peer disclosure. However, managers may also have incentives to be “forthcoming” in 
disclosure for both good and bad news due to litigation or reputational concerns. If information transfer is 
imperfect, the underlying firm may make confirmatory disclosures for both good and bad news to reduce 
residual investors’ uncertainty. 
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closest peer provides discretionary disclosure on a particular day either before or after 
from the day that the underlying firm initiates discretionary disclosure. Thus the hazard 
function can be interpreted as inversely related to the duration between discretionary 
disclosure from the closest peer and the underlying firm. Cox proportional hazard model 
as represented by (3) below specifies a common baseline hazard for all firms h0(ti) and 
allow individual firms’ hazard function h(ti) to differ proportionally with the similarity 
between the underlying firm and its closest peer, which is measured by the decile ranks of 
the textual similarity score (similarity decile) between the closest peer firm and the 
underlying firm in each year. To be consistent with H3, the coefficient on similarity 
decile should be positive, representing a higher likelihood of disclosure if the peer firm is 
more similar to the underlying firm.  
For the full sample in Panel A, variable t represents the number of days apart from the 
discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm when the closest peer firm provides 
discretionary disclosure, either before or after the disclosure of the underlying firm. In 
Panel B, I restrict the sample to situations in which the peer firm discloses before the 
underlying firm. Thus variable t represents the number of days before the discretionary 
disclosure of the underlying firm when its closest firm provides discretionary disclosure. 
In Panel C, I restrict the sample to situations in which the peer discloses after the 
underlying firm. Thus variable t represents the number of days after the discretionary 
disclosure of the underlying firm when its closest firm provides discretionary disclosure. 
In addition to matching with the discretionary disclosure of the closest peer firm, I also 
match the discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm with the 2
nd
 closest, 3
rd
 closest 
and 4
th
 closest firm to show that this phenomenon holds across peer pairs in general.  
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h(ti) = h0(ti) exp [ b0 Similarity Decile + ∑ bk Year Dummyk ] --- (3) 
Second, I run a similar analysis using the more intuitive OLS regression framework 
with additional control variables in Table 7. Similar to Table 6, the sample is also 
conditional on the duration between discretionary disclosures of the underlying firm and 
its closet peer below 90 days. In the regression, my dependent variable uses the number 
of days apart from the discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm when the closest 
peer firm provides discretionary disclosure, either before or after the disclosure of the 
underlying firm. Major independent variable of interest is the similarity between the 
underlying firm and its closest peer (similarity decile). To be consistent with H3, I expect 
the coefficient on similarity decile to be negative in (4). I have also included various 
controls for firm characteristics, such as analyst coverage, institutional ownership, firm 
size, stock returns, stock beta, market-to-book ratio, stock return volatility, years of 
listing, profitability, leverage, etc. 
Number of Days Apart= α + β1 Similarity Decile +β2 Controls+ β4 Year FE + ε --- (4) 
4. Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for the main variables in various tests in the 
paper. The average annual frequency of 8-K filings which contains either Item 2.02, 7.01 
or 9.01 is about 6.1, with about 3.0 filings containing positive news and 3.1 filings 
contain negative news. The average annual frequency of 8-K filings which contain either 
Item 7.01 or 9.01 is about 4.3.  This suggests that some of 8-Ks contain both Item 2.02 
and Item 7.01/Item 9.01 in one filing. The average size of the peer group is 5.06 when 
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defining comparable peers based on textual analysis on business description using a 
similarity threshold that defines 25% of firms in each year peerless.
41
  Table 2 displays 
the correlation table for the major variables used in the main test of Table 5. The 
correlation between peer size and frequency of discretionary disclosure is highly positive, 
providing preliminary support to my hypothesis in the paper. 
4.2 Inferences on Non-Disclosure 
In Table 3, I examine how the uncertainty of market inference on the underlying firm 
changes when its closest peer initiates discretionary disclosure by regressing daily closing 
bid-ask spread on indicators for days on and after peer disclosures and days on and after 
disclosures by the underlying firm, with the inclusion of event fixed effect.   
The result from column (1) suggest that there is a slight increase in bid-ask spread 
after the closest peer firm initiates discretionary disclosure but the coefficient on post 
event is not statistically significant, possibly due to some firms also provide 
contemporaneous discretionary disclosures to remove the hanging uncertainty of “non-
disclosure”. In column (2), after adding an additional independent variable post 
disclosure to control for the possible contemporaneous discretionary disclosures by the 
underlying firm, the positive coefficient on post event becomes statistically significant. 
This suggests that the discretionary disclosure by the closest peer may increase the bid-
ask spread of the underlying firm through heightened investors’ uncertainty over the 
interpretation of “non-disclosure” by the underlying firm. The coefficient on post 
                                                          
41
 For robustness checks, I also use the peer size calculated using different similarity thresholds in textual 
analysis and the results are largely the same. If I use a similarity threshold that defines 15% of the firm as 
peerless, the average size of the peer group becomes 8.6. If I use a similarity threshold that defines 50% of 
the firm as peerless, the average size of the peer group becomes 1.6. 
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disclosure indicator is significantly negative and similar in magnitude with the coefficient 
on post event indicator. This is consistent with discretionary disclosures by the 
underlying firm serving to remove the heightened investors’ uncertainty from peer 
disclosures. Column (3) further breaks down the indicator variables into the 
event/disclosure day and the days after the event/disclosure. The results indicate that the 
effect is generally strongest on the event/disclosure day but also sustains at a slightly 
decreasing magnitude through the 7-day window.   
In column (4), I replace the bid-ask spread with the daily trading volume as the 
dependent variable in the regression. The result shows that on the day of discretionary 
disclosure by the closest peer, there is a significant increase in trading volume by about 
6% relative to the average trading volume. On the day of discretionary disclosure by the 
underlying firm, there is a much more significant increase in trading volume by about 
69% relative to the average trading volume. If trading volume is related to the 
information content (e.g. Beaver, 1968), it suggests that the information transfer from 
peer disclosure is slightly less than 10% of the information content from 
contemporaneous/subsequent firm-initiated disclosure in this setting.  
Overall, the results provide strong support to H2 that the bid-ask spread of the 
underlying firm with no contemporaneous discretionary disclosure increases after its 
closest peer initiates business-related discretionary disclosure. This is consistent with 
peer disclosures increasing investors’ perceived probability of information arrival for the 
underlying firm and leading to heightened uncertainty over the implications of “non-
disclosure” by the underlying firm, and possibly increased assessed probability that “non-
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disclosure” by the underlying firm is due to strategic withholding of information rather 
than the absence of new information.  
4.3 Frequency of Discretionary Disclosure 
In Table 4, I conduct an industry-level analysis to test H2 by examining how the 
average annual frequency of discretionary disclosure of firms varies with the number of 
public firms in each industry. Using either NAICS 6-digit classification, SIC 4-digit 
classification or GIC 6-digit classification, I find that the number of public firms in each 
industry is strongly positively associated with the average annual frequency of 
discretionary disclosure per firm in the industry in columns (1), (3) and (5). After 
including year fixed effect in columns (2), (4) and (6) and thus only limiting to examining 
the cross-sectional variations across industries, I find similar results that the number of 
public firms in each industry is indeed positively associated with the frequency of 
discretionary disclosure. In untabulated tests, I include industry fixed effect instead of 
year fixed effect and thus focus only on the time-series variation within each industry. 
Similar results are obtained as well.  
 In Table 5, I conduct a firm-level analysis to test H2 by examining how the annual 
frequency of discretionary disclosure of firms varies with the number of comparable 
public peers identified through textual analysis on business description similarity. 
Controlling for guidance behaviors and firm characteristics in column (1), I find that the 
number of comparable public peers for each firm is significantly positively associated 
with the frequency of voluntary 8-K filings
42
. In columns (2) and (3), I find that the 
                                                          
42
 In the regression, I control for the frequency of bundled and unbundled guidance. My first chapter shows 
that more “informationally unique” firms are more likely to provide bundled guidance to compensate for 
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results in column (1) hold for the frequency of discretionary disclosure with both positive 
and negative news, with the coefficient on peer size for negative news slightly larger in 
magnitude.  In column (4), using the frequency of unbundled guidance as the dependent 
variable among a sample of guiding firms, I find similar results that the number of 
comparable public peers for a firm is positively associated with higher frequency of 
unbundled guidance, which is more discretionary in nature compared to bundled 
guidance.  
Combining Tables 4 and 5, I provide strong evidence that the size of the relevant peer 
group for a firm is positively associated with higher frequency of discretionary disclosure 
using both industry-level and firm-level analyses. This is consistent with having more 
comparable public peers increasing investors’ inferred probability of signal arrival for the 
underlying firm and thus inducing the underlying firm to provide discretionary 
disclosures more frequently.  
4.4 Timing of Discretionary Disclosure 
In Table 6, I run a simple Cox proportional hazard model to investigate how the 
similarity between the underlying firm and its close peer is related to their timing of 
discretionary disclosure. The hazard function in the model refers to the incidence of 
disclosure by another firm given that the other firm in the peer pair initiates any 
discretionary disclosure. Panel A displays the results for days apart between the 
discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the information deficiency from the lack of comparable public peers. Consistent with the presence of 
regular bundled guidance possibly preempting the need by firms to provide additional discretionary 
disclosures. I find that the coefficient on bundled guidance is significantly negative. However, as I control 
for the presence of bundled guidance in the regression, my results on peer dynamics are on top of the effect 
from the presence of guidance policy. 
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the peer firm either before or after that of the underlying firm. Panel B and C displays 
similar results but conditional on the peer firm discloses before and after the underlying 
firm respectively. The results across peer pairs from the closest peer in column (1) to the 
4
th
 closest peer in column (4) for each firm show that firms in peer pairs of the top 
similarity decile
43
 is about 20% more likely to provide discretionary disclosure than firms 
in peer pairs of the bottom similarity decile once the other firm in the pairs initiates any 
discretionary disclosure43.  
In Table 7, I use the more intuitive OLS regression model to regress the number of 
days apart between discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm and the closest 
discretionary disclosure by its close peer either before or after the underlying firm
44
. The 
table displays the results for the timing of discretionary disclosures between the 
underlying and its close peer, from the top closest peer in column (1) to the 4
th
 closest 
peer in column (4). Controlling for standard firm characteristic, the results indicate that 
the duration between the discretionary disclosures of the underlying firm and its close 
peer is about 3 to 4 days shorter, moving from peer pairs in the bottom similarity decile43 
to peer pairs in the top similarity decile43 for each column in Table 7.  
Tables 6 and 7 combined provide strong support to H3 that the similarity between a 
firm and its close peer is associated with closer timing in discretionary disclosures 
between the two firms, consistent with the potential influence of “peer dynamics” on 
                                                          
43
 Similarity deciles are calculated with respect to the similarity between the underlying firm and its closest 
peer for Column (1), between the underlying firm and its 2
nd
 closest peer for Column (2), between the 
underlying firm and its 2
nd
 closest peer for Column (2), between the underlying firm and its 3
rd
 closest peer 
for Column (3), between the underlying firm and its 4
th
 closest peer for Column (4). 
44
The results are robust to alternative specification using Poisson regression.  
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firms’ discretionary disclosure behaviors45 . This also suggests that the informational 
arrival process between firms that are more similar to each other is more correlated in 
terms of timing. For a firm that has many similar peers, it may often be subject to such 
peer dynamics whenever some of its peer firms provide any discretionary disclosure. The 
potential increase in investors’ uncertainty in H1 may thus induce these firms with many 
public peers to provide more frequent discretionary disclosures.  
4.5 Additional Analyses 
4.5.1 Controlling for Frequency of Events 
One potential alternative explanation for firms with more comparable public peers 
providing more frequent discretionary disclosures is that these firms experience more 
events. However, there does not appear to be any strong economic reasons to expect that 
firms with more public peers experience more events. For firms with more public peers, it 
is likely that outsiders have better knowledge on the incidence of events as they happen. 
Nevertheless, I attempt to control for the frequency of events happening as additional 
analyses in Table 8.  
  In column (1) of Table 8, I include a variable that represents the annual frequency of 
8-K filings that contain “Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets” 
to control for the occurrence of M&A activities. While the frequency of M&A activities 
is significantly positively associated the frequency of discretionary disclosure, the 
coefficient on peer size continues to be positive and statistically significant.  In column 
(2), I include a variable that represents the frequency of mandatory 8-K filings that do not 
                                                          
45
The results are robust to alternative samples conditional on shorter duration between discretionary 
disclosures of the underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure from its closet peer, such as 30 
days instead of 90 days in the primary sample. 
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contain Item 2.02, Item 7.01 and Item 9.01 to control for the occurrence of events that 
trigger mandatory disclosure. While the frequency of mandatory 8-K filings is also 
significantly positively associated the frequency of discretionary disclosure, the 
coefficient on peer size still continues to be positive and statistically significant.  In 
column (3), I attempt to include proxies for firm complexity by including the number of 
industrial segments and geographical segments as additional controls. The results still 
largely remain the same.  
4.5.2 Alternative Measure of Discretionary Disclosure 
In Table 5, I follow the voluntary 8-K classification scheme from the existing 
literature (e.g. Cooper et al. 2015) in using “Item 2.02 Results of Operations and 
Financial Conditions”, “Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure” or “Item 8.01 Other 
Events” to represent discretionary disclosure. However, as Item 2.02 often contains a 
firm’s earnings announcements, one may argue that Item 2.02 represents more of a 
regular disclosure policy and may not contain a large discretionary component. Thus I 
also compute the frequency of discretionary disclosure using only “Item 7.01 Regulation 
FD Disclosure” or “Item 8.01 Other Events” from 8-K filings as an alternative measure, 
in attempt to capture the more discretionary disclosures. 
In Table 9, I rerun the main analyses in Table 5 using voluntary 8-K filings that 
contain Item 7.01 and 8.01 only. The coefficients on peer size continue to be positive and 
statistically significant, similar to Table 5. In column (4), I rerun the analysis using the 
annual total number of voluntary items under Item 7.01 and Item 9.01 of 8-K filings, 
instead of the annual frequency of voluntary 8-K filings that contain either Item 7.01 or 
9.01 as the dependent variable. The results also largely stay the same.  
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4.5.3 Alternative Measure of Peer Size 
As robustness checks, I use an alternative measure of peer size computed using 
similarity in business segment distribution across firms to rerun the analyses from Table 
5 in Table 10. The results remain largely similar to Table 5 but the statistical significance 
level generally drops across all four columns. This suggests that similarity in business 
segment provides a coarser identification of peers than similarity in textual business 
description. In particular, the coefficient on peer size in column (2) becomes no longer 
significant for the frequency of discretionary disclosure with positive news. But the 
coefficients on peer size in other columns still remain statistically significant.  
4.5.4 Additional Controls 
In untabulated tests, I include additional control variables in my main test on Table 5 
for robustness checks, such as an indicator for loss firms, litigation risks proxied by high-
risk industry dummies (Francis et al. 1994), proprietary costs proxied by the frequency of 
words on protected sources of competitive advantage in 10-Ks (e.g. patents, licenses, 
copyrights), industry concentration proxied by Herfindahl index, the total number of U.S. 
public and private firms in the firm’s primary NAICS 6-digit industry, etc. The results 
stay largely the same with the addition of these extra controls 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I find that multi-firm dynamics may have a significant influence on the 
discretionary disclosure behaviors of firms. While the presence of comparable public 
peers likely expands investors’ information endowment over their related exposures, 
discretionary disclosures by peer firms may also signal information arrival, raising 
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investors’ assessed likelihood that non-disclosure is due to strategic information 
withholding rather than the absence of new information.   
Consistent with this prediction, I show that the bid-ask spread of the underlying firm 
slightly increases when its closest peer initiates discretionary disclosures, but 
subsequently decreases if the underlying firms also disclose. This suggests that firms 
cannot completely free-ride on the information transfer from the discretionary disclosures 
by peers through non-disclosure. In addition, I find that the number of comparable public 
peers is strongly positively associated with the frequency of discretionary disclosure 
using both industry-level and firm-level analyses. As further evidence of peer dynamics, I 
also show that the discretionary disclosures between the underlying firm and its closest 
peer are closer in timing if their businesses are more similar to each other.   
Overall, my paper provides strong evidence that the presence of peer dynamics 
induces firms to provide more frequent discretionary disclosures. It complements the first 
chapter of my dissertation and focuses on the interdependence among similar public firms 
in discretionary disclosure behaviors. While firms with many public peers may benefit 
from investors having an expanded information endowment from information spillover, 
investors also have better knowledge on information arrival for firms with more public 
peers. The increased perceived probability of information arrival from peer disclosure 
may make non-disclosure more costly for these firms. To remove the heighted 
uncertainty among investors whenever their peer firms provide any discretionary 
disclosure, firms with more public peers are likely induced to provide discretionary 
disclosures more frequently.   
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition 
Measures of Peer Group Size 
industry size (SIC4) The number of public firms within each SIC 4-digit code  
industry size (NAICS6) The number of public firms within each NAICS 6-digit code 
industry size (GICS6) The number of public firms within each GICS 6-digit code 
peer size (textual) The number of comparable public peers for a firm identified using 
similarity in textual business description in 10-K filings 
peer size (segment) The number of comparable public peers for a firm identified using 
similarity in business segment weighting 
Dependent Variables 
bid-ask spread Daily closing bid-ask spread over closing price 
trading volume Daily trading volume 
freq.- 8K w/ Item 2.02, 7.01, 9.01 Frequency of discretionary disclosure in a fiscal year measured 
through the frequency of 8-K filings under Item 2.02, Item 7.01 and 
Item 9.01 
freq.- voluntary 8K w/ positive 
news  
Frequency of discretionary disclosure with positive news in a fiscal 
year measured through the frequency of 8-K filings under Item 
2.02, Item 7.01 and Item 9.01 with positive excess return in the [-1 
day,+1 day] window  
freq.- voluntary 8K w/ negative 
news 
Frequency of discretionary disclosure with negative news in a fiscal 
year measured through the frequency of 8-K filings under Item 
2.02, Item 7.01 and Item 9.01 with positive excess return in the [-1 
day,+1 day] window 
freq.- 8K w/ Item 7.01, 9.01 Frequency of discretionary disclosure in a fiscal year measured 
through the frequency of 8-K filings under Item 7.01 and Item 9.01 
only 
# days apart The number of days between the discretionary disclosure by the 
underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure by its 
closest peer 
# days apart (peer discloses 
first) 
The number of days between the discretionary disclosure by the 
underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure by its 
closest peer if the closest peer discloses first 
# days apart (peer discloses 
next) 
The number of days between the discretionary disclosure by the 
underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure by its 
closest peer if the underlying firm  discloses first 
Standard Firm Controls 
mb ratio Market-to-book ratio 
stock return Cumulative stock returns over the fiscal year 
stock volatility Standard deviation of monthly returns over the fiscal year 
% inst ownership % institutional ownership 
stock beta Stock beta 
roa ratio Income before extraordinary items / total assets at the beginning of 
the year 
firm size Logarithm of total assets 
years of listing Number of years since initial public offering 
coverage Logarithm of (number of analysts + 1) 
leverage Total debt / total equity 
105 
 
Additional Controls 
frequency – 8K w /Item2.01 Frequency of 8-K filings under “Item 2.01 Completion of 
Acquisition or Disposition of Assets” to proxy for the frequency of 
M&A activities 
frequency- mandatory 8K Frequency of 8-K filings that do not contain either Item 2.02, Item 
7.01 or Item 9.01 to proxy for the frequency of events that trigger 
mandatory filings 
frequency - bundled  Frequency of bundled guidance in a fiscal year 
frequency- unbundled  Frequency of unbundled guidance in a fiscal year 
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Appendix B. Measuring Peer Group Size and Identifying Closest Peers at Firm-
Level 
1. Alternative Firm-Level Measure Based on Business Segment Data 
In addition to using primary industry classification to determine the relevant peer group at the 
industry level, I can utilize finer details of industry classification at the business segment level to 
determine the relevant peer group with similar business exposures at the firm level, similar to 
Chapter 1. Under the assumption that business exposures are similar within each business 
segment as defined by 6-digit NAICS codes, I can use similarities in business segment 
distribution to proxy for similarities in business exposures.  
Operationally, I compute cosine similarity scores across all publicly listed firms on an annual 
basis using a vector space model, which represents each firm as a vector in an n-dimensional 
Euclidean space, where n is the number of unique 6-digit NAICS business segment (~1,200) and 
the value of each vector element is the proportion of sales contribution by each segment of the 
firm.. Cosine similarity scores are calculated using the following formula: 
 
The size of peer groups based on business segment information can then be represented by the 
number of close peers with high cosine similarity score. In counting the number of close peers for 
a given firm using segment information in the additional analysis in Table 10, a similarity score 
of 0.867, equivalent to cos 30
o
, is chosen as the similarity score threshold. While the threshold is 
arbitrarily chosen, robustness checks are done using a variety of thresholds and the results are 
largely similar. 
2. Primary Firm-Level Measure Based on Textual Business Description 
Similar to the measure based on business segment information, my peer group size measure 
calculated based on textual business description replaces business segment weights by the relative 
term frequency in the business description section of 10-K filings in the vector space model. 
Similar to Chapter 1, I only include the first 2,000 words in the business description for textual 
analysis as firms tend to put the most essential parts of business description upfront but may often 
diverge on the latter part of the business description. For example, some firms may present much 
more details on items such as regulatory environment, management team profiles, etc., in the 
latter part of the business description section.   
In comparing textual similarities across firms, I apply the commonly used tf-idf (term frequency-
inverse document frequency) weighting factor, which weighs down the effects of too frequently 
occurring terms and weighs up the effects of less frequently occurring terms
46
. This is because 
                                                          
46
 Brown and Tucker (2010) also uses the tf-idf weight scheme in comparing within-firm MD&A changes. 
Instead of using tf-idf weighting factor, Hoberg and Philip (2015) only considers the binary occurrence of 
nouns and pronouns in the whole section of business description as it attempts to focus more on capturing 
product similarity. Similar to Hoberg and Philip (2015) using a 25% threshold (excluding 75% most 
common nouns and proper nouns) in calculating product similarities among firms, I also use a stopword 
threshold of 25% (excluding the 75% most common terms) but exclude extremely rare words/phrases that 
only occur once across all descriptions in calculating the similarity score in my main measure. As tf-idf 
weighting scheme is being used, my measure is not sensitive to the choice of stopword threshold. Another 
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most common terms are unlikely providing much useful information in differentiating among 
firms. Mathematically, each business description in the corpus 𝑑𝑖 is represented by a vector in the 
word space considering the distinctive power of each word (idf), where 𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗 represents the term 
frequency of word 𝑗 for firm 𝑖, 𝑖𝑑𝑓𝑗 represents the inverse document frequency of word 𝑗 and 𝑀 
is the number of unique words in the entire corpus. 
𝑑𝑖 = {𝑡𝑓𝑖1 ∗ 𝑖𝑑𝑓1, … ,  𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑑𝑓𝑗,  𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑀 ∗ 𝑖𝑑𝑓𝑀} 
The size of peer groups based on textual business description can then be similarly represented by 
the number of close peers with high cosine similarity score. In calculating the size of peer groups, 
I count the number of close peers for a given firm using a similarity score threshold that defines 
25% of the firms with no comparable peer. While the threshold is arbitrarily chosen, robustness 
checks are done using a variety of thresholds and the results are largely similar.  
Instead of assuming that all operations within a 6-digit NAICS business segment are 
homogeneous, this measure attempts to expand the scope of information set in considering the 
similarities across firms by utilizing the textual business description information in 10-K filings. 
As business section is part of mandatory disclosure governed by regulation S-K and contains 
mostly factual information, it is unlikely that certain firms would strategically choose words that 
are common or uncommon to describe their businesses, causing systematic biases in the 
measure
47
.  
3. Identifying Closest Peers Based on Textual Business Description  
In Tables 3, 6 & 7, I determine a firm’s closest peers by those firms that have the highest cosine 
similarity scores with the underlying firm in the vector space model using textual business 
description. Thus a firm’s closest peer is identified as the firm which has the highest similarity in 
10-K business description with the underlying firm. For example, following my method in 2012, 
the closest peer of Burger King Worldwide is identified as Carrols Restaurant Group; the closest 
peer of Las Vegas Sands is identified as Wynn Resorts; and the closest peer of Orbitz is identified 
as Priceline.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
major difference is that I use all pre-processed meaningful words/phrases within the first 2,000 words of 
business description. The results of the paper are robust to different combinations of parameters in 
stopword thresholds and the number of words retained from business description section.  
47
 There is fairly detailed framework under regulation S-K on the content of business description in the 10-
K filings, with over 3,800 words of extensive guidance, e.g. on products and services, raw materials, 
seasonality, intangibles, working capital, customers, order backlogs,  competition, research and 
development, regulation, number of employees, etc. However, it is possible that textual analysis based on 
business description section may suffer some noise in measurement due to differential writing styles by 
different firms. 
108 
 
Appendix C. Examples of Voluntary 8-K Filings 
 
Microsoft 
Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure  
On July 8, 2015, Microsoft Corporation (the “Company”) announced plans to restructure the 
company’s phone hardware business to better focus and align resources. The Company also 
announced the reduction of up to 7,800 positions, primarily in the phone business. As a result, in 
the quarter ending June 30, 2015 the Company will record a charge of approximately $7.6 billion 
for impairment of goodwill and assets in its Phone Hardware segment related to assets associated 
with the acquisition of the Nokia Devices and Services business. This charge has no impact on 
cash flow from operations and is non-deductible for tax purposes. Based on the new plans, the 
future prospects for the Phone Hardware segment are below original expectations. The Company 
will record a restructuring charge of approximately $750 million to $850 million in connection 
with the plan. The actions associated with the plan are expected to be substantially completed by 
the end of the calendar year and fully completed by the end of the 2016 fiscal year.  
A copy of Microsoft’s press release is provided as Exhibit 99.1 to this report.  
 
Item 8.01 Other Events.  
On May 10, 2011, Microsoft Corporation (the “Company”) and Skype Global S.à r.l. (“Skype”) 
issued a joint press release announcing that the Company had entered into a purchase agreement 
to acquire Skype for $8.5 billion in cash. A copy of the press release is attached hereto as Exhibit 
99.1.  
 
Walmart 
Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure  
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (the “company”) today announced that John E. Fleming, executive vice 
president, chief merchandising officer, Walmart U.S. will be leaving the company on August 1, 
2010.  
 
 
Item 8.01 Other Events  
The attached press release from our Seiyu business in Japan discusses business strategies and also 
reflects that approximately 30 non-performing stores in Japan will be closed in the future. While 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Walmart" or the "company") is in the process of reviewing and assessing 
the anticipated charges associated with these store closures, it currently estimates that charges 
from the closures in the aggregate will range from approximately $0.04 to $0.05 of diluted 
earnings per share from continuing operations. It is currently anticipated that these charges will 
be recorded over the next several quarters, beginning with the company’s fiscal 2015 fourth 
quarter. The company’s operations in Japan, like its other international operations, other than 
Canada, consolidate generally using a one-month lag and are based on a calendar year.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics  
The table below shows the summary descriptive statistics for the main variables in various tables 
in the paper.  
        
VARIABLES N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
              
TABLE 3       
bid-ask spread 401,693 0.828 2.459 0.065 0.187 0.663 
trading volume 402,042 2288 8801 64.4 299.7 1210 
TABLE 4       
avg. freq.- voluntary 8K(SIC4) 7,682 5.216 3.639 2.48 4.942 6.833 
industry size (SIC4) 7,682 13.95 58.25 2 5 11 
avg. freq.- voluntary 8K (NAICS6) 13,354 5.169 4.030 2 4.5 7 
industry size (NAICS6) 13,354 6.573 20.53 1 2 5 
avg. freq.- voluntary 8K (GIC4) 1,327 5.493 3.246 2.697 5.470 7.067 
industry size (GICS6) 1,327 65.36 68.41 18 39 98 
TABLES 5, 8, 9, 10       
Frequency of Discretionary Disclosure       
freq.- 8K w/ Items 2.02, 7.01, 9.01 33,277 6.118 4.504 4 5 8 
freq.- voluntary 8K w/ positive news  33,277 2.975 2.589 1 3 4 
freq.- voluntary 8K w/ negative news 33,277 3.144 2.815 1 3 4 
freq.- 8K w/ Items 7.01, 9.01 33,277 4.344 4.925 1 3 6 
Size of Peer Group       
peer size (textual) 33,277 5.061 7.547 0 2 6 
peer size (segment) 33,277 58.46 84.74 4 18 81 
Controls       
frequency – 8K w/ item2.01 33,277 0.246 0.639 0 0 0 
frequency- mandatory 8K 33,277 3.159 3.101 1 3 5 
frequency - bundled 33,277 1.598 1.838 0 0 4 
frequency- unbundled 33,277 0.580 1.140 0 0 1 
inst. ownership  33,277 0.574 0.302 0.323 0.624 0.823 
analyst coverage 33,277 1.475 0.970 0.693 1.609 2.197 
years of listing 33,277 17.42 15.01 7.036 13.14 23.00 
firm size 33,277 6.199 2.011 4.758 6.141 7.550 
stock return 33,277 17.79 69.87 -21.01 7.510 38.47 
roa ratio 33,277 0.0160 1.906 -0.0196 0.0331 0.0760 
stock beta 33,277 1.351 0.979 0.683 1.186 1.822 
mb ratio 33,277 3.125 3.803 1.244 1.998 3.429 
stock volatility 33,277 0.133 0.0810 0.0772 0.113 0.164 
leverage 33,277 0.910 2.179 0.0076 0.272 0.812 
TABLES 6,7       
# days apart 259,388 18.58 18.40 5 13 28 
# days apart (peer discloses first) 121,952 20.06 18.72 6 14 29 
# days apart (peer discloses next) 137,436 17.26 18.00 4 12 26 
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Table 2 Correlation Table  
The table below shows the correlation table between the frequency of voluntary 8K filings ((freq 
vol. 8k) under Item 2.02, Item 7.01 and Item 9.01 and the number of comparable peers identified 
using textual similarity in business description (peer size) as well as other standard firm-level 
controls. 
 
freq 
vol. 8k 
peer 
size 
inst. 
owned 
analyst 
cov. 
years 
of 
listing 
firm 
 size 
stock 
return 
roa 
ratio 
stock 
beta 
mb 
ratio 
stock 
vol. 
lev 
freq. voluntary 
8k 
1 
           
peer size 0.1211 1 
          
inst. ownership 0.1868 0.0514 1 
         
analyst coverage 0.2243 0.1556 0.5931 1 
        
years of listing 0.0443 -0.1097 0.0731 0.0381 1 
       
firm size 0.2772 0.0994 0.5813 0.6142 0.2718 1 
      
stock return 0.031 0.0042 -0.0142 -0.0501 -0.0155 -0.0226 1 
     
roa ratio -0.0076 -0.0049 0.0014 -0.004 0.0263 0.0002 0.017 1 
    
stock beta 0.0327 0.0385 0.0337 0.0934 -0.1448 -0.0682 0.0591 -0.0365 1 
   
mb ratio 0.0338 0.0069 -0.013 0.0899 -0.0291 -0.1128 0.1855 0.0858 0.0305 1 
  
stock volatility -0.0486 0.0189 -0.2569 -0.1707 -0.2044 -0.3434 0.1811 -0.0541 0.4354 0.0334 1 
 
leverage 0.102 0.0352 0.0203 -0.0043 -0.0022 0.2159 -0.0083 -0.01 0.0111 0.3078 0.038 1 
             
 
 
  
111 
 
Table 3 Changes in Bid-Ask Spread When Closest Peer Discloses 
The table below examines how the daily closing bid-ask spread of the underlying firm changes 
when its closest peer provides discretionary disclosure as well as when the underlying firm also 
subsequently provides discretionary disclosure within 7 days after its peer disclosure. Sample 
includes any voluntary 8-K filings by the closest peer (under items 2.02, 7.01 & 8.01) that are 
identified with the following event types after matching with Capital IQ database: strategic 
alliances, client announcements, corporate guidance, business expansions, business 
reorganizations, product announcements, conference calls. The date of the earliest report of the 
peer disclosure identified from the 8-K filing, instead of the filing date of 8-K, is used as the date 
of the event. The sample includes observations [-7 days, +7 days] around the event date and 
contains only peer disclosure events that are not preceded by the disclosures of the underlying 
firm. I code event date as an indicator for the date of the earliest report of the discretionary 
disclosure by the closest peer, after event as an indicator for dates following the event date [+1 
day, +7 days] , post event as an indicator for dates on and following the event date [0, +7 days]. 
In addition, I code disclose date (d) as an indicator for the date of the earliest report of the 
discretionary disclosure by the underlying firm if it is within 7 days after the event date, after 
disclosure as an indicator for dates following the disclosure date [d+1, +7 days], post event as an 
indicator for dates on and following the disclosure date [d, +7 days]. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Bid-Ask  
Spread 
Bid-Ask  
Spread 
Bid-Ask  
Spread 
Trading 
Volume 
          
post event [0, +7 days] (+) 0.010 0.088* 
  
 
(1.18) (1.80) 
  event date [day 0] (+) 
  
0.091** 141.304*** 
   
(2.17) (4.10) 
after event [+1 day, +7 days] (+) 
  
0.084 
 
   
(1.62) 
 post disclosure [+d, +7 days] (-)  -0.083* 
  
 
 (-1.79) 
  disclose date [day d] (-) 
  
-0.093* 1,580.829*** 
   
(-1.70) (3.15) 
after disclosure [+ (d+1) day, +7 
days] (-) 
  
-0.079* 
 
   
(-1.66) 
 
     Observations 401,693 401,693 401,693 401,693 
R-squared 0.615 0.615 0.615 0.787 
Event FE YES YES YES YES 
Event and day clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Industry Size and Frequency of Discretionary Disclosure 
The table below examines how the average frequency of discretionary disclosure under items 
2.02, 7.01 & 8.01 per firm within an industry varies with the number of firms within an industry 
(industry size) using various industry classification schemes. Columns (1) and (2) use the NAICS 
6-digit classification scheme. Columns (3) and (4) follow the SIC 4-digit classification scheme. 
Columns (5) and (6) use the GIC 6-digit classification scheme.  
  
NAICS 6-Digit 
Classification 
SIC 4-Digit  
Classification 
GIC 6-Digit  
Classification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLE
S 
(predicted 
sign) 
Avg. Freq. of 
Discretionary 
Disclosure Per 
Firm In 
Industry 
Avg. Freq. of 
Discretionary 
Disclosure Per 
Firm In the 
Industry 
Avg. Freq. of 
Discretionary 
Disclosure Per 
Firm In 
Industry 
Avg. Freq. of 
Discretionary 
Disclosure Per 
Firm In 
Industry 
Avg. Freq. of 
Discretionary 
Disclosure Per 
Firm In 
Industry 
Avg. Freq. of 
Discretionary 
Disclosure Per 
Firm In 
Industry 
              
industry size  0.023*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.009** 
(+) (5.08) (4.37) (4.91) (3.70) (4.33) (1.97) 
       Observations 13,354 13,354 7,662 7,662 1,327 1,327 
R-squared 0.013 0.267 0.026 0.362 0.123 0.539 
Year FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
 Industry and year clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Comparable Peer Size and Frequency of Discretionary Disclosure 
The table below examines how the frequency of discretionary disclosure of firms varies with the 
number of comparable public peers (peer size). Column (1) uses the frequency of voluntary 8-K 
filings under items 2.02, 7.01 & 8.01 as dependent variables. Columns (2) and (3) disaggregate 
total frequency of voluntary 8-K filings into those with positive news and negative news 
respectively. Column (4) uses the frequency of unbundled guidance as dependent variable among 
a sample of guiding firms.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings w/ 
Positive News 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings w/ 
Negative News 
Frequency of 
Unbundled 
Guidance 
          
peer size (+) 0.049*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.015*** 
 
(6.38) (5.79) (5.56) (4.17) 
frequency - bundled -0.117*** -0.066*** -0.050*** 
  (-4.02) (-4.11) (-2.82) 
 frequency - unbundled  0.203*** 0.133*** 0.070*** 
  (4.14) (4.78) (2.85) 
 inst. ownership 0.103 0.108 -0.005 0.067 
 
(0.33) (0.84) (-0.02) (0.89) 
analyst coverage 0.317*** 0.358*** -0.040 0.328*** 
 
(3.76) (5.90) (-0.63) (8.21) 
years of listing -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.006*** 
 
(-0.55) (-0.17) (-0.82) (3.49) 
firm size 0.532*** 0.165*** 0.368*** 0.078*** 
 
(10.65) (5.10) (10.57) (3.45) 
stock return -0.000 0.004*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 
 
(-1.28) (3.82) (-5.23) (5.31) 
roa ratio -0.018* -0.003 -0.015*** 0.301*** 
 
(-1.79) (-0.30) (-3.32) (2.60) 
stock beta -0.049 -0.055** 0.005 -0.025* 
 
(-1.13) (-1.99) (0.17) (-1.69) 
mb ratio 0.027 0.010 0.017* 0.006 
 
(1.59) (1.02) (1.89) (1.22) 
stock volatility 4.838*** 1.332*** 3.506*** 0.054 
 
(6.53) (3.16) (7.21) (0.15) 
leverage 0.078* 0.053** 0.025 -0.012 
 
(1.70) (2.17) (1.02) (-1.20) 
     Observations 33,277 33,277 33,277 16,631 
R-squared 0.330 0.249 0.261 0.097 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm and year clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 Timing of Discretionary Disclosure Using Cox Hazard Model  
Panel A: Peer Similarity and Clustering of Discretionary Disclosures  
The table below presents the Cox proportional hazard model on the number of days apart between 
discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure by its peer 
firm (either before or after the underlying firm). Hazard is denoted by peer disclosure. Columns 
(1) to (4) present the results for the closest peer to the 4
th
 closet peer respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (3) 
SAMPLES Closest Peer 2
nd
 Closest Peer 3
rd
 Closest Peer 4
th
 Closest Peer 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
          
Similarity Decile  0.159*** 0.183*** 0.170*** 0.173*** 
(+) (11.26) (13.33) (12.56) (12.64) 
     
Observations 245,202 245,507 245,621 244,379 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel B: Similarity and Clustering of Discretionary Disclosures if Peer Discloses First 
The table below presents the Cox proportional hazard model on the number of days apart between 
discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure by its peer 
firm, conditional on peer discloses before underlying firm.  
  (1) (2) (3) (3) 
SAMPLES Closest Peer 2
nd
 Closest Peer 3
rd
 Closest Peer 4
th
 Closest Peer 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
          
Similarity Decile 0.161*** 0.199*** 0.169*** 0.183*** 
(+) (9.65) (12.29) (10.59) (11.33) 
 
    Observations 121,952 122,628 123,000 122,143 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel C: Similarity and Clustering of Discretionary Disclosures if Peer Discloses Last 
The table below presents the Cox proportional hazard model on the number of days apart between 
discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure by its peer 
firm, conditional on peer discloses after underlying firm.  
  (1) (2) (3) (3) 
SAMPLES Closest Peer 2
nd
 Closest Peer 3
rd
 Closest Peer 4
th
 Closest Peer 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
Cox Hazard Model 
Coefficient 
          
Similarity Decile 0.158*** 0.167*** 0.171*** 0.162*** 
(+) (9.51) (10.38) (10.79) (10.10) 
 
    Observations 123,250 122,879 122,621 122,236 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 Peer Similarity and Timing of Discretionary Disclosure (OLS) 
The table below examines how the similarity with peer relates to the number of days apart 
between discretionary disclosure of the underlying firm and the closest discretionary disclosure 
by its peer firm (either before or after the underlying firm) using OLS regression. Columns (1) to 
(4) present the results from the closest peer to the 4
th
 closet peer for each underlying firm 
respectively.  
  (1) (1) (1) (1) 
SAMPLES Closest Peer 2
nd
 Closest Peer 3
rd
 Closest Peer 4
th
 Closest Peer 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
#Days Apart From 
Peer’s Closest 
Discretionary 
Disclosure 
#Days Apart From 
Peer’s Closest 
Discretionary 
Disclosure 
#Days Apart From 
Peer’s Closest 
Discretionary 
Disclosure 
#Days Apart From 
Peer’s Closest 
Discretionary 
Disclosure 
          
Similarity Decile -3.525*** -3.494*** -3.455*** -3.613*** 
(-) (-12.01) (-11.99) (-12.42) (-13.26) 
inst. ownership 0.263 -0.060 0.132 -0.655** 
 
(0.64) (-0.18) (0.40) (-2.01) 
analyst coverage -0.311** -0.091 -0.263** -0.064 
 
(-2.40) (-0.70) (-2.05) (-1.04) 
firm size -0.290*** -0.337*** -0.203*** -0.257** 
 
(-4.30) (-5.30) (-3.29) (-2.10) 
stock return -0.003** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(-2.46) (-0.41) (-0.30) (-0.92) 
mb ratio -0.005 -0.006 0.007 0.017 
 
(-0.21) (-0.23) (0.28) (0.78) 
roa ratio -0.966*** -0.652*** -0.872*** -0.633** 
 
(-2.92) (-3.09) (-3.65) (-2.39) 
years of listing 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 
(3.94) (6.03) (3.98) (3.91) 
stock beta -0.026 0.011 -0.042 -0.092 
 
(-0.32) (0.14) (-0.52) (-1.17) 
stock volatility 0.487 1.292 1.170 1.886* 
 
(0.44) (1.11) (1.00) (1.76) 
leverage -0.097** -0.037 -0.067 -0.115*** 
 
(-2.51) (-0.92) (-1.64) (-3.24) 
     Observations 213,586 212,386 211,882 210,736 
R-squared 0.061 0.060 0.062 0.065 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
 Firm clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 Controlling for Frequency of Events 
The table below re-examines column (1) of Table 5 attempting to control the frequency of events. 
Column (1) adds an additional control for corporate transactions by including the frequency of 8K 
filings with “Item 2.01 Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets”. Column (2) adds an 
additional control for mandatory disclosure by including the frequency of 8K filings that do not 
contain Items 2.02, 7.01 or 9.01. Column (3) adds additional controls for firm complexity by 
including the number of industrial segments and the number of geographical segments.   
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K Filings 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K Filings 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K Filings 
        
peer size (+) 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 
 
(6.43) (6.39) (4.28) 
frequency -8Ks w/ item 2.01  0.334***   
 (4.93)   
frequency- non-voluntary 8Ks  0.080***  
  (4.36)  
# industrial segments   0.040 
   (0.86) 
# geographical segments   -0.075*** 
   (-2.58) 
frequency - bundled -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.094*** 
 (-4.08) (-3.98) (-3.34) 
frequency - unbundled  0.201*** 0.199*** 0.204*** 
 (4.10) (4.05) (3.96) 
inst. ownership 0.102 0.087 0.123 
 
(0.33) (0.28) (0.41) 
analyst coverage 0.331*** 0.311*** 0.259*** 
 
(4.01) (3.74) (2.86) 
years of listing -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(-0.35) (-0.40) (-0.18) 
firm size 0.525*** 0.518*** 0.575*** 
 
(10.61) (10.14) (10.53) 
stock return -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-1.64) (-0.82) (-0.48) 
roa ratio -0.018* -0.015 -0.012 
 
(-1.78) (-1.33) (-1.26) 
stock beta -0.051 -0.051 -0.083 
 
(-1.17) (-1.21) (-1.56) 
mb ratio 0.029* 0.027 -0.000 
 
(1.72) (1.64) (-0.01) 
stock volatility 4.817*** 4.443*** 4.945*** 
 
(6.58) (5.38) (6.03) 
leverage 0.075 0.073 0.107* 
 
(1.64) (1.58) (1.91) 
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Observations 33,277 33,277 25,384 
R-squared 0.157 0.157 0.157 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm and year clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 Using Alternative Measure of Discretionary Disclosure 
The table below examines how the frequency of discretionary disclosure of firms varies with the 
number of their comparable peers (peersize). Column (1) uses the frequency of voluntary 8-K 
filings under items 7.01 & 8.01 as dependent variables. Columns (2) and (3) disaggregate total 
frequency voluntary 8-K under items 7.01 & 8.01 filings into those with positive news and 
negative news respectively. Column (4) uses the annual total number of voluntary items (items 
7.01 & 8.01) in 8-K filings as dependent variable conditional on a sample of guiding firms.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings w/ Positive 
News 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings w/ Negative 
News 
Total Number of 
Voluntary Items 
in 8-K Filings 
          
peer size (+) 0.056*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.051*** 
 
(5.87) (5.73) (5.25) (6.23) 
frequency - bundled -0.153*** -0.087*** -0.066*** -0.111*** 
 (-4.74) (-4.77) (-3.77) (-3.18) 
frequency - unbundled  0.175*** 0.104*** 0.071*** 0.270*** 
 (3.16) (3.40) (2.60) (5.94) 
inst. ownership -0.416 -0.151 -0.265 0.528 
 
(-1.19) (-1.04) (-1.01) (1.40) 
analyst coverage 0.132 0.199*** -0.067 0.326*** 
 
(1.37) (3.52) (-1.02) (2.67) 
years of listing -0.007 -0.002 -0.005* -0.016*** 
 
(-1.16) (-0.50) (-1.70) (-2.82) 
firm size 0.703*** 0.274*** 0.428*** 0.756*** 
 
(13.23) (9.76) (12.22) (12.69) 
stock return -0.001 0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-1.04) (3.91) (-8.94) (-3.63) 
roa ratio -0.029* -0.013** -0.017 -0.063*** 
 
(-1.75) (-2.08) (-1.55) (-2.88) 
stock beta -0.095* -0.052* -0.044 -0.020 
 
(-1.90) (-1.85) (-1.58) (-0.33) 
mb ratio 0.027 0.009 0.018** 0.019 
 
(1.63) (1.02) (2.06) (1.03) 
stock volatility 6.834*** 2.834*** 4.000*** 11.146*** 
 
(10.01) (10.31) (9.06) (8.09) 
leverage 0.117** 0.068*** 0.050** 0.131*** 
 
(2.51) (2.69) (2.11) (3.12) 
     Observations 33,277 33,277 33,277 33,277 
R-squared 0.106 0.087 0.089 0.330 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm and year clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10 Using Alternative Measures of Peer Size 
The table below re-examines Table 5 on the relationship between the frequency of discretionary 
disclosure of firms and the number of their comparable peers identified using business segment 
data (segment peer size) instead of using textual analysis on business description. Column (1) 
uses the frequency of voluntary 8-K filings under items 2.02, 7.01 & 8.01 as dependent variables. 
Columns (2) and (3) disaggregate total frequency voluntary 8-K filings into those with positive 
news and negative news respectively. Column (4) uses the frequency of unbundled guidance as 
dependent variable conditional on a sample of guiding firms.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
(predicted sign) 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings w/ Positive 
News 
Frequency of 
Voluntary 8K 
Filings w/ Negative 
News 
Frequency of 
Unbundled 
Guidance 
          
segment  peer size (+) 0.001** 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(2.07) (0.16) (2.42) (1.96) 
frequency - bundled -0.149*** -0.081*** -0.068*** 
  (-4.87) (-4.81) (-3.71) 
 frequency - unbundled  0.211*** 0.137*** 0.074*** 
  (4.19) (4.83) (2.89) 
 inst. ownership 0.086 0.090 -0.003 0.073 
 
(0.28) (0.69) (-0.01) (0.97) 
analyst coverage 0.378*** 0.392*** -0.014 0.340*** 
 
(4.58) (6.48) (-0.23) (8.51) 
years of listing -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.006*** 
 
(-1.02) (-0.64) (-1.17) (3.28) 
firm size 0.553*** 0.172*** 0.381*** 0.083*** 
 
(11.15) (5.37) (10.73) (3.41) 
stock return -0.000 0.004*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 
 
(-0.91) (3.89) (-5.15) (5.40) 
roa ratio -0.016 -0.003 -0.014*** 0.273** 
 
(-1.58) (-0.28) (-2.85) (2.41) 
stock beta -0.063 -0.055* -0.008 -0.031** 
 
(-1.28) (-1.83) (-0.24) (-2.26) 
mb ratio 0.022 0.009 0.013 0.003 
 
(1.32) (0.91) (1.52) (0.54) 
stock volatility 4.929*** 1.394*** 3.536*** 0.104 
 
(6.81) (3.32) (7.54) (0.29) 
leverage 0.084* 0.055** 0.030 -0.007 
 
(1.86) (2.24) (1.24) (-0.69) 
     Observations 33,277 33,277 33,277 16,631 
R-squared 0.149 0.124 0.112 0.094 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Firm and year clustered standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 3 
Searching for Close Peers:  A Comparison of Different 
Methods 
 
1. Introduction 
Industry practitioners and academic researchers are often facing the task of finding 
appropriate peer firms for benchmarking or other purposes. Industry classification has 
long been used as an important input in identifying a firm’s peers in the capital market. 
Some notable ones include the early Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system, 
Fama-French 48 industry classification (1997), North America Industry Classification 
(NAIC) system (e.g. Krishnan and Press 2003), and Global Industry Classification (GIC) 
system (e.g. Bhojraj et al. 2003), textual product-based classification by Hoberg and 
Philips (2010, 2015), etc. However, industry classification schemes alone often have their 
limitations in finding close peers as there tends to be heterogeneity within each industry 
classification and some industries may have rather coarse classification. For example, 4-
digit SIC on average has more than 70 firms in each 4-digit classification and the largest 
number of firms within a 4-digit SIC classification can reach to over 300. 
Beyond industry classification, we need some metrics to measure the degree of 
similarity between firms in our search for close comparable peers. In various contexts, 
some prior papers have attempted to use historical correlation in returns or earnings as a 
measure of similarity between firms or homogeneity among a group of firms. For 
example, Pyo and Lustgarten (1990) used the historical correlation in annual earnings and 
Parrino (1997) used return-based correlation to measure industry homogeneity within 2-
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digit SIC industries. More recently, Lee et al. (2015) even tried to use the intensity of 
internet co-searches as a measure of similarity between firms. While a variety of methods 
are being used by different papers, it is not clear how well each method performs and 
compares against one another.  
In the paper, I attempt to compare various methods that can be easily implemented to 
measure similarity between firms in the search for close comparable peer firms. Besides 
the method that uses the textual similarity in business description of 10-K filings as 
described from my earlier two chapters, I also examine various correlation-based 
methods that utilize key historical market and financial information. These include using 
correlation in daily returns over the past 1 year, correlation in monthly returns over the 
past 5 years, correlation in accounting earnings over the past 5 years, as well as 
correlation in operating cash flows over the past 5 years. In addition, I also include 
various commonly used industry classifications in my comparison tests, such as SIC, 
NAIC, GIC, etc. 
To compare the performance of each method in identifying close peers, I implement 
three sets of comparison tests. In my first test, among a subsample of firms with high 
analyst following, I examine how the top peer firm identified under each method matches 
with a benchmark sample of highly probable peer pairs identified by using analyst co-
coverage. My second test compares how each method performs in terms of the future 
comovement in daily returns, monthly returns, accounting earnings and operating cash 
flows between the top peer firm identified under each method and its base firm. In my 
third test, I compare the explanatory power of using the key valuation multiples and 
accounting ratios of the top peer firm identified under each method to explain the 
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corresponding contemporaneous key valuation multiples and accounting ratios of the 
base firm.   
My results show that my approach in using the textual similarity in business 
description performs consistently well in various comparison tests. Besides that, the 
method using historical comovement in daily returns also performs well in most 
comparison tests. Among others, these two metrics appear to provide the best measures 
of similarity in business exposure between firms. On the contrary, methods using 
historical comovement in either earnings or operating cash flows alone perform poorly in 
various comparison tests, likely due to the lack of sufficient variations with a quarterly 
data frequency in distinguishing among a large number of firms. But I also find that 
combining historical comovement in earnings or operating cash flows with industry 
classification can significantly help improve their performance in identifying close peer 
firms by limiting the search space to fewer firms.  
Not surprisingly, I show that finer industry classification generally performs better 
than coarser industry classification in identifying close peers. For example, 8-digit GICS 
generally outperforms 6-digit GICS and 4-digit SIC generally outperforms Fama-French 
48 industry classification. Among various industry classification schemes being tested, 8-
digit GICS, 8-digit NAICS and 4-digit SIC generally perform better than the others. 
Across my sample, however, I do not find that GIC performs significantly better than 
NAICS or SIC as found by Bhojraj et al. (2003). This may be due to continuous 
improvement in the NAICS system over time as my sample covers a later sample period 
relative to Bhojraj et al. (2003). 
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In further analyses, I find that there are indeed large variations in the similarity 
between the base firms and their closest peers and the degree of similarity is significantly 
positively associated with the future comovement in returns, earnings and operating cash 
flows. These translate to large variations in the future comovement in returns, earnings 
and operating cash flows across the firm-peer pairs. This means that, for some firms that 
show low comovement in returns, earnings and operating cash flows even with their 
closest peers, it will be more difficult for investors to use the information from other peer 
firms to learn about the base firm. This is related to the issue of “informational 
uniqueness” described in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
My study contributes to the growing literature on identifying comparable peers. 
Motivated by earlier studies that use different types of information in measuring 
similarity between firms, I focus on utilizing and testing several easy-to-implement 
methods that involve readily accessible data, e.g. correlation-based methods using 
historical returns, earnings and cash flows as well as textual similarity of business 
description in 10-K filings. I find that using textual similarity in business description and 
historical comovement in daily returns are the best two methods in identifying close peer 
firms.  
To the best of my knowledge, the study is also the first to compare how the historical 
comovement in various market returns and accounting information between close peer 
firms may translate into future comovement in market returns and accounting 
information. The results suggest that comovement of historical daily returns works the 
best in finding peers with the highest future comovement in both monthly returns and 
daily returns. However, using the firm-pairs’ own historical comovement in earnings / 
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operating cash flows respectively perform the best in finding peers with the highest future 
comovement in earnings / operating cash flows.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and Section 3 provides an overview of different methodology in identifying 
peer firms. Section 4 describes my tests of comparison and Section 5 presents the results 
of comparison and other additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
There has been a lot of demand in both academia and industry to search for peer 
firms. For example, relative valuation methodologies usually involve finding a set of 
comparable peer firms. The value of an asset is then compared to the value assessed by 
the market for these comparable assets. These comparable peer firms are also useful for 
benchmarking analysis. In most sell-side research reports, we may find analysts using 
peers in their research reports to compare performance and valuation across firms and 
estimate the value of the firms they cover (De Franco, et al 2015). In “pairs trading” 
strategy, traders also need to identify pairs of closely comparable firms whose prices 
should co-move in the future. In academia, researchers often need to find the most 
comparable firm to be used as a control firm in certain types of analyses, e.g. difference-
in-difference analysis.  
Industry classification has been an important input in identifying peers, especially in 
earlier academic works. It started with the commonly used SIC system, which was 
introduced in 1937 with the latest modification done in 1987. Later, NAIC system was 
developed and subsequently adopted by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget for 
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use by all governmental agencies in 1997. These two industry classification schemes are 
developed by government agencies mainly based on production and supply chain 
processes. Academics have also tested and used the GIC system, which is developed by 
Standard & Poor and Morgan Stanley Capital International on the basis of principal 
business activity. Bhojraj et al. (2003) find that GICS generally outperform these other 
two industry classification schemes. In addition to GICS, there are also several other 
industry classification schemes developed by private companies, such as Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) by FTSE and Dow Jones Industry Classification System 
(DJICS), etc.  
Academics have also attempted to use different information disclosed by firms to 
reclassify into alternative groupings. For example, Baginski (1987) used clustering 
algorithm based on business and financial risk measures to refine groups of firms that are 
similar within 4-digit SIC industries. In recent years, Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2015) 
develop an alternative method in grouping firms based on textual analysis on the 
similarity among firms’ self-reported business description in their 10-K filings to infer 
their product-market peers. In addition, there are several studies that attempt to utilize the 
judgement by informed parties in determining peer firms. Ramnath (2002) utilizes the 
choice of firm coverage by analysts in determining peer firms and categorizes firms as 
peers if at least five analysts covered the same group of firms. De Franco et al. (2015) 
directly hand-collect the peer firm selection by analysts inside samples of analyst reports. 
More recently, Lee et al. (2015) uses internet co-searches at the SEC’s EDGAR website 
to aggregate investor perception in identifying peer firms. They find that firms appearing 
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in chronologically adjacent searches by the same individual appear to be fundamentally 
similar in a variety of dimensions. 
In addition to categorizing firms into groups, in various contexts prior studies have 
also tried to come up with some metrics to capture homogeneity between two firms or 
within groups using information from financial reports or stock returns. For example, Pyo 
and Lustgarten (1990) used the historical correlation in annual earnings and Parrino 
(1997) developed a proxy for industry homogeneity using return-based correlation within 
2-digit SIC industries. Bhorraj and Lee (2002) use a valuation-based approach in the 
selection of peers by identifying peer firms as those having the closest “warranted 
multiple” with the underlying firm within the same 2-digit SIC industries. De Franco et al. 
(2011) develop a measure of financial statement comparability to capture how similar the 
firms are mapping economic events into financial statement through their accounting 
system within the same 2-digit SIC industries.  
3. Overview of Different Methodology  
In this section, I provide an overview and present the strengths and weaknesses of all 
the major methods that can be used in identifying peer firms, including using existing 
industry classification, textual similarity in business description, comovement in various 
return and accounting information,  analyst co-coverage, and internet co-searches.  
3.1 Industry Classification 
As introduced in Section 2, a significant strength of industry classification is that it is 
widely adopted both in practice and academia. In addition, industry classification should 
also be quite reliable as it is usually defined by a consistent standard either by a 
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government agency or private organization. However, industry classification alone may 
not be able to tell you how similar the firms are to each other. In particular, the size of the 
groups can be enormous for certain industry classifications. For example, 4-digit SIC on 
average has more than 70 firms in each 4-digit classification and the largest number of 
firms within a 4-digit SIC classification can reach to over 300. Thus industry 
classification may not always be able to provide sufficient fine information to select a 
few close peers for a firm.  
3.2 Textual Similarity in Business Description 
As introduced in Chapters 1 and 2, textual information in the business description 
section in annual 10-K filings provides a rich set of data points for comparing similarities 
across firms.  The much richer textual information set can help to provide a finer 
comparison across firms. Similar textual methods have also been tested by Hoberg and 
Philips (2010, 2015) in grouping firms based on product-market peers. However, it may 
be costly to implement the procedure for textual analysis, especially on parsing out the 
relevant section of the document. The data may also be subject to some measurement 
errors due to differential writing styles (e.g. choice of words) by different firms.  
3.3 Comovement in Daily Returns 
If stock returns can efficiently reflect changes in firm fundamentals on a daily basis, 
firms with highly correlated daily returns should be similar in their business exposure. 
The advantage of using stock return data is that it is readily available and stock return on 
a daily basis may be able to provide sufficiently large number of data points for 
comparison among firms. However, as the literature on price delay suggests (e.g. Hou 
and Moskowitz 2005), price of some firms may respond to information with some delays 
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due to the presence of market frictions. Thus correlation in daily return may contain some 
components that are unrelated to the common changes in firm fundamentals, potentially 
introducing some measurement errors.   
3.4 Comovement in Monthly Returns 
If monthly stock returns can efficiently reflect changes in firm fundamentals, firms 
with highly correlated monthly returns should likely be similar in their business exposure. 
Hou and Moskowitz (2005) claim that “at monthly frequencies, there is little dispersion 
in delay measures since most stocks respond to information within a month’s time”. If 
this is true, correlation in monthly returns can likely overcome the measurement problem 
associated with daily returns. However, returns on a monthly basis greatly reduce the data 
points for comparison as there are only 12 data points of variations available within a 1-
year interval. Unless monthly returns are measured over a very long period, correlation in 
monthly returns may not provide sufficient variations in differentiating among firms. 
3.5 Comovement in Earnings 
If accounting earnings can efficiently reflect changes in firm fundamentals, firms with 
highly correlated accounting earnings should likely be similar in their business exposure. 
While data on earnings are readily available for public firms and some prior research 
have also attempted to use comovement in earnings as a measure of similarity (e.g. Pyo 
and Lustgarten 1990), earnings data is available at an even much lower frequency than 
monthly return. Thus comovement in earnings may provide even fewer variations than 
monthly returns in differentiating among a large number of firms. In addition, there are 
also concerns about potential earnings management (e.g. Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) 
that may create additional measurement errors.  
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3.6 Comovement in Operating Cash Flows 
Similarly, if operating cash flows can efficiently reflect changes in firm 
fundamentals, firms with highly correlated accounting earnings should likely be similar 
in their business exposure. While operating cash flows are likely less subject to concerns 
related to earnings management, it has the same issue as earnings in that there are only 4 
observations per firm in a single year, providing limited data points for variations in 
distinguishing among a large number of firms. On the other hand, operating cash flows 
may also be affected by differential corporate policy on cash flow management.  
3.7 Analyst Co-Coverage 
Analysts appear to generally focus on following related firms that belong to the same 
industry (e.g. Mikhail, et al. 2004, Boni and Womack 2006). Thus if there are 
substantially overlap in analyst coverage between two firms, these firms are likely peer 
firms to each other. Kaustia and Rantala (2013) use this analyst-based method in defining 
peer groups and find that their method produces substantially more homogenous groups 
of firms compared to common industry classification. However, this method is subject to 
a substantial limitation that it can only be reliably applied on firms that are covered by 
many analysts. This approach does not work at all for any firms with fewer than 2 
analysts.    
3.8 Internet Co-Searches 
Lee et al. (2015) uses internet co-searches at the SEC’s EDGAR website to aggregate 
investor perception in identifying peer firms. They find that firms appearing in 
chronologically adjacent searches by the same individual appear to be fundamentally 
similar in a variety of dimensions. They also show that this method appear to dominate 6-
130 
 
digit GICS industry in their out-of-sample tests. However, this method is subject to the 
limitation that data on Internet traffic at SEC’s EDGAR website is not readily available to 
the public. It may also be subject to some measurement errors, e.g. investors may be 
searching for firms involved in certain M&A deals or searching for firms which happen 
to announce their earnings/forecasts at the same time.  
4. Comparison Tests  
In this section, I implement three sets of tests to compare the performance of each 
method in identifying close peer firms. These include examining what percentage of the 
top peer firm identified by each method matches with a sample of highly probable peer 
pairs identified by using analyst co-coverage, how the top peer firm identified by each 
method performs in its future comovement in returns, earnings and operating cash flows 
with the base firm, as well as how much the top peer firm identified by each method 
explains the base firm’s key contemporaneous valuation multiples and accounting ratios. 
The various methods being tested include using textual similarity in business 
description in 10-K filings, correlation in daily returns over the past 1 year, correlation in 
monthly returns over the past 5 years, correlation in accounting earnings over the past 5 
years, and correlation in operating cash flows over the past 5 years. For the tests that 
involve industry classification schemes, I generally include 8-digit GICS, 8-digit NAICS, 
4-digit SIC, 6-digit GICS, textual product-based classification by Hoberg and Philips 
(2010, 2015) and Fama-French 48 industry classification (1997)
48
. 
                                                          
48
 My testing sample includes all US public firms from 1996 to 2013 subject to data availability on the 
variables involved in the test. As GICS code is unavailable before 1999 from Compustat, I back-fill the 
GICS code of earlier years using the closest available GICS code in later years. I apply the same procedure 
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4.1 Benchmarking Against Analyst Co-Coverage Peers  
Due to knowledge spillover among similar firms, sell-side analysts appear to 
specialize in an industry or some related industries, presumably to economize on the costs 
of information gathering and analysis. Institutionally, brokerage houses tend to be 
organized so that individual analysts focus on a specific industry (Michaely and Womack 
1999). Thus firms that are jointly covered by the majority of their analysts are likely peer 
firms to one another. Kaustia and Rantala (2013) find that this analyst co-coverage 
method of finding peers produces substantially more homogenous groups of firms 
compared to common industry classification.  
In this exercise, my objective is to come up with a “gold standard” benchmark sample 
and see how various methodologies perform relative to the “gold standard”. As my goal 
is to first find some pairs of firms that are highly likely to be peers to each other as the 
“gold standard”, I try to use the subsample of firms that are well covered by analysts 
under the analyst co-coverage method. First, I restrict the sample of firms to those that 
are covered by 5 or more analysts to minimize measurement errors associated with few 
analysts. Instead of the simulated peer threshold used by Kaustia and Rantala (2013), I 
require at least 50% of the analysts covering the firm with the least analyst coverage to be 
covering the other firm in order to count the pair of firms as peers. For example, if 
company A is covered by 7 analysts and company B is covered by 15 analysts, the two 
companies are peer firms to each other if they are jointly covered by 4 or more analysts. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for other industry classification system as well, e.g. I assume that the NAICS codes for firms in 1996 are 
the same as in 1997.   
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Using this procedure, for each well-covered firm I compile a list of peer firms that also 
well-covered by analysts.  
The list, comprised of a subsample of well-covered firms with their well-covered 
peers, is subsequently used as a “gold standard” benchmark sample for comparisons 
among various methods being tested. While the list omits firms and their peers which are 
not well-covered by the analysts, it is unlikely that the peer pairs identified by this 
method are wrong. It may not be able to capture all possible peers with the relatively 
strict criteria imposed, especially for firms and peers that are not so well-covered by 
analysts. However, this method is likely able to capture the most relevant peers among 
the well-covered firms. According to this feature, my comparison test of the different 
methodologies examines how often the top peer firm identified through each method fall 
into the “gold standard” sample among the same subsample of well-covered firms with at 
least 5 analysts (for both the base firm as well as potential peer firms).   
Next, I try to compare how the top peers identified by each method match with the 
“gold standard” sample using the same subsample of well covered firms. A better method 
should be able to identify top peer firms that are more likely to match with the “gold 
standard” sample. In addition, to help mitigate the problem of lacking variations to 
differentiate among large number of firms with correlation data of low frequency, I 
attempt to combine industry classification information with correlation-based data points. 
In this new set of comparison, I try to limit the search space for peer firms to within the 
firm’s Fama-French 48 industry classification using correlation data in daily returns, 
correlation in monthly returns, correlation in accounting earnings, and correlation in 
operating cash flows. In further comparison tests, I also compare my textual method 
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using business description with randomly selected peer firms under various industry 
classification schemes as well as both industry and size-matched peer firms.  
4.2 Future Comovement of Key Market and Financial Variables 
Similar in spirit to explaining out-of-sample variations in monthly returns in Table 3 
of Lee et al. (2015), I examine the future comovemenet of key market and financial 
variables between the base firm and its top peer identified under different methodology. 
While Lee et al. (2015) present the results using the R
2
 from univariate regressions of 
monthly returns, I use the correlation in monthly returns in a rolling window for the next 
5 years, which can be viewed as a direct transformation from R
2
 in univariate regression.  
In addition to monthly return as examined in Lee et al. (2015), I also examine the 
comovement of daily return in the coming year, comovement of earnings in the coming 5 
years and the comovement of operating cash flows in the coming 5 years.  
More specifically, I attempt to compare the future correlation of the key market and 
accounting variables between the base firms and their top peers identified under each 
methodology. Different methodologies being considered include using textual similarity 
in business description in 10-K filings, correlation in daily returns over the past 1 year, 
correlation in monthly returns over the past 5 years, correlation in accounting earnings 
over the past 5 years, and correlation in operating cash flows over the past 5 years, 
randomly selected peer firms as well as size-matched peer firms under 8-digit GICS and 
6-digit GICS. A better method should generate top peer firms that have greater future 
comovement of key market and financial variables with the base firms.  
4.3 Explaining Contemporaneous Valuation Multiples and  Financial Ratios 
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My third comparison test largely follows Table 4 of Lee et al. (2015) in assessing the 
extent to which the top peers identified under various methodology explain the cross 
section of base firms’ valuation multiples and key financial ratios. Key valuation 
multiples under consideration include price-to-book multiples (pb), enterprise value-to-
sales multiples (evs), price-to-earnings multiples (pe). Key financial ratios under 
consideration include returns on net operating assets (rnoa), asset turnover (at), profit 
margins (pm), leverage (lev). For each variable, I run the following cross-sectional 
regression on a rolling quarterly basis where dependent variable Variablei,t is the variable 
of interest for each base firm i and the independent variable Variablep(i),t is the variable of 
interest for the top peer firm of the base firm i identified using different methods: 
Variablei,t = αt + βt Variablep(i),t + εi,t 
Then, I try to compare the R
2 
of the above regression under different methods in 
identifying top peer firms. R
2 
represents how much the information from the top peer firm 
can explain the corresponding information of the base firm. A better methodology should 
generate top peers that have greater explanatory power on the valuation multiples and 
financial ratios of the base firm. In additional comparison tests, I also compare my textual 
method using business description with randomly selected peer firms as well as size-
matched peer firms under various industry classification schemes, including 8-digit 
GICS, 8-digit NAICS, 4-digit SIC, 6-digit GICS, textual product-based classification by 
Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2015) and Fama-French 48 industry classification (1997).  
5. Results of Comparison and Additional Analyses 
5.1.Benchmarking Against Analyst Co-Coverage Peers  
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Table 1 displays the results on the percentage of the top peers identified by each 
method matching with the analyst co-coverage sample among the subsample of firms that 
are well-covered by analysts.  In Panel A, in both the full and common samples of well-
covered firms, I find that the method using textual similarity in the business description 
of 10-K filings performs the best, with its top peer to be found in the analyst co-coverage 
sample about 60% of the time. The method using historical 1-year correlation in daily 
returns appears to work the second best, matching the analyst co-coverage sample about 
38% and 49% of the time in the full and common samples. The method using 5-year 
historical correlation in monthly return generally performs worse than the method using 
correlation in daily returns. On the other hand, the methods using 5-year historical 
correlations in earnings and operating cash flows perform very poorly, matching the 
analyst co-coverage sample less than 10% of the time. These results suggest that, for 
correlation-based method, sample size is very important in distinguishing among a large 
number of firms. While daily stock returns provides a lot of variations with more than 
250 observation points within a single year, earnings and operating cash flows provide 
few variations with only 20 observation points over the course of 5 years.  
In Panel B, I combine the correlation-based methods with industry classification to 
mitigate the problem from lacking variations to distinguish among a large number of 
firms. To do this, I limit the search space for the correlation-based methods to firms 
within the same Fama-French 48 industry classification. As shown in Panel B, the 
performance of all correlation-based methods improves after combining with the 
information from industry classification. Methods using correlations in historical earnings 
and operating cash flows have the most significant improvement, benefiting the most 
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from the much smaller search space with their top peers reaching 20 to 30% matching 
with the analyst co-coverage sample.  However, the method using textual similarity in the 
business description of 10-K filings still performs the best, outperforming any 
correlation-based method combined with Fama-French 48 industry classification. 
In Panel C, I compare the method using textual similarity in the business description 
with randomly selected peers from various commonly used industry classification 
schemes, including the finest 8-digit GICS, 4-digit SIC, 8-digit NAICS industry 
classification, 6-digit GICS as used by Bhojraj, et al. (2003), Fama-French 48 industry 
classification and textual product-based classification (Hoberg and Philips 2010, 2015). 
Not surprisingly, I find that the top peer selected using textual similarity in the business 
description outperforms randomly selected peers from any industry classification. This is 
likely because there are generally some variations in the similarity with the base firm 
within each industry classification as a result of firm heterogeneity within an industry. I 
also find that finer classification appears to perform better, as evidenced by the 8-digit 
GICS performing better than the 6-digit GICS classification as well as the 4-digit SIC 
performing better than the Fama-French 48 industry classification.  
In Panel D, I further compare the method using textual similarity in the business 
description with size-matched peers from the above industry classification. Consistent 
with above, I find that the top peer selected using textual similarity in the business 
description continues to outperform size-matched peers from all the industry 
classifications. At the same time, there is also significant improvement from combining 
industry classification with firm size in selecting the top peer firm in matching with the 
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analyst co-coverage sample. It is possible that analysts may also consider similarity in 
scale in selecting their portfolio of coverage. 
Overall, the results in Table 1 suggest that using textual similarity in business 
description performs the best among various methods in identifying a firm’s closest peer 
that matches with the analyst co-coverage sample. The results also suggest that having a 
large number of observation points may be important in differentiating among a large 
number of firms. As data on earnings and operating cash flows are only available on a 
quarterly basis, methods using comovement in these financial variables alone perform 
poorly in differentiating among firms. However, combining them with industry 
classification may significantly help improve their performance by making the search 
space much smaller.  
5.2 Future Comovement of Key Market and Financial Variables 
Table 2 displays the future correlation of monthly returns, daily returns, accounting 
earnings and operating cash flows between the base firm and its top peer firm identified 
under various methods.  In Panel A, I compare various methods by examining the 
comovement of monthly returns over the next 5 years between the base firm and the top 
peer firm selected under each method.  I find that using correlation in daily returns over 
the past year performs the best in selecting the top peer firm with regards to future 
comovement in monthly returns, with correlation in future monthly returns reaching 
0.299. My method using textual similarity in business description narrowly trails behind, 
with correlation in future monthly returns reaching 0.296.  
In Panel B, I compare various methods by examining the comovement of daily 
returns over the next year between the base firm and the top peer firm selected under each 
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method.  For future comovement in daily returns, I find that correlation in daily returns 
over the past year dominates the rest, with correlation in daily returns next year reaching 
0.244. Size-matched 8-digit GICS performs the second best, with correlation in daily 
returns next year reaching 0.207. My method using textual similarity in business 
description also performs well, producing top peers with 0.196 correlation in daily returns 
next year. 
In Panel C, I compare various methods by examining the comovement of accounting 
earnings over the next 5 years between the base firm and the top peer firm selected under 
each method.  For future comovement in accounting earnings, I find that my method 
using textual similarity in business description dominates the rest, with correlation in 
future accounting earnings reaching 0.167. Correlation in past accounting earnings 
performs the second best, with correlation in future accounting earnings reaching 0.133. 
Surprisingly, correlation in past operating cash flows performs the worst, with only 0.077 
correlation in future accounting earnings.  
In Panel D, I compare various methods by examining the comovement of accounting 
earnings over the next 5 years between the base firm and the top peer firm selected under 
each method.  For future comovement in operating cash flows, I find that the method 
using correlation in the past operating cash flows performs the best, with correlation in 
operating cash flows over the next 5 years reaching 0.182. My method using textual 
similarity in business description performs the second best, with correlation in operating 
cash flows over the next 5 years reaching 0.128. Interestingly, correlation in past 
accounting earnings performs the worst. In addition, methods using correlation in 
monthly returns and daily returns also perform poorly. 
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The results in Table 2 suggest that using textual similarity in business description 
performs consistently well across the different dimensions being tested. While using 
historical correlation in daily returns performs the best for future comovement in returns, 
using textual similarity in business description consistently outperforms historical 
correlation in daily returns for future comovement in accounting variables. Interestingly, 
using the historical comovement of the variable of interest tends to perform well in each 
future comovement test of that variable. For example, using historical comovement in 
operating cash flows generates top peers that have the highest future comovement in 
operating cash flows. This suggests that the comovement of each key market and 
accounting variable between the base firm and its closest peer tends to be sticky in its 
own unique way (i.e. not predicted well by other variables).  
5.3 Explaining Contemporaneous Valuation Multiples and  Financial Ratios 
Table 3 displays the R
2
 from regressing the base firm’s key valuation multiples or 
accounting ratios on the corresponding contemporaneous variable from its top peer firm 
identified under various methods across a common sample in which data is available for 
all methods.  In Panel A, I compare my method using textual similarity in business 
description against other correlation-based methods.  I find that my method using textual 
similarity in business description performs the best in using the top peer firm’s ratios in 
explaining the base firm’s ratios across all three valuation multiples and three out of four 
financial ratios. For profit margin, using correlation of past daily returns performs the 
best among all the methods.  Consistent with the results in my prior tests, correlation 
based on accounting earnings and operating cash flows perform the worst, likely due to 
the lack of variations in differentiating firms.  
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In Panel B, I compare the method using textual similarity in the business description 
with randomly selected peers from various commonly used industry classification 
schemes, including the finest 8-digit GICS, 4-digit SIC, 8-digit NAICS industry 
classification, 6-digit GICS as used by Bhojraj, et al. (2003), Fama-French 48 industry 
classification and textual product-based classification (Hoberg and Philips 2010, 2015). I 
find that the top peer under my textual approach performs the best in explaining 
enterprise value-to-sales ratio, asset turnover ratio and leverage. Although it is the not the 
best in other ratios, my textual approach tend to perform consistently well.  For other 
ratios, 8-digit GICS performs the best in explaining price-to-book ratio and profit margin 
while 8-digit NAICS performs the best in explaining price-to-earnings ratio and return on 
net operating asset.  
In Panel C, I use size-matched peers from various industry classification schemes in 
my tests instead of randomly selected peers as in Panel B. Similarly, I find that the top 
peer under my textual approach performs the best in explaining the price-to-earnings 
ratio, enterprise value-to-sales ratio and profit margin, and also does well in other ratios. 
For other ratios, 8-digit NAICS works the best in explaining price-to-book ratio and 
leverage ratio while 4-digit SIC performs the best in explaining return on net operating 
asset and asset turnover ratio. Consistent with my prior tables, using finer industry 
classification generally outperforms, e.g. 8-digit GICS outperforms 6-digit GICS in 
almost all categories. Contrary to the findings in Bhojraj, et al. (2003), I find that 6-digit 
GICS firms do not seem to perform significantly better than 8-digit NAICS or 4-digit SIC 
for my sample of firms during my sample period. 
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Overall, the results of Table 3 are largely consistent with results in prior tables. Using 
textual similarity in business description performs consistently well across different 
valuation multiples and accounting ratios. For some ratios such as price-to-book, return 
on net operating asset, asset turnover and leverage, certain industry classification 
schemes may actually perform the best. I also find that a finer industry classification such 
as 8-digit GICS appears to dominate a coarser industry classification such as 6-digit 
GICS. In addition, my results also suggest that 8-digit GICS does not significantly 
outperform 8-digit NAICS or 4-digit SIC in my sample.   
5.4 Cross-Sectional Variations in Similarity with the Closest Peer Firms  
My prior analyses show that using textual similarity in business description and 
historical correlation in daily returns generally perform the best in identifying close peer 
firms. The next natural question is whether there are large cross-sectional variations in 
the similarity between the base firm and its top peer firm. If so, how are variations in 
similarity related to the future comovement of key market and financial variables? 
In Table 4, I examine the extent of the variations in the similarity between the base 
firm and its closest peer firm. Since the degree of similarity is measured with different 
scales for different measures (e.g. my textual similarity measure of similarity is expressed 
in terms of cosine similarity score while others are expressed in terms of correlation 
score), I try to use the extent of future comovement in key market and accounting 
variables to standardize the scale for comparison purposes.  
In Panel A of Table 4, I examine how the comovement in monthly returns between 
the base firm and its closest peer over the next 5 years varies across different quintiles of 
similarity between the base firm and its closest peer identified using various methods. I 
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find that the top peer firm identified through historical daily return comovement shows 
the most significant variations across the quintiles, ranging from 0.18 for the least similar 
quintile to 0.40 for the most similar quintile. Methods using textual business description 
and monthly returns are showing a similar scale of slightly less significant variations. 
However, methods using earnings and operating cash flows show minimal variations 
across different quintiles.  
In Panel B, I examine how the comovement in daily returns between the base firm 
and its closest peer over the next 1 year varies across different quintiles of similarity 
between the base firm and its closest peer identified using various methods. The results 
are largely similar to Panel A. Top peer identified through historical daily return 
comovement shows the most significant variations across the quintiles, ranging from 0.07 
for the least similar quintile to 0.35 for the most similar quintile, a difference of more 
than 7 times. Methods using textual business description and monthly returns are 
showing a similar scale of less significant variations while methods using earnings and 
operating cash flows only show minimal variations across different quintiles. 
In Panel C, I examine how the comovement in accounting earnings between the base 
firm and its closest peer over the next 5 years varies across different quintiles of 
similarity between the base firm and its closest peer identified using various methods. I 
find that top peer identified by my textual similarity approach shows the most significant 
variations across the quintiles, ranging from 0.11 for the least similar quintile to 0.26 for 
the most similar quintile. The method using historical correlation in daily returns shows 
slightly less significant variations across quintiles. Other methods using monthly returns, 
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earnings and operating cash flows also show some variations across the different 
quintiles, with a difference of 0.05-0.06 between the bottom and top quintile. 
In Panel D, I examine how the comovement in operating cash flows between the base 
firm and its closest peer over the next 5 years varies across different quintiles of 
similarity between the base firm and its closest peer identified using various methods. In 
this test, the top peer firm identified through historical daily return comovement shows 
the most significant variations across the quintiles, ranging from 0.08 for the least similar 
quintile to 0.19 for the most similar quintile. Methods using textual business description 
does slightly worse, ranging from 0.09 for the least similar quintile to 0.17 for the most 
similar quintile. Methods using historical correlation in earnings also show some 
variations across the quintiles, with a difference of 0.04 between the bottom and top 
quintile. However, methods using monthly returns only show minimal variations across 
different quintiles. 
In Table 5, I attempt to more directly assess how the similarity between the base firm 
and its closest peer relates to the future comovement of key market and accounting 
variables. Instead of using the quintiles as in Table 4, I directly run regression of the 
future comovement of key market and accounting variables on the raw similarity score 
between the base firm and its closest peer identified under various methods.  
Similar to the results in Table 4, the regression results in Table 5 suggest that the 
degree of similarity between the base firm and its closest peer is significantly positively 
associated with the future comovement in their key market and accounting variables. 
Across Panels A to D, almost all univariate regressions from columns (1) to (5) are 
statistically significant, except in column (5) of Panel A that similarity measured by 
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historical comovement in operating cash flow is not significantly associated with future 
comovement in monthly returns as well as in column (3) of Panel D that similarity 
measured by historical comovement in monthly return is also not significantly associated 
with future comovement in operating cash flows. Across all the panels, textual similarity 
in business description and historical correlation in daily returns show the most 
significant association with future comovement in key market and accounting variables. 
In column (6) across the panels in Table 5, I regress future comovement of market or 
accounting variables on all the similarity scores computed under different methods as 
multiple independent variables in one regression. I find that textual similarity in business 
description and historical correlation in daily returns are the only two methods that are 
consistently statistically significant in all four panels. I also find that the historical 
comovement of any particular variable is also significantly associated with the future 
comovement of that particular variable, even after controlling for other similarity scores 
computed by other methods. 
6. Summary 
In the paper, I compare various methods in searching for close comparable peer firms, 
through examining how the top peer firm identified under each method matches with a 
sample of highly probable peer pairs identified by using analyst co-coverage, how each 
method performs in their top peer firms’ future comovement in returns, earnings and 
operating cash flows with the base firm, as well as how much the top peer firm identified 
under each method can explain their base firm’s key valuation multiples and accounting 
ratios contemporaneously. Besides my method using the textual similarity in business 
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description from the earlier two chapters, I also include various easy-to-implement 
correlation-based methods using daily returns, monthly returns, accounting earnings and 
operating cash flows, along with the commonly used industry classification in my 
comparison tests.  
The results show that my approach using the textual similarity in business description 
consistently performs well in various comparison tests. The method using historical 
comovement in daily returns also performs well in most comparison tests. Among others, 
these two metrics appear to provide the best measures of similarity in business exposure 
between firms. On the contrary, methods using historical comovement in either earnings 
or operating cash flows alone perform poorly in various comparison tests, likely due to 
the lack of variations in distinguishing among a large number of firms. However, 
combining historical comovement in earnings or operating cash flows with industry 
classification can significantly help improve their performance by limiting the search 
space to much fewer firms.  
In further analyses, I find that there are indeed large variations in the similarity 
between the base firms and their closest peers and the degree of similarity is significantly 
positively associated with the future comovement in returns, earnings and operating cash 
flows. These translate to large variations in the future comovement in returns, earnings 
and operating cash flows across different firm-peer pairs. This means that, for some firms 
that show low comovement in returns, earnings and operating cash flows even with their 
closest peers, it will be more difficult for investors to use the information from other peer 
firms to learn about the base firm. This is related to the issue of “informational 
uniqueness” described in my Chapter 1.  
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While I find that textual similarity in business description and historical correlation in 
daily returns appear to the best two measures of similarity between firms, future research 
may investigate if some of these methods can be combined in some ways to minimize the 
measurement errors associated with each method. In deciding which method to choose as 
a measurement of similarity between firms, researchers may need to think about how the 
construction of the measure is related to other variables of interests. In my previous two 
chapters, I choose the textual similarity in business description in 10-K filings as my 
main measure because correlation in daily returns may be mechanically related to my 
other variables of interests, e.g. stock returns may be affected by a firm’s guidance policy 
and discretionary disclosure.  
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Table 1 Comparison of % Top Peer in Analyst Co-Coverage Sample 
The tables below display what percentage of the top peers identified by each methodology 
coincides with the analyst co-coverage sample among the subsample of firms that are well-
covered by analysts. Panel A shows the results for top peers identified by textual similarity in 
business description, correlation in daily returns, correlation in monthly returns, correlation in 
accounting earnings, and correlation in operating cash flows without imposing any restriction on 
industry membership. Panel B shows the results for the same methodology in A, but restricting 
the search space for peers to well-covered firms within the same Fama-French 48 industry 
classification for correlation in daily returns, correlation in monthly returns, correlation in 
accounting earnings, and correlation in operating cash flows (not for textual similarity in business 
description). Panel C compare the results for top peers identified by textual similarity in business 
description to randomly selected peers from various industry classification, including 8-digit 
GICS, 8-digit NAICS, 4-digit SIC, 6-digit GICS, textual product-based classification by Hoberg 
and Philips (2010, 2015) and Fama-French 48 industry classification.  Panel D compares the 
results for top peers identified by textual similarity in business description to the size-matched 
peers from various industry classification, including 8-digit GICS, 8-digit NAICS, 4-digit SIC, 6-
digit GICS, textual product-based classification by Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2015) and Fama-
French 48 industry classification. 
Panel A: Textual Method and Correlation-Based Method 
 Textual 
Similarity in  
Business 
Description  
Correlation in 
Daily Returns 
Over Past 1 
Year 
Correlation in 
Monthly 
Returns Over 
Past 5 Years 
Correlation in 
Acct. 
Earnings Over 
5 Years 
Correlation in 
Operating 
Cash Flows 
Over 5 Years 
      
Full Sample      
% Top Peer in 
Analyst  
Co-Coverage 
Sample 
0.579 0.382 0.281 0.074 0.048 
No. of 
Observation 
15419 17294 14433 12555 12162 
      
Common 
Sample 
     
% Top Peer in 
Analyst  
Co-Coverage 
Sample 
0.617 0.487 0.347 0.092 0.057 
No. of 
Observation 
4277 4277 4277 4277 4277 
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Panel B: Textual Method and Correlation-Based Method Combined with Industry 
 Textual 
Similarity in 
Business 
Description  
Correlation in 
Daily Returns 
within FF48 
Correlation in 
Monthly 
Returns within 
FF48 
Correlation in 
Acct. 
Earnings 
within FF48 
Correlation in 
Op. Cash 
Flows  within 
FF48 
      
Full Sample      
% Top Peer in 
Analyst  
Co-Coverage 
Sample 
0.579 0.471 0.425 0.254 0.230 
No. of 
Observation 
15419 17569 15969 12790 12713 
      
Common 
Sample 
     
% Top Peer in 
Analyst  
Co-Coverage 
Sample 
0.607 0.563 0.498 0.286 0.271 
No. of 
Observation 
5278 5278 5278 5278 5278 
      
Panel C: Textual Method and Industry Classification 
 Textual Randomly Selected From 
 Similarity  GIC8 NAICS8 SIC4 GIC6 TNIC FF48 
        
Full Sample        
% Top Peer 
in Analyst 
Co-Coverage 
Sample 
0.579 0.286 0.363 0.327 0.184 0.239 0.132 
No. of 
Observation 
15419 13286 13054 13473 13088 13373 13328 
        
Common 
Sample 
       
% Top Peer 
in Analyst 
Co-Coverage 
Sample 
0.620 0.325 0.397 0.374 0.215 0.257 0.142 
No. of 
Observation 
2216 2216 2216 2216 2216 2216 2216 
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Panel D: Textual Method and Industry Classification Combined with Firm Size 
 Textual 
Similarity 
Size-
matched 
from 
GIC8 
Size-
matched 
from 
NAICS8 
Size-
matched 
from 
SIC4 
Size-
matched 
from 
GIC6 
Size-
matched 
from 
TNIC 
Size-
matched 
from 
FF48 
        
Full Sample        
% Top Peer 
in Analyst 
Co-
Coverage 
Sample 
0.579 0.435 0.454 0.434 0.312 0.313 0.219 
No. of 
Observation 
15419 15645 15085 15797 15424 15758 15420 
        
Common 
Sample 
       
% Top Peer 
in Analyst 
Co-
Coverage 
Sample 
0.609 0.494 0.494 0.480 0.365 0.362 0.264 
No. of 
Observation 
6465 6465 6465 6465 6465 6465 6465 
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Table 2 Future Comovement in Key Market and Financial Variables 
The tables below display the future correlation of key market and financial variables between the 
base firm and its top peer firm identified under various methodologies. Panel A shows the results 
for the future correlation in monthly returns between the base firm and its closest peer firm. Panel 
B shows the results for the future correlation in daily returns between the base firm and its closest 
peer firm. Panel C shows the results for the future correlation in earnings between the base firm 
and its closest peer firm. Panel D shows the results for the future correlation in operating cash 
flows between the base firm and its closest peer firm. 
Panel A: Comovement in Monthly Returns in the next 5 Years 
 Mean S.D. N 
Textual Similarity in Business Description 0.296 0.221 26,445 
Correlation in Daily Returns  0.299 0.235 31,175 
Correlation in Monthly Returns 0.271 0.271 26,661 
Correlation in Earnings 0.211 0.192 20,369 
Correlation in Operating cash flows 0.199 0.187 19,877 
Random from GIC6 0.243 0.220 24,674 
Size-matched from GIC6 0.271 0.213 25,178 
Random from GIC8 0.238 0.203 24,779 
Size-matched from GIC8 0.285 0.220 25,549 
Panel B: Comovement in Daily Returns in the next 1 Year 
 Mean S.D. N 
Textual Similarity in Business Description 0.196 0.212 57,514 
Correlation in Daily Returns 0.244 0.240 65,059 
Correlation in Monthly Returns 0.196 0.224 59,799 
Correlation in Earnings 0.161 0.182 41,670 
Correlation in Operating cash flows 0.154 0.172 41,602 
Random from GIC6 0.166 0.208 53,235 
Size-matched from GIC6 0.197 0.211 53,271 
Random from GIC8 0.161 0.190 53,228 
Size-matched from GIC8 0.207 0.219 53,583 
Panel C: Comovement in Earnings in the Next 5 Years 
 Mean S.D. N 
Textual Similarity in Business Description 0.167 0.338 23,695 
Correlation in Daily Returns 0.119 0.335 25,400 
Correlation in Monthly Returns 0.111 0.333 21,466 
Correlation in Earnings 0.133 0.335 19,632 
Correlation in Operating cash flows 0.077 0.316 18,968 
Random from GIC6 0.110 0.337 22,180 
Size-matched from GIC6 0.105 0.324 22,758 
Random from GIC8 0.119 0.329 22,957 
Size-matched from GIC8 0.098 0.320 22,106 
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Panel D: Comovement in Operating Cash Flows in the Next 5 Years 
 Mean S.D. N 
Textual Similarity in Business Description 0.128 0.319 23,359 
Correlation in Daily Returns 0.085 0.311 24,582 
Correlation in Monthly Returns 0.076 0.308 20,631 
Correlation in Earnings 0.074 0.308 18,797 
Correlation in Operating cash flows 0.182 0.336 18,823 
Random from GIC6 0.084 0.319 21,889 
Size-matched from GIC6 0.078 0.306 22,475 
Random from GIC8 0.074 0.300 21,821 
Size-matched from GIC8 0.090 0.314 22,707 
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Table 3 Explaining Valuation Multiple and Accounting Ratios 
The tables below display the R
2
 from regressing the base firm’s variable about key valuation 
multiples or accounting ratios on the corresponding contemporaneous variable from its top peer 
firm identified under various methods. These variables include price-to-book multiples (PB), 
enterprise value-to-sales multiples (EVS), price-to-earnings multiples (PE), returns on net 
operating assets (RNOA), asset turnover (AT), profit margins (PM), leverage (LEV). Panel A 
shows the results for top peers identified by textual similarity in business description, correlation 
in daily returns, correlation in monthly returns, correlation in accounting earnings, and correlation 
in operating cash flows. Panel B compares the textual method to randomly selected peer from 
various industry classification, including 6-digit GICS, 8-digit GICS, 8-digit NAICS, 4-digit SIC, 
Fama-French 48 industry classification (FF48), and textual product-based classification (TNIC) 
by Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2015).  Panel C compares the textual method to size-matched peer 
from various industry classification, including 6-digit GICS, 8-digit GICS, 8-digit NAICS, 4-digit 
SIC, Fama-French 48 industry classification (FF48), and textual product-based classification 
(TNIC) by Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2015).  
Panel A:  Textual Method and Correlation-Based Methods 
   
 
N 
Textual 
Description 
Daily  
Returns 
Monthly 
Returns 
Accounting 
Earnings 
Operating 
Cash Flow 
PB 15,957 0.060 0.026 0.025 0.008 0.005 
PE 8,818 0.025 0.015 0.025 0.019 0.006 
EVS 15,957 0.281 0.236 0.230 0.031 0.043 
 
 
     
RNOA 15,976 0.052 0.019 0.016 0.007 0.000 
AT 16,224 0.478 0.388 0.249 0.147 0.105 
PM 16,224 0.162 0.184 0.141 0.082 0.048 
LEV 16,224 0.041 0.028 0.025 0.020 0.016 
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Panel B: Randomly Selected Peer from Industry Classification
49
 
 
N Textual GIC6 GIC8 NAICS SIC FF48 TNIC 
PB 3,688 0.024 0.011 0.044 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.008 
PE 1,365 0.011 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.002 0.011 
EVS 3,684 0.342 0.040 0.216 0.202 0.273 0.055 0.125 
 
 
       RNOA 3,684 0.082 0.015 0.068 0.128 0.115 0.021 0.028 
AT 3,700 0.371 0.057 0.204 0.245 0.252 0.031 0.138 
PM 3,700 0.163 0.018 0.171 0.167 0.146 0.066 0.024 
LEV 3,700 0.074 0.027 0.033 0.062 0.041 0.002 0.028 
Panel C: Size-Matched Peer from Industry Classification
49 
 
 
N Textual GIC6 GIC8 NAICS SIC FF48 TNIC 
PB 48,660 0.054 0.019 0.029 0.067 0.059 0.015 0.029 
PE 25,181 0.017 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.004 
EVS 48,660 0.340 0.122 0.232 0.241 0.272 0.111 0.215 
 
 
       RNOA 48,576 0.068 0.044 0.068 0.094 0.099 0.028 0.053 
AT 49,056 0.367 0.115 0.347 0.365 0.401 0.141 0.213 
PM 49,056 0.212 0.062 0.159 0.175 0.171 0.048 0.113 
LEV 49,056 0.036 0.017 0.054 0.027 0.028 0.009 0.018 
 
                                                          
49
 In Panel B, I do not require the availability of data to calculate the multiples and ratios before randomly 
assigning a peer firm. After requiring the availability of data for all 7 industry classification, sample size 
drops significantly from 208,645 firm-quarter observations for textual similarity method, 162,217 firm-
quarter observations for 6-digit GICS, 165,424 firm-quarter observations for 8-digit GICS, 158,037 firm-
quarter observations for 8-digit NAICS, 169,875 firm-quarter observations for 4-digit SIC, 162,754 firm-
quarter observations for Fama-French 48 industry classification and 180,507 observations for textual 
product-market based classification by Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2015). This is out of a total of 520,219 
firm-quarter observations. In Panel C, since there is an overlap in peers selected under various methods due 
to size-matching, there is a less significant drop in sample size after requiring data availability for all 7 
industry classification methods.  
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Table 4 Variations in Similarity with the Closest Peer  
The tables below display the variations in the similarity with the closest peer under different 
methods, including using textual similarity in business description, correlation in daily returns, 
correlation in monthly returns, correlation in accounting earnings, and correlation in operating 
cash flows. Panel A shows how different quintiles of similarity relate to the comovement in 
monthly returns in the next 5 years. Panel B shows how different quintiles of similarity relate to 
the comovement in daily returns in the next 1 year. Panel C shows how different quintiles of 
similarity relate to the comovement in accounting earnings in the next 5 years. Panel D shows 
how different quintiles of similarity relate to the comovement in operating cash flows in the next 
5 years. 
Panel A: Comovement in Monthly Returns in the Next 5 Years 
Quintiles of 
Similarity with 
Closest Peer 
Textual 
Business 
Description 
Daily 
Returns 
Monthly 
Returns 
Earnings Operating 
cash flows 
1 (most similar) 0.352 0.404 0.345 0.305 0.262 
2 0.307 0.308 0.314 0.265 0.259 
3 0.273 0.268 0.300 0.263 0.278 
4 0.252 0.216 0.265 0.245 0.279 
5 (least similar) 0.239 0.182 0.224 0.264 0.261 
 
Panel B: Comovement in Daily Returns in the Next 1 Year 
Quintiles of 
Similarity with 
Closest Peer 
Textual 
Business 
Description 
Daily 
Returns 
Monthly 
Returns 
Earnings Operating 
cash flows 
1 (most similar) 0.235 0.346 0.239 0.201 0.216 
2 0.208 0.233 0.220 0.226 0.221 
3 0.191 0.177 0.199 0.208 0.207 
4 0.160 0.109 0.161 0.198 0.178 
5 (least similar) 0.145 0.065 0.142 0.179 0.186 
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Panel C: Comovement in Earnings in the Next 5 Years 
Quintiles of 
Similarity with 
Closest Peer 
Textual 
Business 
Description 
Daily 
Returns 
Monthly 
Returns 
Earnings Operating 
cash flows 
1 (most similar) 0.256 0.246 0.196 0.192 0.210 
2 0.178 0.169 0.171 0.199 0.169 
3 0.149 0.143 0.166 0.179 0.162 
4 0.134 0.115 0.160 0.166 0.161 
5 (least similar) 0.109 0.115 0.135 0.136 0.160 
 
Panel D: Comovement in Operating Cash Flows in the Next 5 Years 
Quintiles of 
Similarity with 
Closest Peer 
Textual 
Business 
Description 
Daily 
Returns 
Monthly 
Returns 
Earnings Operating 
cash flows 
1 (most similar) 0.167 0.190 0.133 0.152 0.217 
2 0.131 0.127 0.122 0.144 0.125 
3 0.127 0.108 0.132 0.131 0.110 
4 0.114 0.096 0.128 0.126 0.104 
5 (least similar) 0.092 0.085 0.121 0.114 0.102 
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Table 5 Similarity with the Closest Peers and Comovement in Future Periods 
The tables below display how the similarity with the closest peer under different methods relates 
to the future comovement of key market and accounting variables using regression analysis. Panel 
A regresses the comovement in monthly returns in the next 5 years on the similarity measure 
under various methods. Panel B regresses the comovement in daily returns in the next 1 year on 
the similarity measure under various methods. Panel C regresses the comovement in accounting 
earnings in the next 5 years on the similarity measure under various methods. Panel D regresses 
the comovement in operating cash flows in the next 5 years on the similarity measure under 
various methods. Firm clustered t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel A: Comovement in Monthly Returns in the Next 5 Years 
VARIABLES 
(1) 
Future 
Monthly 
Return 
Comovement 
(2) 
Future 
Monthly 
Return 
Comovement 
(3) 
Future 
Monthly 
Return 
Comovement 
(4) 
Future 
Monthly 
Return 
Comovement 
(5) 
Future 
Monthly 
Return 
Comovement 
(6) 
Future 
Monthly 
Return 
Comovement 
              
Textual  0.457*** 
    
0.268*** 
Similarity (8.11) 
    
(3.13) 
Daily Return  
 
0.503*** 
   
0.476*** 
Comovement 
 
(5.59) 
   
(5.61) 
Monthly Return  
  
0.345*** 
  
0.169** 
Comovement 
  
(7.68) 
  
(2.16) 
Earnings  
   
0.211*** 
 
0.099 
Comovement 
   
(3.35) 
 
(1.19) 
Op. Cash Flow 
    
0.002 -0.228** 
Comovement 
    
(0.03) (-2.32) 
       Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 32,582 32,109 30,153 26,521 26,640 23,888 
R-squared 0.086 0.163 0.087 0.074 0.070 0.203 
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Panel B: Comovement in Daily Returns in the Next 1 Year 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Future Daily 
Return 
Comovement 
Future Daily 
Return 
Comovement 
Future Daily 
Return 
Comovement 
Future Daily 
Return 
Comovement 
Future Daily 
Return 
Comovement 
Future Daily 
Return 
Comovement 
              
Textual 0.395*** 
    
0.242*** 
Similarity (12.41) 
    
(4.90) 
Daily Return  
 
0.775*** 
   
0.764*** 
Comovement 
 
(17.49) 
   
(13.94) 
Monthly Return  
  
0.299*** 
  
0.042 
Comovement 
  
(8.26) 
  
(1.18) 
Earnings  
   
0.199*** 
 
0.052 
Comovement 
   
(4.89) 
 
(1.27) 
Op. Cash Flow 
    
0.275*** 0.044 
Comovement 
    
(4.24) (0.87) 
       
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 63,584 62,723 58,616 47,798 48,252 42,709 
R-squared 0.211 0.459 0.220 0.192 0.195 0.480 
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Panel C: Comovement in Earnings in the Next 5 Years 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Future 
Earnings 
Comovement 
Future 
Earnings 
Comovement 
Future 
Earnings 
Comovement 
Future 
Earnings 
Comovement 
Future 
Earnings 
Comovement 
Future 
Earnings 
Comovement 
              
Textual 0.634*** 
    
0.616*** 
Similarity (12.11) 
    
(9.97) 
Daily Return  
 
0.426*** 
   
0.364*** 
Comovement 
 
(16.27) 
   
(12.23) 
Monthly Return  
  
0.171*** 
  
0.051 
Comovement 
  
(5.07) 
  
(1.30) 
Earnings  
   
0.277*** 
 
0.151*** 
Comovement 
   
(6.13) 
 
(3.30) 
Op. Cash Flow 
    
0.265*** 0.210*** 
Comovement 
    
(4.63) (3.63) 
       Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 22,199 20,327 20,366 16,970 17,008 15,244 
R-squared 0.028 0.032 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.059 
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Panel D: Comovement in Operating Cash Flows in the Next 5 Years 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Future 
Operating 
Cash Flow 
Comovement 
Future 
Operating 
Cash Flow 
Comovement 
Future 
Operating 
Cash Flow 
Comovement 
Future 
Operating 
Cash Flow 
Comovement 
Future 
Operating 
Cash Flow 
Comovement 
Future 
Operating 
Cash Flow 
Comovement 
              
Textual 0.347*** 
    
0.368*** 
Similarity (6.56) 
    
(6.18) 
Daily Return  
 
0.306*** 
   
0.285*** 
Comovement 
 
(12.96) 
   
(10.37) 
Monthly Return  
  
0.014 
  
-0.078* 
Comovement 
  
(0.43) 
  
(-1.96) 
Earnings  
   
0.178*** 
 
0.066 
Comovement 
   
(3.93) 
 
(1.45) 
Op. Cash Flow 
    
0.613*** 0.581*** 
Comovement 
    
(9.44) (8.55) 
       
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 21,864 20,140 20,182 16,758 16,857 15,129 
R-squared 0.009 0.018 0.001 0.002 0.019 0.045 
       
 
 
  
160 
 
Bibliography 
Acharya, V. V., DeMarzo, P., & Kremer, I. (2011). Endogenous information flows and 
the clustering of announcements. American Economic Review, 101(7), 2955-2979.  
Ali, A., Klasa, S., & Yeung, E. (2009). The limitations of industry concentration 
measures constructed with compustat data: Implications for finance research. Review 
of Financial Studies, 22(10), 3839-3871.  
Amihud, Yakov, (2002), Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series 
effects, Journal of Financial Markets, 5, issue 1, p. 31-56. 
Badertscher, B., Shroff, N., & White, H. D. (2013). Externalities of public firm presence: 
Evidence from private firms' investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 
109(3), 682-706.  
Baginski, S. P. (1987). Intraindustry information transfers associated with management 
forecasts of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 25(2), 196-216.  
Baginski, S. P., Hassell, J. M., & Kimbrough, M. D. (2002). The effect of legal 
environment on voluntary disclosure: Evidence from management earnings forecasts 
issued in U.S. and canadian markets. The Accounting Review, 77(1), 25-50.  
Baiman, S., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1996). The relation among capital markets, financial 
disclosure, production efficiency, and insider trading. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 34(1), 1-22.  
BALAKRISHNAN, K., BILLINGS, M. B., KELLY, B., & LJUNGQVIST, A. (2014). 
Shaping liquidity: On the causal effects of voluntary disclosure. The Journal of 
Finance, 69(5), 2237-2278.  
Ball, R., and L. Shivakumar. (2008). How much new information is there in earnings? 
Journal of Accounting Research 46: 975-1016. 
Ball, R., Jayaraman, S., & Shivakumar, L. (2012). Audited financial reporting and 
voluntary disclosure as complements: A test of the confirmation hypothesis. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 53(1–2), 136-166.  
161 
 
Barney, J. B. (1986). Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business strategy. 
Management Science, 32(10), 1231-1241.  
Beaver, W., 1968, The information content of annual earnings announcements, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Supplement, 67-92. 
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010). The financial reporting 
environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
50(2–3), 296-343.  
Beyer, A., & Dye, R. (2012). Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings 
forecasts. Review of Accounting Studies, 17(4), 877-912.  
Bhojraj, S., & Lee, C. M. C. (2002). Who is my peer? A valuation-based approach to the 
selection of comparable firms. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(2), 407-439.  
Bhojraj, S., Lee, C. M. C., & Oler, D. K. (2003). What's my line? A comparison of 
industry classification schemes for capital market research. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 41(5), 745-774.   
Billings, M. B., Jennings, R., & Lev, B. (2015). On guidance and volatility. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 60(2–3), 161-180. 
Boni, L., & Womack, K. L. (2006). Analysts, industries, and price momentum. The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 41(1), 85-109.  
Brown, N., & Kimbrough, M. (2011). Intangible investment and the importance of firm-
specific factors in the determination of earnings. Review of Accounting Studies, 
16(3), 539-573.  
Brown, Nerissa C. and Gordon, Lawrence A. and Wermers, Russ. (2006). Herd Behavior 
in Voluntary Disclosure Decisions: An Examination of Capital Expenditure 
Forecasts. Working Paper. 
BROWN, S. V., & TUCKER, J. W. (2011). Large-sample evidence on firms? year-over-
year MD&A modifications. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(2), 309-346. 
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases 
and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), 99-126. 
162 
 
Chen, S., Matsumoto, D., & Rajgopal, S. (2011). Is silence golden? an empirical analysis 
of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 51(1–2), 134-150.  
Chuk, E., Matsumoto, D., & Miller, G. S. (2013). Assessing methods of identifying 
management forecasts: CIG vs. researcher collected. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 55(1), 23-42. 
Coller, M., & Yohn, T. L. (1997). Management forecasts and information asymmetry: An 
examination of bid-ask spreads. Journal of Accounting Research, 35(2), 181-191.  
Cooper, Michael J. and He, Jing and Plumlee, Marlene (2015), Voluntary Disclosure and 
Investor Sentiment. Working Paper. 
DE FRANCO, G., KOTHARI, S. P., & VERDI, R. S. (2011). The benefits of financial 
statement comparability. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(4), 895-931.  
Dechow, P. M., & Dichev, I. D. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of 
accrual estimation errors. Accounting Review, 77(4), 35.  
Demirakos, E. G., Strong, N. C., & Walker, M. (2004). What valuation models do 
analysts use? Accounting Horizons, 18(4), 221-240.  
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost 
of capital. The Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1325-1359.  
Dye, R. A. (1985). Disclosure of nonproprietary information. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 23(1), 123-145.  
Dye, R. A., & Sridhar, S. S. (1995). Industry-wide disclosure dynamics. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 33(1), 157-174.  
Eberhart, A. C. (2001). Comparable firms and the precision of equity valuations. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 25(7), 1367-1400.  
EINHORN, E., & ZIV, A. (2008). Intertemporal dynamics of corporate voluntary 
disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 567-589.  
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1997). Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 43(2), 153-193.  
163 
 
Fischer, P. E., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). Reporting bias. The Accounting Review, 75(2), 
229-245.  
Foster, G. (1981). Intra-industry information transfers associated with earnings releases. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 3(3), 201-232.  
Francis, J., Philbrick, D., & Schipper, K. (1994). Shareholder litigation and corporate 
disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 32(2), 137-164.  
Franco, G., Hope, O., & Larocque, S. (2015). Analysts' choice of peer companies. Review 
of Accounting Studies, 20(1), 82-109. doi:10.1007/s11142-014-9294-7  
Freeman, R., & Tse, S. (1992). An earnings prediction approach to examining 
intercompany information transfers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15(4), 
509-523.  
Glosten, L. R., & Milgrom, P. R. (1985). Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist 
market with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 
14(1), 71-100.  
Gong, G., Li, L. Y., & Zhou, L. (2013). Earnings non-synchronicity and voluntary 
disclosure. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(4), 1560-1589.  
HAIL, L. (2011). Discussion of consequences and institutional determinants of 
unregulated corporate financial statements: Evidence from embedded value 
reporting. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(2), 573-594.  
Han, J. C. Y., Wild, J. J., & Ramesh, K. (1989). Managers' earnings forecasts and intra-
industry information transfers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11(1), 3-33.  
Heinle, Mirko, Verrecchia, Robert E (2015), Bias and Commitment to Disclosure. 
Management Science, Forthcoming. 
Hoberg, G., & Phillips, G. (2010). Product market synergies and competition in mergers 
and acquisitions: A text-based analysis. Review of Financial Studies, 23(10), 3773-
3811.  
Hoberg, Gerard and Phillips, Gordon M. (2014), Product Market Uniqueness, 
Organizational Form and Stock Market Valuations. Working Paper.  
 
164 
 
Hoberg, Gerard and Phillips, Gordon M. (2015), Text-Based Network Industries and 
Endogenous Product Differentiation. Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming 
Hou, K., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2005). Market frictions, price delay, and the cross-section 
of expected returns. Review of Financial Studies, 18(3), 981-1020. 
HOUSTON, J. F., LEV, B., & TUCKER, J. W. (2010). To guide or not to guide? causes 
and consequences of stopping quarterly earnings guidanc. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 27(1), 143-185. 
Jerry, C. Y. H., & Wild, J. J. (1990). Unexpected earnings and intraindustry information 
transfers: Further evidence. Journal of Accounting Research, 28(1), 211-219.  
JORGENSEN, B. N., & KIRSCHENHEITER, M. T. (2012). Interactive discretionary 
disclosures*. Contemporary Accounting Research, 29(2), 382-397.  
Kasznik, R.. (1999). On the Association between Voluntary Disclosure and Earnings 
Management. Journal of Accounting Research, 37(1), 57–81. 
Kaustia, Markku and Rantala, Ville (2013), Common Analyst - Based Method for 
Defining Peer Firms Working paper (December 17, 2013).  
KRISHNAN, J., & PRESS, E. (2003). The north american industry classification system 
and its implications for accounting research. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
20(4), 685-717.  
Kim, I., & Skinner, D. J. (2012). Measuring securities litigation risk. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 53(1–2), 290-310.  
LAMBERT, R. A., LEUZ, C., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2012). Information asymmetry, 
information precision, and the cost of capital. Review of Finance, 16(1), 1-29.  
Landsman, W. R., Maydew, E. L., & Thornock, J. R. (2012). The information content of 
annual earnings announcements and mandatory adoption of IFRS. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 53(1–2), 34-54.  
Lee, C. M. C., Ma, P., & Wang, C. C. Y. (2015). Search-based peer firms: Aggregating 
investor perceptions through internet co-searches. Journal of Financial Economics, 
116(2), 410-431.  
165 
 
Lee, S. , Matsunaga, S. R., & Park, C. W. (2012). Management forecast accuracy and 
CEO turnover. The Accounting Review, 87(6), 2095-2122.  
Lerman, A., & Livnat, J. (2010). The new form 8-K disclosures. Review of Accounting 
Studies, 15(4), 752-778.  
Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000). The economic consequences of increased 
disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 38, 91-124.  
Li, Xi and Yang, Holly, Mandatory Financial Reporting and Voluntary Disclosure: The 
Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Management Forecasts (August 2015). The 
Accounting Review, Forthcoming. 
Litov, L. P., Moreton, P., & Zenger, T. R. (2012). Corporate strategy, analyst coverage, 
and the uniqueness paradox. Management Science, 58(10), 1797-1815.  
Matsumoto, D., Pronk, M., & Roelofsen, E. (2011). What makes conference calls useful? 
the information content of managers' presentations and analysts' discussion sessions. 
The Accounting Review, 86(4), 1383-1414. 
Michaely, R., & Womack, K. L. (1999). Conflict of interest and the credibility of 
underwriter analyst recommendations. Review of Financial Studies, 12(4), 653-686.  
Mikhail, M. B., Walther, B. R., & Willis, R. H. (2004). Do security analysts exhibit 
persistent differences in stock picking ability? Journal of Financial Economics, 
74(1), 67-91. 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., & Yu, W. (2000). The information content of stock markets: Why 
do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movement? Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58(1), 215-260.  
Parrino, R. (1997). CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 46(2), 165-197.  
Pownall, G., & Waymire, G. (1989). Voluntary disclosure choice and earnings 
information transfer. Journal of Accounting Research, 27(Current Studies on The 
Information Content of Accounting Earnings), 85-105.  
166 
 
Pyo, Y., & Lustgarten, S. (1990). Differential intra-industry information transfer 
associated with management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 13(4), 365-379.  
Ramnath, S. (2002). Investor and analyst reactions to earnings announcements of related 
firms: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(5), 1351-1376. 
Rogers, Jonathan L. and Schrand, Catherine M. and Zechman, Sarah L. C., Do Managers 
Tacitly Collude to Withhold Industry-Wide Bad News? (October 30, 2014). Chicago 
Booth Research Paper No. 13-12. 
Rogers, J. L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2013). Bundled forecasts in empirical accounting 
research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55(1), 43-65.  
Rogers, J. L., Skinner, D. J., & Van Buskirk, A. (2009). Earnings guidance and market 
uncertainty. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 48(1), 90-109. 
Skinner, Douglas J. (1994). Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news? Journal of 
Accounting Research 32 (1) (Spring): 38-60. 
THOMAS, J., & ZHANG, F. (2008). Overreaction to intra-industry information 
transfers? Journal of Accounting Research, 46(4), 909-940.  
Tse, S., & Tucker, J. (2010). Within-industry timing of earnings warnings: Do managers 
herd? Review of Accounting Studies, 15(4), 879-914.  
Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 5, 179-194.  
Woon-Oh Jung, & Kwon, Y. K. (1988). Disclosure when the market is unsure of 
information endowment of managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 26(1), 146-
153.  
 
